

KOREA'S SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Edited by Kadir Ayhan

Foreword by Enna Park
(Ambassador for Public Diplomacy)

Hangang Network
(사) 한강학술문화교류네트워크

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Edited by Kadir Ayhan

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FOREWORD

Enna Park
Ambassador for Public Diplomacy

CONGRATULATORY REMARKS

Dear ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being here today at Ewha University to attend this international graduate student conference on "Korea's Diplomacy and Soft Power." I'm Enna Park, Ambassador for Public Diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I'm honored to be speaking to you today because I see before me the next generation of diplomats, scholars, and leaders. Your curiosity and passion to learn about diplomacy is inspiring to me.

I am thankful to Ewha University's Center for Global Social Responsibility and to Prof. Kadir Ayhan for organizing this event. I'd also like to thank all our distinguished speakers and moderators, including our keynote speaker Prof. Nancy Snow and Prof. Emanuel Pastreich who moderated the D-Talk session I participated in during the last hour. Last but not least, I want to thank the Hangang Network for Academic and Cultural Exchanges for organizing activities to stimulate students' interest in the field of diplomacy. All of you are important in helping to promote Korea's image to the youth of the world, and your participation in events such as today's conference is deeply appreciated.

Today, I'd like to talk about my job and the role that public diplomacy plays in foreign affairs. When you think of diplomats, do you imagine fancy people at state dinners and cocktail parties? Actually, diplomats' lives are far more mundane. For most of our careers, we are the people who have to organize the state dinners and parties that you see in newspaper images.

In another respect, diplomats' lives are far more exciting than dinners

and cocktails. Through our networks and communication skills, we work to promote peace over war; set up structures like the Paris Climate Agreement to fight global warming; and help developing countries to rise out of poverty. Given the number of wars and crises in the world today, it appears that we have not been totally successful. But let's just say that if diplomats were not involved at all, there would be a lot more wars and poverty than currently in the world today.

Our jobs are not easy. At present, there is a paradigm shift happening in Korean politics. In the past, diplomacy was the sole purview of the government, but now it is becoming very important to win the hearts and minds of people at both home and abroad in order for a government to have legitimacy and political support. As such, public diplomacy is becoming more important, not only in foreign affairs, but also in domestic affairs. That is why we plan to open The Center for Participatory Diplomacy in April 2018. Our goal is to have 50 million Korean citizens gain knowledge about foreign policy and to build on the public's knowledge to amplify our nation's foreign policy.

At this point, you may be asking how public diplomacy works to win people's hearts and minds in support of national interest goals. In my shop, we use a wide array of public diplomacy tools including: media relations, strategic communications, advocacy campaigns, cultural promotion, educational exchanges, broadcasting, international business promotion, tourism, and branding. The effect of our work may have a short-term effect as can be seen through media relations; a medium-term effect through the result of advocacy and branding campaigns; or a long-term effect such as relationship-building through cultural and educational exchanges. The main task of public diplomacy is to select the best tools to best communicate the message.

I can summarize my job description by saying that it requires some diverse skills: policy-wonk, publicist, negotiator, and cheerleader. I enjoy my work and hope that the young leaders here today will become our future diplomats. Actually, as I think about it, all of you here are already "citizen diplomats"! You are already important actors in Korea's public diplomacy because you are sharing Korea's image with the world. Your interest Korea, your papers, talks, posts, and tweets, all help to promote Korea to others

around the world.

To conclude, I want to say to our young leaders that the world's future will be entrusted into your hands before long, and there will be many difficult challenges that you will have to overcome in order to maintain peace and prosperity on this earth. Please keep your curiosity alive, nurture your idealism, and eagerly anticipate the important tasks that await you.

Thank you.

Enna Park

29 November 2017

Introduction

Korea's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Under Moon Jae-In Administration: A Window of Opportunity

Kadir Ayhan

Toward the end of 2016, a Korean activist friend had posted on his Facebook page that the corruption scandal involving Park Geun-Hye, the then-president of Korea, had undone the efforts for promoting a good image of the country among foreigners, particularly the efforts by him and his NGO. To him and many other Koreans, Park Geun-Hye's involvement in the scandal was a cause for embarrassment. How did the President find himself involved in a close friend's con scheme, which was staged over many years? Moreover, how could the President have contributed to Korea's image as a corrupt country?

Seoul was thus engulfed in political turmoil from the latter half of 2016 to the first half of 2017. It had been revealed that two NGOs run by Choi Soon-Sil, Park's close associate, had laundered money for personal gain. It was also alleged that conglomerates had made huge donations to the NGOs in exchange for political favors from the government. The media and civil society took the issue very seriously; for months, millions of Koreans held candlelight vigils every Saturday. The protests were broadcast all over the world. In December 2016, the Parliament voted to impeach President Park Geun-Hye, and 234 members voted for her impeachment whereas 56 voted against. In March 2017, the Constitutional Court offered a unanimous verdict and upheld the impeachment. The global media interpreted this as the success of a peaceful revolt, praising the non-violent, but effective,

mobilization in Korea (see Delury, 2017; Smith, 2016; The Economist, 2017).

Some Koreans are worried that the scandal tarnishes Korea's image in the world's eyes. In contrast, there is an alternative interpretation of the recent events. According to this alternative interpretation, the impeachment demonstrates Korea's intolerance toward corruption, even if it involves political leaders and heads of conglomerates; Korea is a consolidated democracy where the media operates with satisfactory levels of freedom; Korean citizens and civil society organizations are conscious of their democratic rights and employ civil and peaceful means to protect their rights; Korea values freedom of association and that protesters are offered protection to the extent that dissenters can protest in the vicinity of the Blue House; and protesters with opposing views had protested by side without causing violence or necessitating police interference.

In the aftermath of the political crisis, this second interpretation may provide the new administration very important opportunities. This chapter addresses the opportunities available to the new Moon Jae-In administration and offers policy recommendations for the government. In the last part, the chapters in the book are introduced.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER[1]

Joseph Nye, who coined the term "soft power," defines it as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want" (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Nye argues that soft power is based on attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. However, Lee Geun (2009, 2010) argues that soft power is based on soft resources such as ideas, images, symbols, know-how, discourses, culture, and traditions. Lee defines soft power as "the power to construct the preferences and images of self and others through ideational or symbolic resources that lead to behavioral changes of others" (Lee, 2010, p. 116). Lee (2009) argues that the latter definition is analytically clearer and more applicable to non-

1 The definitions suggested here are used for the purposes of this chapter only. The views are not necessarily shared by authors of other chapters.

hegemonic countries, unlike Nye's concept, which, as per Lee, focuses on global leadership.

Soft resources are converted into soft power, intentionally or unintentionally, by creating "new ways of thinking, an attractiveness, or a fear in the minds of the recipients in the short-term," which may have long-term effects "when the short-term changes are fixed as 'common sense' or habits'" (Lee, 2009, p. 210). However, for soft resources to be converted into soft power, the former should be able to access the marketplace of ideas without being impeded by cultural holes (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010) or a cultural filter (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 102-104). Additionally, the marketplace must also be functional (Kroenig, McAdam, & Weber, 2010).

The term "public diplomacy" has been in use since the 1960s, but it became more common after Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990. The former has become even more popular since the 9/11 attacks. Contemporary approaches define public diplomacy as "an instrument used … to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). Public diplomacy is an instrument, not the only instrument, used to generate and utilize soft power (Nye, 2011; see also Hayden, 2012).

A NEW ERA IN KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Beginning last decade, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been responsive to calls for restructuring the Ministry to improve the practice of public diplomacy. Officially initiated in 2010 (Ma, Song, & Moore, 2012), evolution of Korea's public diplomacy reflects the recent development in public diplomacy practice and the academic discourses. As a result, two important changes have occurred: (i) better appreciation of the complexity of public diplomacy and (ii) structural reforms within the MOFA.

Until recently, public diplomacy was understood merely in marketing terms, as a means to brand Korea as an attractive country. In fact, creating a positive image of Korea was regarded as the ultimate goal, and the brand

marketing strategy involved one-way communication with the target audience. The Presidential Council on Nation Branding was founded during President Lee Myung-Bak's tenure to accomplish this goal. However, the Council was shut down in less than four years.

The Public Diplomacy Act[2] was passed in 2016, and it reflects the recent discourse in the field, also referred to as "new public diplomacy" (Melissen, 2005; Pamment, 2012). Of late, the complexity of public diplomacy has been acknowledged and appreciated; as a result, its scope has been extended beyond nation-branding. The act also served as the basis for founding the Public Diplomacy Committee. The Committee convened its first meeting on August 10, 2017, a year after the Act came into effect as a result of the impeachment and the ensuing political turmoil. The Committee is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and comprises representatives from the national and local governments, as well as people from the private sector and the academia. It is too early to evaluate the Committee's work, but a whole-of-government approach to public diplomacy and supplementation from the private and the non-profit sectors were necessary to overcome the lack of coordination and redundancies in Korea's public diplomacy practice (see MOFA, 2017e, p. 5; see also Taehwan Kim, 2012). In this context, the whole-government-approach is capable of integrating public diplomacy into "all aspects of diplomatic practice" without necessarily using the term "public diplomacy" (Pamment, 2016a, p. 239).

The Committee has assigned Korea Foundation (KF) to carry out public diplomacy initiatives (MOFA, 2017d). Under MOFA's leadership and KF's coordination, it is hoped that the Committee "will step up cooperation among central government agencies/between central government agencies and provincial governments, utilize the private sector's public diplomacy capabilities, and increase public awareness and social consensus about public diplomacy" (MOFA, 2017b).

Korea's First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017–2021) shall serve as a guideline for the Moon Jae-In administration. The plan was implemented in the Committee's first meeting (MOFA, 2017a) and is based on the following vision: "Attractive Korea Communicating with the World

2 See Ayhan (2016) for an overview of the Public Diplomacy Act.

Together with Citizens" (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11). In addition, it also lists four goals: (i) improving Korea's status and image using rich cultural resources, (ii) disseminating accurate information about Korea, (iii) constructing a friendly and strategically favorable environment for Korea's policies, and (iv) empowering agents of public diplomacy and encouraging collaboration among them (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11). In addition, the following strategies have been identified to achieve these goals: (i) "cultural public diplomacy," utilizing Korea's cultural resources, (ii) "knowledge public diplomacy," aiming to amend inaccurate information about Korea and promote Korean studies, (iii) "public diplomacy on policy," aiming to make Korea's policies more intelligible and accessible to other countries and to the foreign population in Korea, (iv) the "Public Diplomacy Program of Korean Citizens," which empowers Korean citizens to become citizen public diplomats, and (v) the "public diplomacy infrastructure" to enhance the efficacy of the above strategies (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11).

Furthermore, Park Enna, Korea's Public Diplomacy Ambassador, suggests that "future direction of Korea's public diplomacy" needs to move one step further from addressing only foreign publics through exchange programs, which she calls "public diplomacy 2.0," and should address also "world citizens" by contributing to global governance goals and the provision of global public goods catching up with the "most evolved" version of public diplomacy, namely "public diplomacy 3.0" (Park, 2017).

In short, public diplomacy is no longer seen as a tool to merely project a positive image of the country to foreigners through one-way branding. Moreover, it is also understood that public diplomacy requires a whole-government-approach; in other words, it has been acknowledged that the MOFA cannot do this alone and the various governmental agencies must have coordination among themselves. Citizens' involvement is also considered crucial for achieving effective public diplomacy outcomes, a significant improvement from the traditional view that regards governmental organizations as the exclusive agents of public diplomacy (MOFA, 2014, 2015, 2016).

Additionally, the developments in Korea's public diplomacy have resulted in structural reforms of the MOFA. Until recently, public diplomacy was managed exclusively by the Cultural Diplomacy Bureau,

although it was the MOFA's "Cultural Diplomacy Manual" that defined cultural diplomacy as "a subordinate concept" of public diplomacy (MOFA, 2010; see also Ayhan, 2014, pp. 135–136). As a result of the recent structural reforms, the following divisions are now responsible for public diplomacy: the Policy-Planning Directorate and the Cultural Diplomacy Bureau. The former is responsible for charting foreign policies and ensuring that the policies are communicated effectively to foreign publics. The latter continues to focus on utilizing Korea's cultural resources to fulfill public diplomacy objectives. More importantly, Korea now has a more empowered Public Diplomacy Ambassador, whose prime responsibility is to oversee public diplomacy policies and activities, and the Ambassador directly reports to the Minister (Ayhan, 2016, pp. 18–19).

TRANSFORMING THE POLITICAL CRISIS INTO OPPORTUNITIES

As explained above, Korea has, within a very short span of time, ensured that its public diplomacy policies reflect recent trends in the field and academia. What more, then, should the new administration address, especially in the aftermath of the corruption scandal and President Geun-Hye's impeachment? In this section, I attempt to address this question.

First, it is important to consolidate the recent changes in Korea's public diplomacy by pursuing the ends prescribed in the First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017–2021). The MOFA has brought together various ministries and government agencies, and it is important for the MOFA to coordinate these agencies to ensure that public diplomacy-related activities are connected to Korea's foreign policy goals (see MOFA, 2017e, p. 5). In this context, it is necessary to minimize inter-ministry or inter-agency conflicts in practice. As the Public Diplomacy Committee is led by the MOFA, the latter has the authority to integrate the programs and activities of ministries and agencies involves foreigners in order to fulfill the Committee's public diplomacy goals and, hence the MOFA's foreign policy goals. For example, the Ministry of Justice oversees the Social Integration Program for foreigners who wish to take up residence in Korea or obtain Korean citizenship. However, so far, the program has focused solely on

immigration, and it lacks both a public diplomacy agenda and an interest in foreign policies. Similarly, although the Ministry of Education (MOE) has managed the Global Korea Scholarship since 1967, it has not accommodated public diplomacy objectives. However, effective implementation of the First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy may ensure that these programs also adopt a public diplomacy perspective. This may also enable the MOFA and the Committee on Public Diplomacy to coordinate these programs.

Second, although public diplomacy is no longer understood to mean only cultural diplomacy, there is still overemphasis on the cultural programs compared to other aspects of public diplomacy listed in the Plan (MOFA, 2017e). This imbalance is due to the lack of conceptual clarity in the discourse about soft power and public diplomacy in Korea (Ayhan, 2017). Often, soft power resources, such as culture, are understood as power; but the mechanism by which resources are converted into soft power is hardly taken into consideration (Lee, 2009). Moreover, soft power is sometimes used interchangeably with public diplomacy and, worse, sometimes as an adjective for it (Ayhan, 2017).

In practice, almost all citizen initiatives supported by the MOFA's "Public Diplomacy Program of Korean Citizens" are cultural exchange programs, mainly aimed at promoting Korean music and food (see MOFA, 2017c). While cultural exchange programs are also important, other intellectual exchanges also should be encouraged and supported. For example, in the US, the State Department's Public Diplomacy Small Grants Program functions differently. The program provides funds to Korean and American civil society organizations for intellectual activities in the fields of Korea-US alliance, transnational or global challenges, and human rights, among other issues (U.S. Embassy Seoul, 2017). This program, given its focus on intellectual activities, connects opinion leaders from Korea with opinion leaders from the US. Such intellectual programs that bring Korean and foreign opinion leaders or youth leaders facilitating mutual understanding and potential future collaboration between them should also be supported and encouraged. Furthermore, the topics of such activities does not need to be about Korea. In line with the spirit of "public diplomacy 3.0" that Ambassador Park describes, the topics could cover global governance goals as well. These network-weaving initiatives based on mutually shared goals

can lead to "international collaborations" which are "sometimes … the most important form of public diplomacy" (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 22).

The long-term goals of public diplomacy are (i) building relationships and (ii) management based on genuine dialogue (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Gilboa, 2008; Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002; Nye, 2004). These goals should be embedded into all public diplomacy initiatives, including cultural or intellectual exchanges. Mere appreciation of Korean culture or food is inadequate, and in the absence of genuine relationships and dialogue, public diplomacy may not be sustainable. However, the prominence of Korean popular culture, or Hallyu, may be used as a trigger to build and maintain relationships, moving beyond promotional measures.

Similarly, it is important to question other established practices. For example, the Plan calls for a detailed strategy to promote Korean studies at the international level (MOFA, 2017e, pp. 34–35). This entails coordinating the efforts of the MOFA, the MOE, and the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports. However, it is also necessary to consider alternative means to promote Korean studies at the international level. Promoting Korean studies is not only necessary but is also one of the most significant long-term investments the Korean government can make. It is also more valuable than promoting Korean popular culture and food. Emanuel Pastreich (2016), a prominent naturalized foreign scholar in Korea, argues that

> Advertising about Korean food and talks at Harvard by Psy are ineffective for raising long-lasting respect for Korean culture and are counterproductive. To suggest that Korea is something fun waiting to be consumed is much less effective than introducing it as a set of values that has stood the test of time and will offer deep insights for those willing to make the effort.

Although it is likely to be more convenient, cheap, and possibly more effective, international education policies, in general, and Global Korea Scholarship in particular, has never been integrated with promotion of Korean Studies. Foreign students find it appealing to study in Korea on government scholarships; the MOE is responsible for ensuring the enrolment of these students and guaranteeing them satisfactory education.

The Ministry of Justice (MJ) ensures that the students get their student visas and, if necessary, limited part-time work permits as well. It is important to include this program and, indeed, other international education and student mobility programs in the public diplomacy equation (see e.g. Byrne & Hall, 2013; Byrne, 2016). The MOFA must also ensure that foreign students' experience of Korea is worthwhile as their own accounts of their experience, word-of-mouth, are both significant and arguably one of the most credible sources for other foreign students (Berger, 2016). Moreover, foreign students speak Korean language and learn about Korea not only in classes but also by living and experiencing the Korean way of life. For these reasons, foreign students in Korea may be best suited to develop expertise in the field of Korean studies.

However, the current international education policies and the scholarship program in Korea do not recognize the significance and potential of foreign students in strengthening Korean Studies worldwide, because it has not been the education-related agencies' job to do so. The Public Diplomacy Committee, however, has declared the promotion of Korean studies a significant public diplomacy goal. Therefore, the Committee must ensure that the investments (or sunk costs?) on foreign students in Korea are tied to goals related to Korean Studies. Additionally, the international student policies pursued by the MOE (or National Institute for International Education Department) and the MJ (or Immigration Office) should be aligned with the Committee's goals regarding the promotion of Korean Studies. After all, Korea is the best place for Korean Studies. Developing and promoting Korean studies in Korea requires little investment and is also highly beneficial. This is not to imply that Korean studies should not be promoted overseas. In fact, promoting this field overseas also has its merits and must be pursued with increasing emphasis.

Third, as mentioned in the first meeting of the Public Diplomacy Committee, it is important to communicate Korea's policies to foreign publics. Two aspects are important in this context: (i) ensuring that Korea's policies are understood and appreciated, or, at the very least, ensuring that they do not draw negative reactions and (ii) presenting Korea's policies as a benchmark to the developing countries, given Korea's status as a non-hegemonic and benign developed country.

Nye (2004) lists three main sources of soft power: culture, political values, and foreign policies. Political values and foreign policies are especially relevant to Korea's recent public diplomacy goal of ensuring an understanding of its policies. It is important for Korea to uphold democratic, liberal, and coherent political values, both at home and abroad, if it seeks credibility and aspires to be a model nation (Nye, 2004). Korea's foreign policies, therefore, should necessarily reflect these political values. Korea would find its credibility and integrity questioned should it pursue policies that are solely pragmatist, opportunist, and driven by self-interest.

The recent political crisis, which led to President Park Geun-Hye's impeachment, has provided Korea a great opportunity to enhance its credentials as a consolidated liberal democracy. The civil society and the media addressed the political crisis in a non-violent and democratic manner. The judiciary, too, steered clear from politics and, in doing so, confirmed that Korea's democratic values are not arbitrary.

Korea has consistently become more significant on the global stage, particularly since it hosted the G20 in 2010. Much like the other middle powers, Korea, too, has found its "niche" (Henrikson, 2005) to make up for its lack of hard resources, which great powers that constitute the G7 and BRICS possess in abundance. Initiatives such as the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth and Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation have accorded Korea importance in the context of global governance (Taekyoon Kim, 2015, p. 3). Korea, with its growing interest and participation in global governance, has situated itself as a middle power mediating between the developed world, mainly represented by the G7, and the developing world, mainly represented by BRICS member states in the G20 platform. It was in this context that the MIKTA partnership was entered into by the middle powers at the G20 summit. The MIKTA partnership involved the coming together of nation-states that were not affiliated with G7 or BRICS (except Saudi Arabia and Argentina). MIKTA is constituted by Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia. I am skeptical about the prospects of MIKTA given the incoherence in political values and interests among the five member states; however, it augurs well that Korea and Australia have been the most assertive and enthusiastic members. The Global Public Diplomacy Network, which is

constituted by public diplomacy organizations from middle power countries, was also a Korean initiative. It aims to strengthen collaboration between the middle powers. Korean policymakers believe that the collective international initiatives of the middle powers, as opposed to individual initiatives, will enable them to acquire a stronger voice in global affairs. Korea's middle power diplomacy is in line with what Nye calls "power with," as opposed to "power over," other actors, and this concept highlights the importance of cooperation to address global or transnational issues in an age of complex interdependence (2011, p. 90).

Korea's political values have not been internationally criticized or challenged much. However, given Korea's growing prominence on the global stage and its responsibilities as a significant stakeholder, more attention will be directed toward Korea's, integrity, conduct, and political values, both at home and abroad. Korea might be required to tradeoff between its short-term interests, such as tied aid or relations with certain authoritarian countries, and long-term interests as a responsible and reliable stakeholder in global governance. Therefore, its public diplomacy policies should be informed by principle-laden political values during the "take-off" stage, rather than attempting to sugarcoat "crash landings" (Kelley, 2009). In other words, Korea's political values must be negotiated, deliberated upon, and legitimated in the public sphere to ensure that the values act as philosophical guidelines (or *Weltanschauung*) for policies in the long-run. This process is also important to ensure the efficacy and integrity of Korea's policies, given their significance as a source of soft power (Habermas, 1989; Schmidt, 2008).[3]

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3 The Public Diplomacy Act and the Plan on Public Diplomacy also call for communication with domestic Korean constituents. This is done to ensure they understand the nature of public diplomacy policies and to facilitate their participation. Recently, Moon Jae-in Administration decided to democratize foreign policy and diplomacy by involving citizens in the process even more. This new policy is termed "people-centric diplomacy" (국민외교). Reflecting public opinion on foreign policies and diplomacy as well as domestic policies is a progressive sign. Particularly in terms of public diplomacy, allowing the citizens, as legitimate stakeholders, to participate in policymaking and giving them opportunities to share their opinions and experiences with the policymakers would be very beneficial. This way, the citizens would feel a stronger sense of ownership of public diplomacy policies, and their input might prove valuable for the policies. However, some cautions are in order regarding the new policy of "people-centric diplomacy." First, politicians and public opinion may trade-off long-terms interests for short-term gains. Nicolson suggests

Korea's transformation into a developed economy in a short span of time is highly acknowledged. It is also referred to as the Miracle of the Han River. The Korea International Cooperation Agency promotes Korea's development experiences and offers consultation services and bilateral ODA to developing countries. It does so by making Korea's policies accessible in the marketplace of ideas to policymakers all over the world. That Korea voluntarily translates its policies to make them more accessible to developing countries lends it great credibility. By promoting its policies, Korea also offers viable options for developing countries seeking alternative development policy options. Korea is the first country to graduate from receiving aid to a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Korea's authority in the field of International Development Cooperation stems from its expertise and capabilities (see Avant, Finnemore, & Sell, 2010).

To maintain its credibility and project itself as a responsible and reliable donor country, Korea must address problems in its development cooperation policies. This, too, must be based on the establishment of a *Weltanschauung* in order to avoid the arbitrary practices associated with a pragmatist approach (see also Taekyoon Kim, 2017). It is common for developed donor countries to be faced with the consideration of "a truly developmental perspective versus one shaped principally by diplomatic or commercial imperatives" (Black, Brown, & Heyer, 2016, p. 304; see also Pamment, 2016b). Korea needs to address the discrepancies between "the unremitting ghost of developmentalism" that brings real output expectations from ODA investments and humanitarian assistance (Taekyoon Kim, 2017, p. 2). And insofar as the guiding principles are not arbitrary, Korea can draw further authority in its relations with other actors (see Avant et al., 2010). Korea has made some progress by increasing the ratio of its untied aid from 21% in 2000 to 58% in 2015, but still falling behind OECD DAC's goal of 75%

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disaggregating diplomacy into policy and negotiation and that "diplomatists should seldom be allowed to frame policy. Politicians should seldom be allowed to conduct negotiation. Policy should be subjected to democratic control: the execution of that policy should be left to trained experts" (quoted in Clinton, 2011, p. 29-30). Second, this policy should not be seen as an extension of public diplomacy or vice versa (see e.g. MOFA, 2017f) since the goals are different. Third, the term "people-centric diplomacy" is analytically questionable.

(OECD, 2017).

The corruption crisis of Park Geun-Hye administration, which also included Korea Aid program, offers an important window of opportunity for the new government to pass reforms. And in doing so, the new administration can help elevate Korea's stature as a respectable global leader of development cooperation. Such crises offer golden opportunities to create new common knowledge by undermining "the taken-for-grantedness of these old rules and habits destabilizing the cognitive basis of existing institutions" (Van Ham, 2010, p. 11; see also Culpepper, 2008, p. 5; Haas, 1992, pp. 14-15; Klein, 2007; Young, 1989, p. 371).

It is futile to present Korea as a consolidated democracy in the aftermath of Park Geun-Hye's impeachment. The political climate in Korea is favorable for the implementation of necessary structural changes and long-term strategic plans to substantiate Korea's self-image as a consolidated democracy. Korea, having already achieved economic development and democratization in miraculously short time, possesses the capacity to further develop its public diplomacy and soft power. Korea's public diplomacy policies have been evolving over the last seven years. It has now been recognized that Korea's public diplomacy needs to address global governance-related goals (Park, 2017). These factors also indicate Korea's capacity to further develop its public diplomacy and soft power.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This book is the product of the 2017 Korea's Diplomacy and Soft Power Conference organized by Hangang Network for Academic and Cultural Exchanges, a Seoul-based NGO, at Ewha Womans' University. All chapters, except introductory chapters, are written by graduate students from diverse backgrounds and different universities. An article contest, to select the ten chapters of the book from the contest's entries, coincided with the Conference. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (MOFA) sponsored the article contest, the Conference and the book publishing process. The Ewha Womans' University's Institute for International Trade and Cooperation (IITC) generously hosted the conference. Korean

Ambassador for Public Diplomacy Enna Park gave the opening remarks at the conference following her D-Talk (Diplomatic Talk) speech, which is published as the foreword to this book. Professor Nancy Snow, one of the most prominent names in the field of public diplomacy, visited Seoul to give the keynote speech, which is published in this volume. As the editor of this book, I would like to thank the MOFA, Ambassador Enna Park, Ewha IITC, Professor Nancy Snow, Professor Brendan Howe, Professor Jeffrey Robertson, Professor Kim Taehwan, Professor Olga Krasnyak and Hangang Network, and all students who made the Conference and this book possible. In the following paragraphs, I introduce the chapters of this book.

In Chapter 1, David Baker analyzes how South Korea uses international development aid as a tool of its public diplomacy. Baker examines how South Korea's own experience of rapid development has enabled development to become a niche of its middle power diplomacy. The author explains how South Korea combines its foreign aid and development policies with public diplomacy in the following two ways. First, through projects, such as Korea Aid, South Korea uses foreign aid to help enact its public diplomacy initiatives. Second, as South Korea has recently graduated to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) club, its experience of South–South cooperation allows it to act as a bridge between different paradigms of development within the global development community.

In Chapter 2, Benjamin A. Engel compares the *Saemaul Undong* (SMU) program, which was created under the Park Chung-Hee's administration in the 1970s with the SMU program promoted as a development program overseas by the Park Geun-hye administration. Using the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a research framework, he finds that the current program is trying to supplement the program of the past so as to align it with the current values of development. Such a comparison also highlights that the SMU program of the Park Chung-Hee era had a few drawbacks in a few areas and, while achieving some development goals also operated as a mechanism for the ruling regime to build political support in rural areas.

In Chapter 3, Anaïs Faure examines South Korea's middle power diplomacy and the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the

country's foreign policy vision. In particular, the article discusses the way in which middle power diplomacy and ODA were reflected in Korea's relations with Latin American countries between 2008 and 2016. The author argues that Korea has developed a middle power identity of a "bridge country," and has played multiple roles that of a broker, facilitator, and agenda-setter by strengthening its ties with Latin American partners through network diplomacy and implementing ODA as a form of niche diplomacy.

In Chapter 4, Eriks Varpahovskis explores the education channels in Korean soft power strategy towards Uzbekistan. Varpahovskis describes how Korea advances its strategic relations with Uzbekistan by approaching selected Uzbekistan public through the implementation of multi-channeled education projects.

In Chapter 5, Penelope Vandenberghe analyzes how South Korea uses the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics as a part of its nation branding strategy to cultivate new forms of soft power and further build on the already existing soft power. Vandenberghe's chapter also deals with South Korea's efforts to use the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics to initiate dialogue with North Korea.

In Chapter 6, Sarah Kunis explores the potential of using sports as a tool of public diplomacy in the case of relations between North Korea and South Korea. Although the two Koreas remain politically divided, sports have the ability to overcome the limitations that traditional public diplomacy poses and, therefore, can play a unique role in positively influencing public opinion and shaping the relations between the two countries. Kunis' chapter examines the mechanisms of how sports diplomacy influenced inter-Korean relations during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and the 2014 Incheon Asian Games.

In Chapter 7, Sang Jun Lee examines the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup as a public diplomacy initiative of Korea. Lee discusses the nexus between sports and public diplomacy, and uses three pillars of public diplomacy, which are credibility, legitimacy, and relationships, to analyze the short- and long-term impacts of the sports mega-event on a public diplomacy perspective. Lee, further, asserts that the mutual, fluid, and flexible nature of sports make it a valuable tool to exercise public diplomacy.

In Chapter 8, inspired by Manuel Castells' highly quoted article (2008), Eduardo Tadeo analyzes the centrality of the non-state actors and the digital sphere in the public diplomacy of Korea. Tadeo examines how the Korean diaspora in the United States conducts its own public diplomacy trough digital narratives, to represent itself in the American society, and further express its interests, values and ideas.

In Chapter 9, Seksan Anantasirikiat investigates South Korea's public diplomacy efforts vis-à-vis publics of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Anantasirikiat argues that South Korea has adopted several educational and cultural programs beyond the Korean Wave (Hallyu) to build a positive image and attitudes. These public diplomacy programs have been institutionalized by engaging the international organizations, educational institutes, and the local governments to share their original ideas and responsibilities.

In Chapter 10, Seong Hee Oh examines a case of non-state actors in public diplomacy, focusing on the publication, Korean Quarterly. This was founded by a Korean American adoptees' group in Minnesota, the United States. Traditionally, Korean American adoptees group were considered just as a target of public diplomacy. However, the author suggests the group acts as a non-state actor that can express its voice and influence certain events surrounding them.

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Introduction
Public Diplomacy for Peace

Nancy Snow
Pax Mundi Professor of Public Diplomacy
Kyoto University of Foreign Studies
Keynote Speech at "Korea's Diplomacy & Soft Power"
Ewha Womans University

I'm delighted to stand before you at Ewha Womans University, founded by a Methodist missionary, Mary Scranton. This is the most prestigious women's university in Korea and one of Korea's best.

Mrs. Scranton shared something in common with my mother. They both were Massachusetts' natives. My mother married my Alabama-born father and moved to the Deep South. Mary Scranton moved from Massachusetts to Korea as the first secretary of the Women's Foreign Missionary Society.

Mary Scranton and I also share something in common. I grew up a Methodist. It was at Bon Air Methodist Church where I first sang in the youth choir. I treasure this Christian upbringing because it gave me early education into values, ethics, and service to community.

Mary Scranton was not just a pioneer in education. She was also an early public diplomat. Indeed, *The Korea Herald*, in partnership with the Independence Hall of Korea, reported about Mary Scranton's legacy in November 2016 as the 20th installment in an article series that spotlights the roles that foreign nations played in Korea's path to independence and nation-building.

> *On May 31, 1886, an individual surnamed Kim personally visited the school as she wanted to learn English to become an interpreter. This was the academy's first one-on-one English class with just one*

female student, marking the founding of Ewha Academy.

What would become Ewha Womans University provided a foundation to Korea's future public diplomacy:

- Female education and gender equality in higher education were secured by EWU
- The school, given its Christian mission, was less repressed by the Japanese government. *The students actively participated in student demonstrations from late 1929 to early 1930, during the March 1 Movement, June 10 Manse Movement, and the Gwangju Student Movement.*
- Scranton said of her work: "I have made up my mind to love the people of this country whether or not they like the work I am doing."
- Ewha served as a light to the women's movement in Korea

We all should be very proud to be on these hallowed grounds where so much of what the Republic of Korea would become was allowed to flourish. One female student receiving personal instruction from Mary Scranton in the medium of English is the very essence of what Edward R. Murrow meant by the "last three feet in face-to-face conversation."

> *It has always seemed to me the real art in this business is not so much moving information or guidance or policy five or 10,000 miles. That is an electronic problem. The real art is to move it the last three feet in face to face conversation."* Edward R. Murrow, ABC TV's "Issues and Answers," August 4, 1963.

In 2017, we must use the spirit and legacy of Mary Scranton, Edward R. Murrow, and the energy in this room, to build a renewable energy source known as power for peace. Yes, I used the word power along with peace. We are a world driven by associations of power with violence and domination. We must reclaim the power of public diplomacy. Soft power and public diplomacy are being taken for granted. Soft power is being

decimated in favor of hard power. Public diplomacy is being ignored as an integral process to global security, peace and development. It's as if we are losing our impulse for creativity and for forging paths to human coexistence. We use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the primary measure of the health of an economy. According to the Oxford Dictionary, GDP is "the total value of goods produced and services provided in a country during one year." Countries with larger GDPs get to set the rules and norms of international affairs. They often, to use Theodore Roosevelt's term, "speak softly and carry a big stick." This is known as Big stick Ideology or Big Stick Diplomacy:

> *The idea of negotiating peacefully, simultaneously threatening with the big stick, or the military, ties in heavily with the idea of Realpolitik, which implies a pursuit of political power that resembles Machiavellian ideals. It is comparable to gunboat diplomacy, as used in international politics by imperial powers.* (Wikipedia, Big Stick Ideology)

Let me suggest a new measure: PDP. Public Diplomacy for Peace is the primary measure of the global communications health of a national economy. PDP is "the total value of persuasion and influence appeal for peace provided in a country during one year." Countries with larger PDP speak convincingly and carry a large agenda of nonviolent persuasion that is focused on permanent peace outcomes. Wikipedia has no definition of Peace Diplomacy or Public Diplomacy for Peace. Why don't we add it? Why don't we use a PDP measure? There is nothing stopping us, except for our acquiescence to Machiavellian ideals and Gunboat Diplomacy.

If we now have cities and states in the United States building alternative diplomacies to the national administration, then we too can build alternative measures of a country's strength through measuring its soft power and public diplomacy tools, services, and products. For example, every foreign student residing in the Republic of Korea is a potential or actual citizen diplomat of both his/her home country and host country. These students are acting as cultural mediators—interpreters and translators or one culture to another. We need to measure their impact on mutual understanding

outcomes. It's doable, if only we made the time, effort, and contribution to better understanding the international educational exchange process. At one time we did.

Right now, the U.S. soft power apparatus is on life support. The State Department is mostly ignored. Senior diplomats are leaving government because of the devaluation of diplomacy in favor of war rhetoric and bloated military budgets. The budget of the Fulbright Program alone is slated for a reduction by 47%.

Soft power is the "complex machinery of interdependence," as Joseph Nye called it. It's an investment. Soft power is culture power. It is not military or hard power, although the military uses soft power as a tool of persuasion. I'm not in favor of soft power being coopted by those institutions that do not fully value its significance and value in international relations.

Let me share a recent experience I had. I reached out to a very prestigious institution of higher education to inquire about a possible research collaboration. I shared my background in public diplomacy specialization. I was told that the department was a "bombs and bullets" operation (hard power), and there wouldn't be a fit with any faculty because this department had no one working in the area of soft power. All the more reason to have someone, don't you think?

Sadly, our field of public diplomacy and soft power is often viewed more like a desperate tactic in our toolkit of international relations, or even a necessary evil. There is much resistance to those of us engaged in person-to-person exchange, international and intercultural communication competence. We aren't seen as heavy hitters; in other words, there isn't a military-industrial complex around soft power. You see, the threat or use of force is an investment. It makes a lot of money. There are a lot of players involved who want a piece of the pie. The threat or use of force involves big ticket items, warships, drones, nuclear stockpiles, and other means of mutual assured destruction. All we have on our side of the human equation is our commitment to elevate public diplomacy and soft power to where they belong—in the service of life preservation. There is no lobby, Silicon Valley for life preservation. We are using our technology too often for life destruction. We have barely scratched the surface of what diplomatic

solutions can do to restore good faith in international relations. We let our emotional fears lead the way and our deep pockets drive the agenda.

My friends, we are living in times that are reinforcing our national differences, contested histories, old grievances, and enemy images. We are calling heads of state "rocket man." To be sure, there are despotic regimes, but what about our despotic hearts? Can we not engage in international discourse that is rational and reasoned? Can we not assume some level of human coexistence in our discourse? Are we not all in this together? If so, then let us lead by example, let us think before we speak, let us assume that there is some common ground and room for common agreement, even if just a small stepping stone.

This is what the language and management of soft power and public diplomacy affords us—an option and opportunity to develop our better selves. and to increase our investment in personal relations and personal diplomacy over the simple, tired solutions of more battleships, tanks, and bombs.

The national security establishment is viewing this region as "all options are on the table" region. Do we realize the insanity of this conclusion? It means that a limited nuclear war is actually under consideration. This should never be any option. We who are from nations that are active and open nuclear powers must call on our governments to cease consideration for a nuclear solution to our conflicts. We must use efforts to drawn down our nuclear threats and challenge the rhetoric of violence, dehumanization, name-calling, and bullying that characterizes our lesser selves. We can do better. We must do better.

I call upon everyone gathered here today to stand up for public diplomacy and what it can do in the name of peace. Make a pledge to write letters to the editor, opinion pieces, blogs, and papers that value this subfield of international relations. Personally, I view public diplomacy as the most important fundamental communication management in the process of international relations. It isn't a substitute or a sub to anything. It is a tool for survival.

Remember, in everything you do and are that persuasion is better than force, public diplomacy and soft power are more life-affirming than hard power last results. Ask yourself, am I contributing to peace? Have we

exhausted all diplomacy efforts?

Let me quote Dr. Takeshi Matsuda, President, Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, from a speech he gave to his Fulbright alma mater, Texas A&M University:

> There is no more ennobling human aspiration than to choose a path towards human coexistence based on non-militarism.

The choice for PDP is up to us.

Let me share a fable that suggests what I prefer. Perhaps you know it. It's an Aesop fable called "The North Wind and the Sun." The North Wind and the Sun disputed as to which was the most powerful, and agreed that he should be declared the victor who could first strip a wayfaring man of his clothes. The North Wind first tried his power and blew with all his might, but the keener his blasts, the closer the Traveler wrapped his cloak around him, until at last, resigning all hope of victory, the Wind called upon the Sun to see what he could do. The Sun suddenly shone out with all his warmth. The Traveler no sooner felt his genial rays than he took off one garment after another, and at last, fairly overcome with heat, undressed and bathed in a stream that lay in his path.

Moral: Persuasion is better than Force. And Public Diplomacy is better than Gunboat Diplomacy.

South Korea and the Public Diplomacy: International Development Nexus

David John Baker

INTRODUCTION

The concept and practice of international development have changed over the last decade. The changes are mainly due to the differing development practices of emerging donors that have challenged the paradigms held by the traditional donors from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistant Committee (DAC). As a result, many governments and non-state actors have sought to enact public diplomacy initiatives through their development policies. However, the relationship between public diplomacy and international development has not received much scholarly attention. This paper, therefore, aims to address this gap, and in doing so, it seeks to contribute to the fields of public diplomacy and international development.

One may argue that the link between public diplomacy and international development is too abstract and vague to form the basis of an academic study. However, the very parameters of what can be considered public diplomacy or what it can be linked to are often rather fluid and vague as well. This is evident in how no consensus exists among public diplomacy practitioners and scholars regarding a uniform definition of public diplomacy. Definitions of public diplomacy vary widely. Nevertheless, the fact that the "USC Center on Public Diplomacy has made International Development a priority area in their work" (Pamment, 2016, p. 9) seems to confirm that the public diplomacy–development nexus is a topic worth researching. Addressing the growing importance of the public diplomacy–

development nexus, Zaharna (2010) notes that "the migration of language from development projects into public diplomacy is perhaps a reflection of the growing trend to highlight development assistance as a part of a country's public diplomacy" (p. 207).

Discussing the role of development aid and how it can be linked to public diplomacy, James Pamment (2016) sheds light on the changes that have taken place in the development field. The author highlights the significance of the Millennium Development Goals in bringing the global development community together for the very first time. He notes that while the new discourse has led "international development actors to think in terms of 'partnerships' and 'participation,' PD has also shifted its debates toward 'dialogue,' 'engagement,' and 'collaboration'" (p. 7).

This shift has led the medium powers, such as South Korea and Canada, to employ official development aid (ODA) as a part of their public diplomacy initiatives. Pamment (2016) asserts that the emergence of "non-traditional soft power and aid actors" from emerging economies (such as the BRICS and MINTS member states) has led to an increased use of "public diplomacy and targeted international development funding to support their political and economic objectives" (p. 8).

This paper analyses the ways in which South Korea uses international development aid as a tool of public diplomacy. South Korea, until recently, was a recipient of aid but graduated to become a full-fledged OECD-DAC member in 2010. South Korea's experience of rapid development, often dubbed as the "miracle of the Han River," makes for an interesting case study. Its geopolitical location, history, and size may allow for it to become a sort of bridge between the traditional donors from the Global North and the emerging donors from the Global South. Moreover, in general, South Korea can also serve as a bridge between the developed and developing countries.

South Korea, much like Canada and Australia, is often viewed as a middle power whose significance in the field of development has constantly grown. Korea has used innovative methods to foster development cooperation, and in doing so, it has been able to promote its positive image among recipient nations and other foreign audiences. This paper suggests that South Korea may be in a uniquely advantageous position to use its

experience with aid as a form of "niche diplomacy."

In an international conference in 2010 jointly organized by the Jeju Peace Institute, Korea Foundation, and U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Kim Dong-gi, a representative of Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, spoke about the context and the then current status of Korea's public diplomacy initiative. He also spoke about the challenges faced by the initiative (Kim, 2010). He stated that while traditional diplomacy still plays an important role, new areas of diplomacy that utilize "soft power assets such as culture, values, knowledge and national brand images" are increasing in importance (Kim, 2010). His speech highlighted how various non-state actors, from citizens to NGOs, have become "prominent in the diplomatic arena due to globalization, the proliferation of democracy, and the advancement of communications technology." He also spoke about the growing trend in public diplomacy that "utilizes soft power assets to promote the national image and build trust in foreign civil societies, citizens, as well as governments" (Kim, 2010).

That public diplomacy engages non-state actors, especially as a result of globalization and innovations in communication technology, is acknowledged by studies in this field. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on how to interpret the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power. Some studies use the terms *public diplomacy* and *soft power* interchangeably, whereas some studies treat them as distinctly different concepts.

As per Kim's pragmatic definition, public diplomacy refers to the "diplomatic measures to approach foreign citizens directly using art, knowledge, media, language and development assistance" (Kim, 2010). Thus, public diplomacy encompasses a wide array of fields. In the Korean context, this can be seen in the cooperation between the government and other organizations. This paper focuses on the relationship between Korean public diplomacy and its development assistance. More precisely, this paper asks the following question: how does South Korea use development as a tool for public diplomacy?

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on qualitative research as well as theories and concepts that address the public diplomacy–development nexus. This study also relies on a wide array of academic journals and studies, government statements and releases, and other news and media sources regarding public diplomacy and development. The materials address the links between public diplomacy and development in general and public diplomacy and development initiatives in Korea in particular. Interviews were also conducted with students of the Korean Development Institute (KDI) to better understand the Korean context.

This paper is divided into two sections. First, it describes the relationship between public diplomacy and international development using (i) Zielińska's (2016) theory of development diplomacy and (ii) Pamment's (2016) three levels of analysis on the intersection between public diplomacy and international development. Second, the paper sheds light on South Korea's public diplomacy and its relationship with international development. It also focuses on the concept of niche diplomacy and its relationship with public diplomacy and development. The paper also argues that South Korea is a middle-power democracy with great potential to exploit its expertise (niche) in development as a tool for its public diplomacy initiatives. To this end, this paper examines the theories put forth by Zielińska (2016) and Pamment (2016) and offers empirical evidence to support the theories' claims. It does so by examining the links between public diplomacy initiatives and international development. It is in this context that the projects initiated by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) are studied. South Korea's public diplomacy–development nexus is examined by analyzing KOICA's programs. Other relevant aspects of the South Korean public diplomacy–development nexus are also discussed. Finally, a few concluding remarks are made about the ways in which South Korea uses development as a tool of public diplomacy.

THEORIES OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH DEVELOPMENT

The emergence of new donors has altered the understanding of aid or ODA as their methods of supplying resources to developing countries are less clearly defined. Moreover, the idea of what can be defined as aid is becoming increasingly blurred. The definition of public diplomacy and the ways in which it can be related to development are also not clearly defined. This is largely due to the fact that governments sometimes seek to conceal any public diplomacy ambitions in their development policies because development aid is generally considered an altruistic obligation of richer countries. In addition, the promotion of a donor nation's own interests could be viewed as undignified.

As public diplomacy spills into different fields of practice and theory, it is very difficult to define it in a thorough manner. This is especially evident in the extent to which the various definitions differ from each other and in the variety of ways in which different governments and practitioners frame the concept of public diplomacy. To further inspect the relationship between public diplomacy and development in South Korea, this section introduces the theories developed by Zielińska (2016) and Pamment (2016), which link public diplomacy and development.

ZIELIŃSKA'S CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY

In addressing development assistance as a tool of public diplomacy, Karolina Zielińska defines "development diplomacy" as "diplomacy done through development aid" and "as a part of public diplomacy that realizes its aims thanks to soft power resources" (2016, p. 9). She states that aid programs no longer operate with the exclusive objective of fostering development; they are also used to promote and enhance the donor country's image (Zielińska, 2016, p. 10).

Zielińska regards development diplomacy as a part of new public diplomacy, which can be practiced by both governments and non-state actors. It is "based on soft power, two-ways communication, management

of (credible) information; and…both short- and long-term oriented" (Zielińska, 2016, p. 13). Zielińska says that while development aid may not be a formal part of states' public diplomacy programs, it still "constitutes a soft power resource for public diplomacy in itself" and involves the "employment of other soft power resources in the service of public diplomacy" (p. 15). If aid can develop "positive, mutual and symmetric relationships," it can enhance the soft power of a donor country and support its public diplomacy initiatives (p. 15).

Zielińska favors Ociepka's definition of public diplomacy. As per the latter's definition, public diplomacy is the "two-way, dialogical form of political international communication, directed at the public abroad, realised through the media and direct channels. Its aim is shaping or supporting a positive image of a country and society abroad, including - by influence on public opinion - building of positive attitudes towards the country" (p. 10). Zielińska says that "public diplomacy understood this way is meant to assist in the realisation of aims of given country's policy in the international environment" (p. 10-11).

Zielińska states that the following elements of "new" public diplomacy have emerged over the last few decades: educational diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, digital diplomacy, historical diplomacy, local government diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy, social diplomacy, and development diplomacy (Zielińska, 2016, p. 11-12). The borders between these fields are blurred as many public diplomacy initiatives involve several of these elements. However, it can be said that development diplomacy functions best when it is supported by other instruments of public diplomacy (p. 23).

Moreover, Zielińska finds that "forms of aid such as training, study visits, acceptance of students, on-the-spot consultations or know-how transfer, as well as small-scale projects well embedded in local community, seem to be most promising in terms of converging aims related to development with the ones of public diplomacy" (p. 23). She also points out the fact that while many small- or medium-power countries deliver aid purely for "altruistic reasons", their aid programs are often linked to "a certain moral standing", and self-image, of their role in the international system (Ociepka in Zielińska, 2016, p. 23).

PAMMENT'S THREE LEVELS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By looking at the different ways in which researchers have analyzed the relationship between international development and public diplomacy, Pamment (2016) isolates three levels where these two areas intersect.

At the first level, the "act of giving aid can itself be considered a form of public diplomacy" as aid can also be regarded as "an extension of traditional diplomatic objectives towards the general public" (p. 10). In particular, aid in terms of advocacy, education, and exchanges has a far-reaching effect on foreign publics. Pamment (2016) draws from Edward Guillon's early definition of public diplomacy. As per the latter's definition, public diplomacy involves "dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy," which in turn involve "the interaction of private groups in one country with those of another." Such situations entail a "transnational flow of information and ideas" and could even include topics such as health education (p. 10). Such interactions are evident in areas of development aid, such as technical assistance, educational exchanges, and volunteering programs.

Pamment (2016) suggests that Gregory's (2011) definition of public diplomacy in the twenty-first century also pertains to the first level. According to Gregory (2011), new public diplomacy is "an instrument used by states, associations of states, and sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitude, and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (p. 353). For instance, a donor nation may send aid workers to implement projects that promote shared values and interests, and even foreign policy objectives. Aid may be offered in relation to sanitation or renewable energy to safeguard the global public goods of healthcare and a cleaner environment. Such efforts require interactions between the publics of the recipient country and the experts and aid workers from the donor country. The interactions are typically facilitated by means of cultural and educational exchanges, which in turn promote shared values. Furthermore, such exchanges may help the donor country acquire the recipient country's support for its foreign policy goals. In this way, development aid can build relationships and influence foreign publics.

The second level of Pamment's (2016) analysis regards "the communication of aid activities as public diplomacy" (p. 11). This level involves "branding, marketing, and promotion of aid activities to foreign citizens and domestic stakeholders in a manner that supports an actor's reputation and image" (p. 12). Similarly, a study that examines the European Union's (EU) public diplomacy initiatives states that aid is made "visible in the recipient country and beyond" as "it is important not only that aid be given but that it is seen to be given" (De Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005, p. 17). In this way, development promotes the EU's self-image; the EU considers itself a normative power that advocates values, such as peace, democracy, the rule of law, and development.

Lastly, the third level focuses on how development and public diplomacy matters "are discussed and understood within institutions and among the experts that produce aid and public diplomacy" (Pamment, 2016, p. 12). This level can be exemplified by South Korea's approach to public diplomacy and development and its efforts to become a rule-maker in the global development field. These aspects are discussed in detail in the second section.

KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-MENT

South Korea is geopolitically situated between two economic giants: Japan and China. Its relations with North Korea have deteriorated, and there is a constant threat of war. These factors limit South Korea's hard power and create an "ever-present sense of instability" (Ma, Jung-he & Moore, 2012). In adapting to this geopolitical position, South Korea has taken advantage of its wealth of soft power assets, such as the *hallyu* (Korean Wave). Korea uses its soft power resources in its public diplomacy initiatives to promote a favorable image of itself among foreign states. Although Korea's public diplomacy formally began only in 2010, it has already developed significant programs (Ma et al., 2012; Cull, 2013). Studies note that Korea's experience of rapid development is regarded as a model for developing countries, and Korea, therefore, could incorporate development aid in its public diplomacy

initiative (Ma et al., 2012; Cull, 2013; Cho, 2012).

While Cull (2013) advocates that Korea should use its middle-power status and image of "being a good global citizen" (p. 18), Cho (2012) sees public diplomacy targeted at "developing and underdeveloped nations" as a way for Korea to alter "the perception that it is sandwiched between major powers of Northeast Asia"—China and Japan (p. 285). He argues that Korea has a great opportunity to share "its know-how on economic growth and development" so that it can "become a nation that other nations want to share the experience with" and emulate (p. 285).

Accordingly, Enna Park, a former Director-General for Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, regards development cooperation as the main pillar of Korea's foreign policy. She has stated that public diplomacy in development cooperation could upgrade South Korea's national prestige (Park, 2013, p. 5). The significance of development assistance as a tool for public diplomacy is also acknowledged by Yun Duk-min, the Chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy. Yun Duk-min believes that it is time for "Korea's public diplomacy to take a leap forward, given the significance of soft power in determining a middle power's diplomatic sway, and the potentials the country has built over the past 20-plus years through the Korean Wave, official development assistance and other knowledge and people-to-people exchange programs" (Min-sik, 2016).

DEVELOPMENT AS SOUTH KOREA'S NICHE

"Niche diplomacy" is often seen as an appropriate way for smaller countries to conduct their public diplomacy. Countries such as Canada and Norway have developed their "niche" (or specialization) as actors in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and development aid, which have accorded them international prestige; these efforts have also enabled foreign audiences to perceive them positively (Henrikson, 2005). In the field of development cooperation, Lee (2014) argues that while the development aid practices of most countries are based on "the intrinsic goals of development cooperation, it is difficult to completely detach development cooperation policy from

individual countries' interests" (p. 79). He notes that major donors have displayed a "dual dynamic of cooperation and competition in constructing the new order." In other words, major donors agree that a framework for global governance in development is needed, but they "compete against each other to realign the coming global order of development cooperation toward their interests" (p. 79). In this context, he argues that development cooperation is "a natural candidate for niche diplomacy" of middle powers (p. 79).

The most important factor in the context of South Korea's efforts to develop a niche for development diplomacy is its own experience. Korea has also actively participated in and initiated global discussions in the development arena (Lee, 2014). It has played "a bridging role among various players with potentially conflicting interests including traditional donors, providers of South-South cooperation, NGOs, CSOs, and private funders" (Lee, 2014, p. 96). In what Lee (2014) describes as "the complex nature of the international architecture of development cooperation" (p. 96), South Korea's experience in development, its geopolitical location, and its middle-power politics have allowed it to specialize and become a leader in the global governance of development. This is also due to Korea having garnered respect from diverse actors across the development community.

Accordingly, the President of KOICA has stated that Korea should not "remain a follower but it may become a rule-maker" in the development arena (Shin, 2016). When South Korea became an OECD-DAC member in 2010, it fully embraced its new role. As a result, the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, a major conference for the global development community, was held in Busan in 2011 (Mawdsley, Savage & Kim, 2013). This pivotal conference saw opposing development regimes speak of deeper cooperation in a way that fit the host country's aspirations of becoming a leader, a bridge, or a *rule-maker*.

South Korea's role as a bridge between the development practices of the Global North and Global South has received much scholarly attention. It has allowed South Korea to further its image within the global development community as a country specializing in development. In this way, South Korea exemplifies the third level of Pamment's public diplomacy – international development intersection, in which Korea is becoming the

rule-maker "within institutions and among the experts that produce aid and public diplomacy" (Pamment, 2016, p. 12).

In fact, the KDI and KOICA have already developed programs such as the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and the Development Experience Exchange Program (DEEP). KSP focuses on "joint policy research, workshops, training, field trips and dissemination seminars" for foreigners, while the latter is involved in "country tailored consulting" to help developing countries address a wider range of issues that they come up against in their quest for economic progress (Lee, 2014, p. 95).

In my interactions with students at the KDI in Sejong City, I found that a significant number of them come from developing countries. They are typically recipients of Korean scholarships (mostly KOICA) and possess an interest in learning about the Korean development model. This information suggests that Korea is conscious of its reputation as an expert in the development and that it capitalizes on this reputation to engage in niche diplomacy.

As the KDI students return to their home countries as policymakers, they may spread the word about the Korean development model, and in doing so, they may act as public diplomacy agents.

To shed more light on the ways in which development and public diplomacy intersect in the case of South Korea, the following section analyzes how the Korean government and KOICA tailor development programs as public diplomacy initiatives. The section also further substantiates the claims made by the theories discussed earlier on in this paper.

KOREAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (KOICA)

KOICA is the governmental agency that addresses issues related to development cooperation. It "has established over 60 vocational institutes" in developing countries and actively invites "foreigners to Korea for training programs" (Ma et al., 2012, p. 17). KOICA builds networks through development initiatives in education and training to spread Korean know-how and its experience of development. KOICA is even known to brand its

projects to support and promote Korean culture, as exemplified by the labeling of the Korea Innovative Maternal and Child Health Initiative (KIMCHI) as the Korean signature dish, kimchee.

In an interview in 2016, Kim In-shik, the President of KOICA, stated that "KOICA should be at the forefront of crafting new assistance models that can expedite the recipients' growth while boosting business, cultural and people-to-people ties with Korea" (Shin, 2016). The idea of supporting aid to promote cultural ties is very much in line with the first level of the relationship between public diplomacy and development described by Pamment. As per the first level, the very act of offering aid enables positive interactions and image building. Moreover, its aim to create new models of assistance supports Korea's aspirations to become a *rule-maker* in development.

KOICA's President sees the "fragmentation among various state agencies" as Korea's main problem in utilizing development as a venue for public diplomacy. This is exemplified by the fact that more than 44 institutions that implement ODA in Korea lack common objectives or a coherent vision (Shin, 2016). This intra-agency tension impedes consistency, which is important for successful public diplomacy. By describing ODA as "one of the most effective tools to promote Korea's brand image and influence," (Shin, 2016) Kim In-shik acknowledges the importance of publicizing the implementation of development programs. This represents the second level in Pamment's theory of development: public diplomacy relationship.

The following section discusses two of KOICA's programs, Korea Aid and World Friends Korea, which use development as a tool for public diplomacy.

KOREA AID

In May 2016, during President Park Geun-hye's visit to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, the Korean government launched Korea Aid. The program aims "to blend health support with cultural and public diplomacy" (Shin, 2016). As part of this "mobile aid" project, two ambulances and four food

trucks were driven to poor parts of Africa, where they provided "medical services while serving Korean food and screening soap operas and music" (Shin, 2016). Moreover, it saw "more than 20 South Korean doctors and nurses…join hands with their Ethiopian counterparts to provide basic medical services, especially to girls in medically underserved regions" (Kwang-tae, 2016).

The project included three elements, which were labeled "K-Medic, K-Culture and K-meal," and it also involved volunteer doctors, cooks, and technicians (SerMyo-Ja, 2016). K-Medic pertained to the developmental aspect of the project and focused on offering health education and health services. K-Meal focused on "forging friendship through sharing a meal," and K-Culture involved the screening of educational clips; it also introduced various aspects of Korean culture (SerMyo-Ja, 2016). The Korean government expects that the program will enhance cultural and economic exchanges with the partner countries (Arirang News, 2016).

While the government expects the program to contribute toward achieving the sustainable development goals (Kwang-tae, 2016), the program has been controversial and has provoked "backlash from civic groups and some academics," who labeled it a "one-off political show" (Shin, 2016). The critics argue that ODA "should not be diverted for cultural promotion" as the Korea Aid program "not only lacks long-term viability but also runs counter to the international community's efforts to systematically improve the health environment in the region" (Shin, 2016). While some of these criticisms may seem harsh, the Korea Aid program does admittedly seem more like a cultural festival than a development project.

However, KOICA's President has argued that "it is too early to call the program a failure" (Shin, 2016) as it may have had positive results in terms of healthcare and may have also promoted South Korea's image in the recipient communities. He also stated that "KOICA has been running mobile clinics in West Africa and elsewhere, which managed to save many lives and helped plug the medical service vacuum in remote and critically underserved areas in a relatively cost-efficient way" (Shin, 2016).

This project can be regarded as an example of development diplomacy, which, as described by Zielińska (2016), "realizes its aims thanks to soft

power resources" (p. 9). In this way, soft power assets blend with social diplomacy as doctors and nurses from Korea interact with members of the recipient community. Moreover, the promotion of Korean culture through the mobile aid concept amounts to what Zielińska calls "on-the spot consultations" and "small-scale projects" (p. 9), which are ways of implementing public diplomacy initiatives through development assistance. However, seen from the perspective of Pamment's third level, this project could have upset South Korea's desire to play the role of a "bridge-maker" in the international development community as the community did not favor Korea's strategy.

The Korea Aid program also serves as an interesting example of the relationship between public diplomacy and international development. The Korean government and KOICA in particular, did not conceal their intentions to utilize their development obligations to promote Korea's image. The Korean government had in fact publicly stated that Korea Aid "will combine development assistance with cultural diplomacy" (SerMyo- Ja, 2016).

WORLD FRIENDS KOREA

World Friends Korea is another example of Korea's public diplomacy initiatives, which is also managed by KOICA. World Friends Korea was initiated in 2009 when the Korean government integrated six governmental agencies that ran overseas volunteer programs into one single brand (KOICA, 2016). Between 2009 and 2014, World Friends Korea sent over 20,000 volunteers to partner countries (KOICA, 2016). Since 1990, KOICA has dispatched over 50,000 volunteers; currently, KOICA volunteers are spread across 96 countries (Friends of Korea, 2016). World Friends Korea firmly believes in the power of "soft diplomacy"—creating a common vision for the future through partnership and collaboration (Friends of Korea, 2016).

Drawing from the United States Peace Corps, World Friends Korea has defined three main goals: promotion of sustainable development, poverty reduction, and improved living standards; forging deep and "friendly ties"

with partner countries; and "self-fulfillment" with the opportunity "to become active global citizens" (Friends of Korea, 2016). Thus, the volunteers act as soft diplomatic assets who work to fulfill development targets in partner nations while simultaneously sharing and promoting the values and culture of South Korea and developing stronger networks.

In their collaborations "with governments, schools, non-profit organizations, and businessmen in various areas, including education, the environment, agriculture and information technology," Korean officials have stated that the volunteers "will also play an important role in promoting Korea's culture and food around the world" (Na, 2009). Thus, World Friends Korea and Korea Aid seem to have very similar functions. Both programs aim to foster development and simultaneously promote Korean culture and food overseas.

As World Friends Korea is the second largest volunteer organization in the world (after the U.S. Peace Corps), its activities can be seen from the perspective of the first level of Pamment's theory, which highlights civil society's role as a mediator and a broker of aid. The very fact that South Korea has such a big group of volunteers in the field of development already gives it a positive image. Actors who deliver aid in its various forms also serve as public diplomacy agents who promote and make visible the Korean national brand, its reputation, culture, and image (second level).

Finally, the significance of World Friends Korea as a tool of public diplomacy can be related to Zielińska's concept of development diplomacy. As Zielińska states, development diplomacy functions best when it is supported by other instruments of diplomacy. The 'functionings' of World Friends Korea also include citizen diplomacy and educational diplomacy initiatives. Through these initiatives, volunteers engage with foreign publics, transfer knowledge, and build relationships with them. Moreover, World Friends Korea's activities are also an example of social diplomacy. As a part of public diplomacy, social diplomacy encourages civil society to "engage in activities abroad that aim at enhancing development" (p. 12).

CONCLUSIONS

Many definitions of public diplomacy do not represent the links between development aid and public diplomacy. The purpose of this paper was to show that public diplomacy could be integrated into the field of development. This is all the more possible as the norms governing development aid have been changing.

It seems that South Korea has indeed developed policies that mix public diplomacy and international development. Development has also become Korea's "niche" in the context of middle-power diplomacy. While the aims of development initiatives are not always attributable to the ends of public diplomacy, theories developed by Pamment (2016) and Zielińska (2016) link public diplomacy and development. Korea's case also seems to confirm the links between these fields.

South Korea blends development and public diplomacy in two ways. First, it blends public diplomacy into its development initiatives while also using its experience of rapid development as a tool for its public diplomacy. In more concrete terms, it brings together development and public diplomacy through projects such as Korea Aid, in which hallyu and other aspects of Korean culture are promoted as an integral part of the mobile development aid project. In this way, development aid can be used as a tool to enact public diplomacy initiatives. Second, South Korea is a prominent middle power, a member of OECD-DAC, and a strong promoter of South–South cooperation in development. This allows for it to be considered a bridge-maker between different paradigms of development. South Korea capitalizes on its reputation as "the Miracle of the Han River" by using its own development experience to bridge the developed and developing world. It also acts as a rule-maker in the changing sphere of global development governance.

To diversify its public diplomacy strategies and to not entirely rely on the strength of the *hallyu*, South Korea may find that linking its experience in development with its public diplomacy initiatives could serve as a lucrative public diplomacy asset. Evidence seems to support the claim that South Korea is a privileged middle-power state, occupying a position between the developed and the developing world, which seeks to utilize its

expertise in development as its niche. Public diplomacy is still relatively new for the South Korean government. Korea is likely to enact more innovative ways of blending development with public diplomacy and vice versa in the future.

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Father and Daughter's *Saemaul Undong*: True Replication or Mere Glorification?

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While discussing the possibility of replicating *Saemaul Undong* (새마을운동; SMU) in his paper on the Republic of Korea (Korea)'s rural development program in the 1980s, Mick Moore stated, "serious attempts at replication seem rare, and the crudity of South Korean propaganda for *Saemaul* has ensured that many of the more discerning foreign visitors have quickly seen through it."[1] However, what Moore could not foresee, as he wrote in the midst of the Chun Doo-hwan regime that had perverted the original rural development program, which sought to make villages in developing Korea self-sufficient, into a nationwide mass mobilization movement in which, according to President Chun, "the participation of the entire people are essential to the success of the *Saemaul Undong*,"[2] was that the daughter of Park Chung-hee, the former Korean president and strongman who started and expanded SMU, would become president and use the program of her father as a sort of national brand for overseas economic assistance.

The goal of this research is to compare and contrast the SMU of Park Chung-hee that was implemented in Korea with the version of SMU currently being promoted abroad as a development program and that was pushed hard by the former Park Geun-hye administration. While SMU has a long history in Korea, this paper will focus solely on SMU during the Park Chung-hee regime and the portion of SMU that focused on village development. While SMU would go on to be greatly enlarged to include

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1 Mick Moore, "Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The Saemaul Movement in Retrospect," *Pacific Affairs* 57(4) (1984-1985): 579.

2 Headquarters of Saemaul Undong The Republic of Korea, *Saemaul: 1988* (Republic of Korea: Korea Textbook Co., Ltd., 1988), 39.

movements in corporations and factories, these programs are not presently being promoted as development strategies abroad and therefore fall outside of the scope of comparison. Furthermore, while SMU has been promoted by previous administrations, the vigor of promotion during the Park Geun-hye administration reached new heights as President Park Geun-hye promised to devote more effort to the project to "develop a new paradigm for rural development in developing countries" during her address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015.[3] Also, given that President Park Geun-hye argued in her speech that SMU is one of Korea's development programs that led to its rapid economic growth and that it will share such programs with developing countries in an effort to contribute to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which was adopted by the UN a few days prior to her speech, the original SMU and current SMU program being promoted by Korea will be analyzed based on the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals as outlined in the 2030 Agenda.[4]

This comparison is necessary for two reasons. First, an analysis of the original SMU under Park Chung Hee based the Sustainable Development Goals will allow a determination to be made on whether or not this program is congruent with these goals and whether or not the program should be promoted by Korea and the UN. This analysis can evaluate Korea's development process under Park Chung Hee and draw conclusions on whether or not it is an appropriate model to use as a benchmark in developing countries. Second, comparing the current manifestation of the SMU program being promoted abroad will further give us clues as to how the current administration views the SMU of the Park Chung Hee era. That is, whether or not the administration views SMU as a program truly aimed at improving the lives of rural citizens, or if it was, as some critics contend, a program designed to build up rural political support for an increasingly authoritarian Park Chung Hee regime. If subtle changes in the program are

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3 "Full Text of Speech at U.N. General Assembly," *Yonhap News Agency*, September 29, 2015, accessed December 9, 2015, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/09/29/51/0301000000AEN20150929002700315F.html

4 For a complete list of the goals see: United Nations General Assembly, "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," October 21, 2015, accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

found, we can infer that the Park Geun-Hye administration sees the original SMU as not congruent with the Sustainable Development Goals.

If the original SMU and the currently reincarnation of SMU being promoted abroad are similar, it may be argued that an attempt at true replication is being made. If subtle changes are found in the current version of SMU, the current administration may be seen as merely trying to glorify Korea's development history without acknowledging some of the model's pitfalls. Here it will be argued that SMU in its original form would not promote the all of the goals of the Sustainable Development agenda. And, after reviewing recent government proposals, there are subtle changes in the makeup of SMU that indicate some current officials recognize the original model's authoritarian origins and have tried to adjust the program to fit the Sustainable Development Goal agenda.

THE FATHER'S *SAEMAUL UNDONG*

SMU was designed to be an integral part of Korea's development process and was given the lofty goals of making "new people, new villages, a new society, and a new country" by the government.[5] With that in mind, the main goals of the program were to build new and rich villages where people lived well. To accomplish this goal, SMU would turn the people of rural Korea into diligent, self-helping, and cooperative people; a trio of characteristics that would be dubbed the *Saemaul* Spirit. And once these enriched people had built new, rich, and clean villages, this thus would create a new, rich, and clean nation. Or in the words of the Park Chung Hee administration, "if all citizens become new people and the entirety of society changes into a new society, then the country too will become new."[6]

In terms of organization, the movement had a SMU village leader in each village who was selected or elected to work with the government on the project; the selection vs. election issue will be addressed below. Village leaders were usually in their 30s or 40s and had mostly achieved a higher

5 Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 7.

6 Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 13.

level of education compared with other rural residents.[7] As the movement grew, the national government also placed the program under the powerful Ministry of Home Affairs in 1971 and in 1973 a local SMU office was created in each administrative area with one public official specifically tasked with managing SMU affairs; a sort of dual structure that in resembles the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government structure. Furthermore, a *Saemaul* Central Committee (새마을운동 중앙협의회) was formed with local village-level branches also being established throughout the country as well (읍면추진위원회).[8]

Using the Sustainable Development Goals as a base for judgment, the outline of SMU and stated goals provided by the Park Chung Hee government in its writings appears to be, at least on the surface, a model program. The first three goals of ending poverty, ending hunger, and improving well-being are among the foremost goals of SMU.[9] In fact, the most urgent factor SMU sought to address was poverty.[10] In conjunction with this effort was a sort of promise that the people would then be able to eat well and be full on a daily basis. The well-being of the people was addressed in a number of ways as well, but the most visible aspect of SMU was the movement to replace thatched roofs with slate or tin roofs and the construction of public baths in villages. SMU also addressed wider societal concerns. Improved sanitation through better construction of outhouses and the provision of measures on how to keep water clean aimed at cleaning up villages (Goal 6). Another main goal of the program was to widen and pave roads to improve rural infrastructure (Goal 9). Lee and Lee argue that SMU was also effective at reforesting efforts and indeed one of the main symbols

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7 Yunjeong Yang, "*Saemaul Undong* Revisited: A Case of State-Society Dynamics in Social Capital Mobilisation, Focusing on the Role of Local Leaders in South Korea of the 1970s" *Journal of International Development* (2015): 9, accessed December 7, 2015, DOI: 10.1002/jid.3048.

8 In Rib Baek, Pan Suk Kim, and Soo Chul Lee, "Conributions and Limitations of Saemaul Undong in Korea for Regional Development and Welfare Improvement in Less Developed Countries," *Public Administration and Development* 32 (2012): 419.

9 Statistics are not provided in the interest of saving space. However, a great deal of official statistics are available in Man Gap Lee's edited book entitled *Toward a New Community Life*.

10 Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 21.

of SMU was the planting of trees (Goal 15).[11]

Although SMU contributed greatly to these goals, there are a few of the Sustainable Development Goals which were either addressed poorly or inadequately. SMU as a program incorporated educational goals and provided a great deal of educational opportunities to the village leaders, but the knowledge passed down was very technical in nature and encouraged very little critical thinking (Goal 4). The Ministry of Culture and Public Information's text on the contents of the program reads like an instruction manual on the one hand and a collection of Park Chung Hee thought on the other with the latter half of the volume being a collection of his statements. Park Chung Hee also called for schools around the country to "keep up with the government's policies and become centers of local development" effectively leading to SMU taking over education rather than promoting education as a public good in and of itself. According to Cheong Ji-Woong, the basic characteristics of SMU education were 1) orientation towards modernization, 2) directed toward improvement of living standards, and 3) directed toward spiritual reform.[12] These goals of education in the movement are seeking to create citizens who view the legitimacy of their government as being based on economic growth and conditioning them to assist in that process. Thus, education was mainly focused on building human capital to benefit economic development and it is difficult to say that improving educational attainment was a goal of SMU; rather education was used as a tool for conditioning the people of Korea toward the goals of SMU and the state.

Furthermore, SMU has a mixed record in terms of promoting gender equality (Goal 5). The section on kitchen improvements blatantly acknowledges that this is the space of the woman where she spends a great deal of time.[13] However, SMU did make efforts to appoint women into leadership roles in the program. And Kim Eun-Mee credits SMU with

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11 D. Lee and Y. Lee, "Roles of Saemaul Undong in reforestation and NGO activites for sustainable forest management in Korea," *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 20(4) (2005): 1-16.

12 Ji-Woong Cheong, "Information, Education, and Training in the *Saemaul* Movement," in *Toward a New Community Life*, ed. Man Gap Lee (Seoul: Institute of Saemaul Undong Studies, Seoul National University, 1981): 550.

13 Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 111.

improving the quality of life in the countryside which allowed women opportunities to engage jobs outside the home and create their own sources of income.[14] While such criticism may be unwarranted given the climate toward women's rights at that time both in Korea and the international society, this is obviously one place we should expect to see change in the current manifestation of SMU.

Yet where SMU falls most glaringly short is with regards to the crucial sixteenth Sustainable Development Goal. Goal sixteen calls for the promotion of the rule of law, the reduction of corruption and bribery, development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, and the promotion of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels, among other points.[15] While it is argued here that SMU failed to promote these goals, there is not a consensus and in fact the opposite argument has been made. Eom Seok-Jin offers this opposing view by evaluating SMU through the lens of UNESCAP's eight characteristics of good governance, several characteristics of which overlap with the Sustainable Development Goals.[16] For example, regarding transparency, Eom argues that the consensus-oriented nature of the decision making process[17] increased transparency as did the bureaucratic structure of the administrations related to SMU (separation of planning and evaluation from implementation).[18] In terms of rule of law, Eom argues that laws were enacted to govern the implementation of SMU.[19] And with regards to accountability, Eom states that farmers were held accountable

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14 Eun-Mee Kim, "Rural Development and Women's Participation: Lessons from the *Saemaul Undong* of Korea," Presentation given on December 4, 2014, accessed December 10, 2015, https://www.donorplatform.org/index.php?option=com_cobalt&task=files.download&tmpl=component&id=2731&fid=15&fidx=0&rid=2392&return=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZG9ub3JwbGF0Zm9ybS5vcmcvY29iYWx0.

15 United Nations General Assembly, "Transforming our world," 25.

16 For more information on these characteristics see: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf

17 Among the characteristics of SMU according to the Park Chung Hee administration was that the people of each village would meet together and deliberate over how best to use resources they were provided with. Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 8.

18 Seok-Jin Eom, "The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the Perspective of Good Governance," *The Korean Journal of Policy Studies* 26(2) (2011): 34.

19 Eom, "The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited," 35.

through the linkage of results by villages and support from the government. Also, public officials were held accountable based on a similar system of rewards for achieving goals and punishment for failure.[20] Michael Douglass also argued that such a system would cause local officials to "wake up" and become more accountable.[21]

However, overwhelming counter arguments can be made for Eom's various positions. While Park Chung Hee argued in a speech in 1973 that "the Saemaul movement is a training ground for Korean democracy… First of all, all villagers should get together and elect a village leader…under his leadership, all villagers will discuss and decide on a project by common consent,"[22] Park Jin-Do and Han Do-Hyeon argue that there were very few opportunities for ordinary villagers to take part in the decision-making process. Instead, the *Saemaul* Central Committee and the local branches of the central committee, which were usually only attended by the village leaders, were the main decision-making bodies.[23] This point is further made clear through the manner in which information travelled within SMU. Ji-Woong Cheong notes that a problem with SMU was that information only progressed from the top down and that information that did make it up from the villages to the central government was predominantly quantitative reports rather than qualitative information on the views of ordinary farmers.[24] Additionally, Park Chung Hee's claim that villages would get together to elect a leader are either true or false depending on the scholar one reads. For example, Yang notes that the SMU village leaders were mainly selected by the government,[25] while Sooyoung Park on the other

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20 Eom, "The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited," 38-39.

21 Michael Douglass, "The Saemaul Undong in Historical Perspective and in the Contemporary World," Presentation given at the 5th Seoul ODA International Conference, October 13, 2011, accessed December 7, 2015, http://www.unrisd.org/80256B42004CCC77/(httpInfoFiles)/70A974173AE07CC9C125794400588B1D/$file/2.6%20Michael%20Douglass.pdf

22 Arthur Goldsmith, "Popular Participation and Rural Leadership in the Saemaul Movement," in *Toward a New Community Life*, ed. Man Gap Lee (Seoul: Institute of Saemaul Undong Studies, Seoul National University, 1981): 434.

23 Park, Jin-do, and Han, Do-hyeon. "Saemaurundonggua yushincheje [Saemaul Undong and the Yushin Regime]." *Critical Review of History* 47 (1999): 69.

24 Cheong, "Information, Education, and Training in the *Saemaul* Movement," 547.

25 Yang, "Saemaul Undong Revisited," 15.

hand argues that they were indeed elected by the villagers.[26] The presence of these various assessments leads one to believe that elections may have taken place in some villages at some times but that other villages did not hold elections or saw their leaders replaced.

Furthermore, the mere presence of laws does not signify that the rule of law exists in a country. Every country has laws; rule of law signifies that even the leaders of government and industry are subject to the law and punished accordingly if they break the law. It cannot be argued that SMU contributed to bringing the rule of law to Korea. Conversely and in relation to accountability, the system of rewarding officials who oversaw successful development in their administrative area likely led to more corruption rather than less. Yunjeong Yang states that various benefits were given to SMU village leaders including certificates of leadership, legal consulting, cheaper licenses, priority for loans and telephone lines, possible selection as public official, and even scholarships for their children.[27] Such rewards may have led to fudging of statistics to give the appearance of growth in order to gain access to more government benefits. Finally, Eom's argument that the government keeps the people accountable through a system of competition leads one to doubt whether he understands definition of accountability as well. Therefore it is difficult to argue that SMU contributed to promoting rule of law and the structure of the program likely encouraged corruption given the lack of citizen or legislative oversight given that one third of the National Assembly was appointed by President Park Chung Hee following the implementation of the Yushin constitution in November 1972.

Given this analysis, we can conclude that SMU has a mixed record when it comes to upholding ideals such as those promulgated by the UN in the form of the Sustainable Development Goals. This mixed record has resulted in a clear split amongst scholars who analyze the results of the program. Those who positively appraise SMU point toward the increase in the standard of living for rural residents and the high levels of participation by villagers. Critics, while acknowledging the economic growth of the villages during this period, point toward the use of SMU as a means to gain political

26 Sooyoung Park, "Analysis of Saemaul Undong: A Korean Rural Development Programme in the 1970s," *Asia-Pacific Development Journal* 16(2) (2009): 123.

27 Yang, "Saemaul Undong Revisited," 11.

support from the countryside during an era when demonstrations by laborers and students in the cities against Park Chung Hee's increasingly authoritarian regime under the Yushin constitution. Moore goes as far as comparing the program to populism under Mao Zedong in China.[28]

This assessment tends to agree with the latter group of scholars. SMU undoubtedly succeeded in its goals of modernizing Korean villages and raising the income of rural residents. However, the top-down structure signifies that it also had a distinct political purpose. The Park Chung Hee administration indeed acknowledges this by stating that while modernization should take place not only economically but also in terms of politics and society, economic growth was the most important while simultaneously trying to hide behind some notion that the Park Chung Hee regime was "democracy with Korean characteristics."[29] In this light, SMU was a movement which sought to build a base of political support in the countryside which would view the Yushin regime as legitimate based on its promised economic growth. This was crucial now that Park Chung Hee could no longer claim to be a legitimate ruler based on electoral victories. This nature of the Park Chung Hee regime trickled down into SMU. It sought to provide economic growth while subsequently limiting the interest articulation from society through a rigid top-down structure. There was a great deal of participation by villagers, but participation was not optional either. Thus a political cloud of smog lingers over the otherwise great achievements of SMU in the 1970s.

In terms of the framework for comparison, given the nature of education and especially the weak system of governance within SMU, it must be argued that the original version of SMU built by Park Chung Hee and his administration fails to meet all of the standards of the Sustainable Development Goals promulgated by the UN despite its success in several areas. While it is important to note that the Park Chung Hee regime never claimed to be holding itself to any such standard, the current administration does have a duty to uphold the Sustainable Development Goals. Thus we should expect some revisions to have been made in the SMU model that is

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28 Moore, "Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea," 580.

29 Ministry of Culture and Public Information, *Saemaulundong*, 20.

being promoted abroad to developing countries of the present era.

THE DAUGHTER'S *SAEMAUL UNDONG*

The *Saemaul Undong* program promoted by the Park Geun-hye administration can be divided into two main elements: rural development programs in developing countries and inviting officials and scholars from recipient countries to Korea for training on SMU. The programs being carried out in recipient countries have several similarities to the original program started in 1970. The foundation of the program according to the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Korea's flagship international aid agency, are the three core values of the *Saemaul* Spirit defined by the original program which would build "new people": diligence, self-help, and cooperation. In addition to these qualities, sharing, volunteering, and creation have been added. Also, the project aims at tackling many of the Sustainable Development Goals as did the original project including campaigns to reduce poverty and hunger, promote well-being and sanitation, construct infrastructure, promote environmentally friendly development, and improve rural access to electricity. As a means to address these various tasks, the modern incarnation of SMU also seeks to encourage collective financing of projects in addition to the aid provided by Korea.[30] This was also a core element of the original program which in the long run had the unfortunate effect of causing household debt in the rural areas to spike as residents sought to finance an increasing number of projects.[31]

These similarities are to be expected as they meet the Sustainable Development Goals as well as the Millennium Development Goals of the previous era. The crucial aspect here is to see if the Korean government is addressing the critics' points on education and more importantly on the ability of a program like SMU to encourage good governance. With regards to education, KOICA notes that one of its integrated approaches is to develop human and social capital (Goal 4). While the development of

30 See www.koica.go.kr

31 Baek et al., "Contributions and Limitations of Saemaul Undong," 423.

human capital was an element found in the original SMU in terms of training rural residents in new techniques to create new sources of income, the development of social capital was not necessarily a major focus of the Park Chung Hee SMU. This is mostly likely because social capital was already relatively high in Korea. Rather this is a new aspect added as the Korean government is running into problems implementing SMU in developing countries were social capital and trust are low.[32] As stated above, the original SMU sought to invade the education system to proliferate the teachings of SMU and construct a rural society friendly towards the Yushin's claim to legitimacy based on economic development. The current version of SMU seems to leave this aspect out and merely urges the promotion of diligence, self-help, and cooperation in terms of education. Other educational programs are outside the scope of SMU and conducted under the auspices of other KOICA programs.

Measures to promote gender equality was a measure lacking in the 1970s edition of SMU, but the current administration seems to be taking measures to address this outdated approach. KOICA states that it takes a special approach to specifically address vulnerable groups such as women and children. A specific measure it outlines is supporting microfinance for women. Other than KOCIA, Park Yeong-Ho of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) emaphsizes the establishment of women's associations within the SMU programs being devised for West Africa.[33] The recognition for the inclusion of this aspect is clearly present representing a needed improvement over the original SMU.

In terms of the debate on whether or not SMU was or can be run using a system of good governance, the projects being promoted by the Korean government are promoting the same basic governance structure of the original SMU. However, the difference is that in the developing countries where these programs are being implemented there is no centralized bureaucracy to push out or take control away from the villagers. In other

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32 ODA Watch. "Saemaeurundong ODA, nugureul wihayeo saebyeokjongeun ullina? [Saemaul Undong ODA, For whom is the bell ringing?]" Forty-fourth ODA Talk Packet. October 25, 2013, accessed December 7, 2015, http://www.odawatch.net/38637, 7.

33 Park, Yeong-ho. "Saemaeurundong geongheomui daeapeurika jeonsu hyoyulhwa bangan [Ways to make Saemaul Undong more effective by learning from experiences in Africa." *KIEP Regional Economic Focus* 7(27) (2013): 8.

words, local SMU committees are formed in the new SMU in developing countries, but no Central Committee to give orders. For example, in an article written by KOICA researcher Kim Sung-Gyu, the governance structure used in SMU projects in Mongolia and Myanmar consisted of SMU village committees while also suggesting that village level committees would work with district level governments.[34] However, with the project focus of KOICA being on the village level, and also with the mere presence of KOICA leading the project, the room for interference or control by higher levels of government are minimal.

In essence, the character of the new international version of SMU hinges on this point and is providing SMU with a new bottom-up nature. Park Yeong-Ho argues for the bottom-up approach,[35] as does Kim Sung-Gyu who urges for the program to shy away from reverting to a top-down program developed by local governments in Korea.[36] These local government programs mention by Kim hint at another issue with the current SMU─ mainly that it is no longer under sole control of one Korean government agency. According to statistics provided by KOICA via ODA Watch, through 2010 roughly 177 billion won has been spent on SMU programs abroad.[37] KOICA comprises about 67 percent of that spending with the remainder being spread over a variety of government agencies including the Gyeongsang-buk do provincial government which spent about 4 billion won on SMU projects. Although not clearly spelled out, Kim Sung-Gyu seems to be pointing out the calls for implementing top-down style SMU in developing countries from the Park Chung Hee School of Policy and Saemaul at Yeongnam University in Gyeongsangbuk-do. Park Seung-Woo, president of the school, argues for a combined top-down and bottom-up

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34 Kim, Seong-kyu. "Saemaeulundong ODA hyeonhwanggua jeonmang – ironjeok nonuiwa saeop hwakdaebanganeul jungimeuro [Current Status of and Prospects for Semaul Undong ODA – Focusing on Theoritical Arguments and Means to Expand the Project." *Gukjegaebalhyomnyeok* [International Development Cooperation] 4 (2013):): 149.

35 Park, Yeong-ho, "Saemaeurundongui gukjehwa bangan: apeurikareul jungsimeuro [Ways to make Saemaul Undong International: Focusing on Africa," Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedow n.js p?fname=%BE%C6%C7%C1%B8%A E%C4%A B09-03%B9%DA%BF%B5%C8%A3.pdf&fpath=Pool0206.

36 Kim, Seong-kyu. "Saemaeulundong ODA hyeonhwanggua jeonmang," 159.

37 ODA Watch, "Saemaeurundong ODA," 34.

approach.[38] Another scholar from the same school suggests the same strategy.[39]

However, the confusion does not end there as while these organizations and scholars seem to be competing not only academically on scholarly points, they are also competing internally within the government for the soul of the program. A program evaluation of an SMU project implemented in Myanmar published by KOICA was prepared by Yeongnam University, although the author remains anonymous. This paper, in contrast to the work of Kim Sung-Gyu who is an resident researcher at KOICA, argues for expanding SMU in Myanmar to help build up government institutions to implement the program more broadly following an assessment that indicates the *Saemaul* Spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) did not take hold.[40] It is difficult to predict how the struggle will end. KOICA currently lists a couple dozen rural development projects are currently underway with a handful containing the phrase "*Saemaul Undong*," but KOICA provides nearly no information about this ongoing programs and their goals.

Yet these SMU programs implemented by KOICA and a few other government organizations are not the only means of passing along SMU to other countries. A more economical method is to invite government officials and scholars to Korea and instruct them in the history and techniques of SMU with the idea that these officials would use the knowledge to carryout similar programs in their home countries. The number of officials who have received this training are number in the thousands with 4,171 having been trained by KOICA between 1991 and 2008. Another 2,329 were trained been trained by the Central Committee of *Samaul Undong* between 1973 and 2009. Additionally roughly 200 more trainees went to the Rural

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38 Seung-Woo Park, "Application of *Saemaul* Movement for Rural Development in Developing Countires," presentation on November 6, 2013, accessed November 8, 2009, http://www.krei.re.kr/web/eng/oda?p_p_id=EXT_BBS&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=exclusive&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_EXT_BBS_struts_action=%2Fext%2Fbbs%2Fget_file&_EXT_BBS_extFileId=1721

39 Yang-Su Lee, "Study on Limits and Supplements Applying the Saemaul Undong into Vietnam-Focusing on the New Rural Development Policy of Viet Nam," *Hangukbigyojeongbuhakbo* 18(3) (2014): 81-100.

40 KOICA, "Ex-post Evaluation Report on the Hlegu Township Rural Development Project in Myanmar," December 2013, accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.oecd.org/derec/korea/Ex-post-Evaluation-Report-on-the-Hlegu-Township-Rural-Development-Project-inMyanmar.pdf, 70.

Development Administration, and 2,081 visited Gyeongsang-buk do provincial government agencies for training between 2008 and 2010 alone.[41] While no research as yet argued a SMU like program has been completely transplanted to another country through these trainings, if a full- scale replica of SMU is built abroad, these training sessions are likely to contribute greatly to that effort as the projects in recipient countries have thus far been on a limited scale.

It is difficult to gage how these trainings are affecting these thousands of foreign scholars and government officials. We may guess that attendees of training in Gyeongsangbuk-do and Yeungnam University may receive instruction on a more top-down approach while those who study at other institutions may be influenced toward a bottom-up approach. For example, a master's thesis was written at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies by a scholar from Myanmar which argues for caution when trying to transplant SMU wholesale to developing countries; this idea of adapting SMU to local conditions being championed by Kim Sung-Gyu.[42] Yet we cannot speculate on what specifically drives individual scholars to favor a bottom-up approach over a top-down approach and to what degree training in a KOICA or other agency programs would affect or change the attitudes of a trainee.

TRUE REPLICATION OR MERE GLORIFICATION?

Although anticlimactic, at this stage it is difficult to determine whether or not the SMU of the Park Geun-Hye administration is a replication of the 1970s SMU initiated under the Park Chung Hee regime. This is because of the conflict over the nature of the project to be pushed overseas in developing countries. Although specific data on the goals or success of the most recent programs has not been provided, SMU is receiving widely positive reviews for its role in poverty reduction, income generation, expansion of rural infrastructure, transfer of modern agriculture techniques,

41 ODA Watch, "Saemaeurundong ODA" 33-34.

42 Aung Thu Win, "Saemaul Undong in Korea and challenges for Replication to Myanmar," Master's Thesis, Seoul National University, 2014.

among other positive outcomes. In this regard a true replication is indeed a positive thing as these aspects fall in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. This is reflected in the fact that KOICA has partnered with several major international organizations, including UNDP, OECD, the World Food Programme, and others, to work on expanding the SMU program and improve its implementation.[43]

The question remains, however, how the governance structure of SMU will develop under the international edition of SMU. The rift between scholars on whether the original top-down nature of SMU should be scrapped in favor of a more democratic bottom-up approach or whether the top-down approach is the only true method which can effectively instill the *Saemaul* Spirit, which Park Chung Hee thought was so crucial to the movement, into the hearts and minds of villagers in developing countries has yet to be setttled. Another important aspect to consider here is that SMU is no longer strictly a Korean program. As the Korean government expands the program by working with various international organizations, these new partners will also have a say in the future of SMU. Given the language of the Sustainable Development Goals, we would have to expect the future of the program to be more toward the bottom-up approach, but that is yet to be determined.

With this in mind, it must be concluded that the current reincarnation of SMU under the Park Geun-Hye administration is more of a glorification of SMU's past with key tweaks to bring it in line with the democratic goals of international society. While there seems to be a significant attempt to distort some of the history behind SMU by a group of some domestic scholars, others are direct in acknowledging both the great accomplishments of SMU in terms of poverty reduction and income generation while admitting the Park Chung Hee regime's ulterior motives. Those working from within the government refrain from the criticism of the past while suggesting a new path for the future. This is likely due to the Korean government's interest in tweaking the country's history to improve its soft power profile. At the same time the Korean government seems to be tacitly agreeing that the SMU of

43 See KOICA brochure on SMU: http://koica.go.kr/download/2015/brochure_Saemaul_Undong.pdf

the 1970s does not fit the current goals of the international community in terms of the Sustainable Development Goals and has sought to scrap the overbearing top-down approach of the 1970s that aimed at least partially at building a base of political support for the Park Chung Hee regime after promulgating the Yushin constitution. In that sense, the *Saemaul Undong* has become a means for glorifying the countries development history and now serves as the Korean brand name in the international aid arena.

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South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy toward Latin America: Official Development Assistance (ODA)'s Perspective

Anaïs Faure

INTRODUCTION

In a bid to overcome its historical tradition of isolationism, South Korea has, in the decades following its rapid economic growth, strived to gain recognition in the international arena. To this end, the country has actively sought to build bilateral and multilateral relations across regions and display *good international citizenship*. In this way, South Korea has aimed to build its credentials as a middle power by cooperating with middle and small powers in South East Asia, Central Asia, and most recently, Latin America.

These efforts can be viewed in the light of South Korea's often complicated relations with major powers, namely China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Given the strategic geopolitical importance of the Korean Peninsula, great power politics has often led to tensions in the region. This has had a direct impact on South Korea's relations with these powers and on South Korea's foreign policy and international status overall. From this perspective, South Korea's active approach of other middle and small powers can be seen as a strategy of diplomatic diversification in order to enhance the country's international status.

So far, South Korea's diplomatic approach toward these middle and small powers has been based on economic ties and Official Development Assistance (ODA). And, of late, public diplomacy initiatives have become another key factor in these relations. Overall, South Korea's efforts have been based on the strategic outlook of middle power diplomacy, which was

most accurately characterized by the *Global Korea* policy, initiated during President Lee Myung-bak's tenure, and *Trustpolitik*, an initiative of the Park Geun-hye administration.

During her tenure, President Park pushed for stronger relations with Latin America. She undertook several official trips to the region, and cooperation with Latin American countries was expanded to non-traditional areas such as science and technology, information and communications technologies (ICTs), and medical industries. This added up to the already established tradition of support to Latin American countries through ODA by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (ECDF), and most recently, Knowledge-Sharing Programs (KSP) under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.

Against this background, this paper analyzes the context, processes, and mechanisms of South Korea's middle power diplomacy and its diplomatic ties with Latin America between 2008 and 2016. This study explores the following questions:

1. How does South Korea understand the concept of middle power diplomacy, and how has this understanding influenced its foreign policy strategies?
2. How has middle power diplomacy informed South Korea's approach to Latin America?
3. What role does ODA play in South Korea's foreign policy strategy toward Latin America?

During the last decade, academics and policymakers alike sought to determine whether South Korea could be regarded as a middle power. They also sought to identify the essential characteristics of South Korea's preferred middle power diplomacy measures. It was agreed upon that South Korea is indeed a middle power given the extent of its material capacities. In addition, since the mid-1990s, South Korea has gradually incorporated elements of middle power diplomacy in its foreign policy strategies. And in 2008, the country officially proclaimed its pursuit of middle power diplomacy.

Much of the existing literature has examined the following: (i) the

process by which South Korea became a middle power (Robertson, 2007; Leveau, 2014), (ii) South Korean policymakers' understanding of the concepts *middle power* and *middle power diplomacy* (Lee, 2012; Fukahori, 2015), and (iii) the roles South Korea can assume given its foreign policy strategies (Kim S., 2013; Park, 2013; Sohn, 2014). In terms of South Korea's actual practice of middle power diplomacy, its relations with Southeast Asia have been examined extensively. Southeast Asia remains a priority region for South Korea given the volume of trade, geographical proximity, and historical ties (Teo, Singh, & Tan, 2013; Leveau, 2014; Lagarrigue, 2014). South Korea's relations with Central Asian countries have also been addressed (Lagarrigue, 2014). However, South Korea's increasingly dynamic relations with Latin America have not received much attention.

Most studies about Korea–Latin America relations focus on the economic aspects of these ties (Kim W.-h. 1998, 2008; Mesquita Moreira & Heuser 2011; López 2012; Estevadeordal, Mesquita Moreira, & Kahn 2015). This focus is understandable as the relations were mainly defined by trade from the late 1980s up to the 2000s. Nevertheless, given South Korea's efforts to build comprehensive partnerships with countries in this region, it is important to examine the underlying diplomatic strategy and the mechanisms that characterize South Korea's approach. This may shed further light on contemporary Korean studies from an International Relations perspective; and more specifically, it may shed further light on South Korea's foreign policy vision and its diplomatic practice.

This study thus aims to address this gap in the literature by linking the analysis of South Korea's middle power diplomacy with its approach toward Latin America. However, it is worth noting that since South Korea has only recently embraced middle power diplomacy it may be difficult to evaluate its efficacy. Hence, this study examines South Korea's foreign policy vision of middle power diplomacy and the influence of this vision on its policies concerning Latin America.

This study is based on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources relevant to South Korea's middle power diplomacy and its relations with Latin American countries. Primary sources include high-level public statements, official reports, and press releases from relevant government

agencies (the Presidential Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and KOICA). Relevant materials from multilateral organizations are also reviewed. Secondary sources include studies that focus on middle powers and middle power diplomacy, South Korea as a middle power, and Korea–Latin America relations. In addition, to gauge the magnitude and strength of these relations, key events such as high-level visits, the type and focus of agreements, and the volume and type of ODA extended by South Korea to Latin American countries are also considered.

The first section of this study addresses the concepts of middle power and middle power diplomacy, and the role of ODA in foreign policy. The following section deals with South Korea's rise to middle power status and discusses its identity as a bridge country. The next section describes network diplomacy and niche diplomacy. Next, South Korea's diplomatic relations with Latin America are examined extensively. The concluding section discusses the prospects of and the challenges faced by South Korea's middle power diplomacy in Latin America and its implications on foreign policy.

MIDDLE POWERS, MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY, AND OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

The transition of the international order from a hegemonic to a post-hegemonic system is one of the most widely discussed topics in the field of international affairs. The post-hegemonic system is believed to be characterized by an increasing multipolarity. While the present international order is not entirely multipolar, the phenomenon of power diffusion—seen in the rise of regional powers, the relative decline of traditional powers, and the growing influence of non-state actors—is very discernible, and its impact cannot be underestimated. Some key historical events, namely, the end of the Cold War (1989), the Asian financial crisis (1997), and the global financial crisis (2008), have directly contributed to these changes. However, these events have also created leadership opportunities for middle powers such as South Korea.

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the bipolar international order and the advent of a unipolar order, characterized by the hegemonic position of the United States and its allies across regions. The Asian financial crisis illustrates the logic underlying the calls for greater financial coordination and highlights the vulnerabilities of globalized economic interdependence. However, it was also in the aftermath of this crisis that South Korea's economic and, to an extent its political, position improved. Consequently, South Korea's power on the global stage also increased. Finally, the global financial crisis of 2008 further highlighted the limitations of the prevailing multilateral arrangements for financial coordination. This enhanced the significance of the G20, bringing together traditional, emerging, and middle powers, while also providing the latter an opportunity to consolidate their leadership.

The treatment of the concept of power in the field of International Relations has yielded two main approaches to the study of *middle powers*. First, the attributional approach categorizes countries based on material attributes, such as economic and military capacity, physical characteristics, and demographic factors (Holbraad, 1984). Second, the behavioral approach argues that material capacity cannot by itself determine the extent of influence in international affairs and categorizes countries based on their foreign policy behavior (Cooper, Higgot, & Nossal, 1993).

Thus, the attributional approach defines a *middle power* as a country that, by virtue of the "aggregation of various attributes of brute national power" (Higgott & Cooper, 1990, p. 599), is located at the intersection of great powers and small powers. As per this definition, a middle power may or may not be endowed with natural resources, may be characterized by a mid-sized population, and a moderate economic performance (Wight, Bull, & Holbraad, 1978; Holbraad, 1984; Ping, 2005).

In contrast, the behavioral approach identifies middle powers based on a characteristic set of behaviors, such as "their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy." (Cooper, Higgot, & Nossal, 1993, p.19). As per this approach, a country can achieve international status through specific foreign policy behaviors, and this

international status may or may not correspond to the country's actual material resources.

While the attributional and behavioral approaches are characterized as competing frameworks, these may be rather seen as complementary definitions offering key analytical insights to the study of middle powers and middle power diplomacy. Accordingly, this study draws from Jordaan's definition of middle power (2003, p. 165), which has commonalities with both approaches. As per Jordaan, middle powers are "states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity, and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system."

This definition highlights two key issues: (i) the state's agency in foreign policy behavior and (ii) the need to choose policies according to material resources in possession. Becoming a middle power is thus a matter of agency—a foreign policy choice which, supported by a moderate amount of material resources, entails a deliberate and active practice of *middle power diplomacy*. Further, based on the appraisal of its own capacities and of the international environment, a country may choose the roles and mechanisms best suited to pursue its foreign policy motivations. The country may choose these roles and mechanisms from an array of possible middle power diplomacy measures. As later discussions will show, these mechanisms may be *niche diplomacy* and *network diplomacy*, and the roles may involve mediating, bridging, brokering, catalyzing, and facilitating cooperation among different actors in the international system.

As Tiberghien suggests (2013, p. 166), the 2008 financial crisis inaugurated an international context characterized "a more fluid and larger game", in which "great power politics cannot solve the challenge of global governance" and, therefore, "the generation of governance must be catalyzed of nudged." Tiberghien contends that, indeed, middle powers are the most suitable for taking on this role. He also suggests that, to this end, middle powers such as South Korea, Singapore, Canada, and Australia can undertake initiatives of "political entrepreneurship" involving the following activities: (1) to provide a forum for trust-building and network creation, (2) to propose creative and novel institutional designs, and (3) to experiment with small-scale secretariats and agencies.

And, just as middle powers may experiment with new roles, they may also find new niches for specialization, as may be the revamping of the normative and practical frameworks Official Development Assistance. Indeed, considering that ODA is one of the possible methods chosen by a state to advance its interests in the international arena, ODA may become the focus of a country's "niche diplomacy", this is, its specialized contribution to the international community based on a perceived comparative advantage in that field. While such specialization need not be restricted to the case of middle powers, it may indeed offer these countries a unique opportunity to enhance their status by contributing to norm-building, establishing credentials as a "good international citizen", and playing a bridge role between key stakeholders involved in the aid process.

SOUTH KOREA'S IDENTITY AS A MIDDLE POWER

As discussed earlier, while a country can be categorized as a middle power based on its material capacities, it is the actual practice of middle power diplomacy that ultimately defines its status. Thus, the practice of middle power diplomacy can be seen as the result of a self-constructed identity as a middle power. That is, by recognizing its *intermediate* position between major and small powers, a country can choose to enhance its international status by adopting the roles and practices characteristic of middle power diplomacy. Therefore, a country may project itself as a *bridge country* or a *broker country*, and, in doing so, it may make use of niche and network diplomacy to act as a catalyzer, facilitator, or manager. Ultimately, however, the middle power roles and the diplomatic mechanisms a country can adopt are dependent on its position, material capacities, and the characteristics of the international order at any given time.

South Korea has been internationally recognized for its rapid economic growth and successful democratization, both achieved in a period of 30 years between 1960 and 1990. By the 2000s, South Korea had become a middle power, even if only based on the attributional criteria of "physical, economic, and military capacity" (Robertson, 2007, p. 155–156):

> In 2005, its population placed it 24th in the world; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 787.627 billion and military expenditure of USD 16.4 billion ranked it eleventh in the world, in each measure respectively. In the majority of physical, economic, and military capacity measurements, South Korea outranks states traditionally associated with middle power foreign policy behavior.

However, the material capacities and the foreign policy behaviors of the country remained at odds. At the time, South Korea had only just begun its transition toward middle power behavior. Up until the 1990s, South Korea did not actively participate in international politics, instead finding itself at the center of regional competition given its geopolitical location, which in turn complicated its relations with great powers. Prior to its participation in international politics, South Korea mainly focused on domestic issues, such as reconstruction and national development, and national security in the aftermath of the Korean War. As a result, South Korea's foreign affairs were characterized by a reactive, instead of a proactive, approach. Moreover, as a result of its strategic geopolitical position and given the imperatives of national security, South Korea favored a realist vision of international affairs and prioritized bilateral relations with major powers, its alliance with the United States being the most representative in this context (Robertson, 2008).

According to Sohn (2014, p. 67), "*the ultimate goal of Korea's foreign policy is the stability and peace of the Korean Peninsula, as well as economic development, for which it has historically relied on the alliance with the United States."* However, the increase in national capacities and major transformations engendered by the international distribution of power has created both the opportunity and the need for South Korea to look beyond its immediate environment and seek a more assertive role in international affairs (Robertson, 2007; Sohn, 2014). Thus, from the 1990s onward, successive governments sought to expand South Korea's participation in the international arena by diversifying its bilateral relations and actively participating in multilateral organizations.[1]

1 These policies are summarized as follows: President Kim Young-sam's (1993–1998)

While these policies were not explicitly based on concepts of *middle power* or *middle power diplomacy*, they had the common aim of integrating South Korea into the post-Cold War system in order to enhance its status through internationalist diplomacy. They aimed to position South Korea as a relevant international actor as well as expand and strengthen its leadership at the regional and global levels. Indeed, these efforts did not go unnoticed. South Korea's role as a founding member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (1989), its entry into the OECD (1996), and its role as a founding member of the G20 in 1999 enhanced its international visibility and significance. This approach to foreign policy, therefore, can be regarded as a precursor to the explicit launch of middle power diplomacy during Lee Myung-bak's presidency (2008–2013). This trend also continued under the Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017).

By the time Lee's tenure as President began, the concepts of *middle power* and *middle power diplomacy* were widely discussed by both academics and policymakers to characterize South Korea's status and foreign policy behavior (Sohn, 2014). Possibly as a result of this trend and as a consequence of the transformations in Korea's foreign policies, the Lee administration explicitly adopted middle power diplomacy as the basis of its foreign policy strategy— "Global Korea".

This strategy aimed to strengthen South Korea's diplomatic relations across regions and facilitate its active participation in multilateral organizations. Moreover, ODA was selected as one of the priority mechanisms for Korea's contributions to the international community. President Lee highlighted South Korea's unique and "ideal" position to contribute to global issues and hinted at the country's potential to play a bridging role: "Korea is well positioned to talk about the problems of the global economy and present solutions to them. That is because we are a middle power nation that has successfully risen from being one of the poorest countries in the world." (Korea.net, 2010)

"globalization policy", encompassing the political, economic, and cultural spheres and based on developing a "new diplomacy"; President Kim Dae-jung's (1998–2003) aim for an independent foreign policy through the Sunshine Policy and the promotion of Korea as a model of successful democratization in the Club of Madrid; and Roh Moo-hyun's (2004–2008) doctrine of Korea as a "balancer in Northeast Asia" and as the "economic hub of Northeast Asia".

The Park administration also adopted middle power diplomacy as a basis for its foreign policy strategy, called *Trustpolitik*. This administration regarded the following as one of its primary goals: "emerging as a middle power which has the trust of the international community and contributes to peace and development in the world" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2014, p. 25). To this end, it invigorated its efforts to strengthen bilateral and regional relations and actively participated in multilateral organizations, while also stressing South Korea's unique international position. In August 2013, Yun Byung-se, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated, "The Park Geun-hye government, as a responsible middle power in the international community, wishes to give back the help we received in the past. As a trustworthy friend, it wishes to make meaningful contributions to maintain the peace and stability of the international community." (MOFA, 2013)

Thus, successive governments emphasized that South Korea could effectively perform a *bridge role* across a variety of issues in the international agenda; and development cooperation was also accorded priority in this context. Indeed, this *bridge role* became the basis for South Korea's identity as a middle power as well as its practice of middle power diplomacy (Kim S., 2013; Sohn, 2014; Fukahori, 2015).

SOUTH KOREA'S NETWORK AND NICHE DIPLOMACY

Based on its identity as a *bridge country*, South Korea's foreign policy has displayed several roles characteristic of middle power diplomacy. In addition to fulfilling the traditional roles of middle powers—such as those of "catalyzer, facilitator, and manager" (Cooper et al., 1993)—South Korea has also adopted mechanisms characteristic of the "new roles" of middle power diplomacy, such as the active pursuit of network power and the practice of network diplomacy.

The traditional roles entail the provision of "intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative and take the lead in gathering followers around it," focusing on "agenda setting" and engaging in "associational, collaborative, and coalitional activities." They also emphasize "institution building, creating formal organizations or regimes, and developing

conventions and norms" (Cooper et al. 1993, p. 25–26). Kim S. (2013, p. 123–125) argues that South Korea is well placed to act as a "complementary programmer" to accelerate "the effective operation of global governance in various fields." Similarly, Sohn (2014, p. 69) also argues that South Korea can perform the roles of a "*designer, planner, or drafter*." These roles essentially entail the reinvention of traditional middle power roles by exploiting South Korea's position as a bridge country.

Performing these roles depends on two key conditions: first, the use of soft power to garner support and legitimacy for coalition-building, and second, the ability to identify specific issues in which the country has a competitive advantage to act as a bridge and broker. This is, in essence, the practice of network and niche diplomacy. Although network diplomacy is broadly based on coalition-building, it is not directed toward the resolution of particular issues. Rather, it involves the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations, specifically in terms of a country's position in the international system.

Considering South Korea's resources and its competitive advantages, the Lee and Park administrations pursued niche diplomacy for the following ends: (i) to enable "regional cooperation and the establishment of regional structures of dialogue and integration" (Leveau, 2014, p. 185), and (ii) to address issues such as "official development assistance, peacekeeping operations, and climate change" (Lee, 2012, p. 14). Regional and global leadership in these areas requires Korea's active practice of network diplomacy, for which "South Korea has to make an effort to call behavioral supports even from geographically remote countries, and attempts to create a favorable network configuration around itself." (Kim S., 2013, p. 121).

South Korea's active participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs as well as in global debates on development cooperation indicates that it regards ODA as one of its main niches in terms of global diplomatic efforts. South Korea's development experience was identified as its strongest advantage. This further legitimized its contributing to development cooperation on a global scale. For instance, South Korea is the first country to complete the transition from a recipient country to a donor country. This transition was highlighted in its accession to the OECD in 1996 and to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010. As Teo,

Singh, and Tan argue (2013, p. 7) "Providing assistance to emerging economies is a tenet of President Lee's 'Global Korea' vision, establishing South Korea's bridging role between developed and developing countries." Similarly, the Park administration also established ODA as one of the main tasks of *Trustpolitik*. In fact, the administration sought to "promote continuous expansion of ODA and implement exemplary integrative development cooperation practices" (Cheongwadae, 2013).

In short, ODA has become an ideal mechanism for South Korea to fulfill its middle power aspirations. It allows the country to make use of its historical experience as the basis to act as a bridge between traditional and emerging donors, as well as between donors and recipient countries. Further, South Korea is also in a powerful position to act as an "agenda setter" by sharing the lessons of its triple experience as a recipient country, an emerging donor, and a member of the OECD/DAC (Lee, 2012; Teo, Singh, & Tan, 2013; Bondaz & Allard, 2014). As Kim T. suggests (2015, p. 2), acting as a mediator not only increases South Korea's soft power and strengthens its role as an agenda setter in the field of development but could also be "the optimal solution of how to use its limited scale of ODA budgets in a more strategic fashion."

At the multilateral level, South Korea's most celebrated contributions include the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit and the 2011 OECD 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), which was held in Busan. Through these events, South Korea could showcase its development experience as a model for developing countries. South Korea also offered donors new insights into the practice of ODA. In particular, the adoption of the "Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth" at the 2010 G20 summit and the adoption of the concept "development effectiveness" to replace "aid effectiveness" at the Busan HLF4 illustrate South Korea's roles as a bridge, broker, and agenda setter.

Moreover, the KOICA and the KSP, initiated by the Ministry of Strategy and Planning, emphasize the sharing and dissemination of knowledge. In 2009, President Lee Myung-bak designated the KSP "as one of the ten key projects for the promotion of South Korea's national brand" (Bondaz & Allard, 2014, p. 5). In 2012, the OECD qualified the KSP as a model partnership for development. Since the creation of the system in 2004, the

South Korea's Major Latin American Partners in the 2000s

Country	Type of partnership
Argentina	"Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation for Common Prosperity in the 21st century" (2004)
Brazil	"Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation for Common Prosperity in the 21st century" (2004)
Chile	"Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation for Common Prosperity in the 21st century" (2004)
Colombia	"Strong Ally" (since the Korean War) "Strategic Cooperative Partnership" (2011)
Costa Rica	"Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership" (2016)
Mexico	"Strategic Partnership for Common Prosperity in the 21st Century" (2005)
Peru	"Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" (2012)

Source: Data collated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) White Papers (2008–2014), MOFA website, and other media sources.

number of KSPs has increased steadily; reaching a total of 193 bilateral projects by 2016. Along with the KSP, the South Korean government has also promoted its rural development experience, known as the *Saemaul Movement*, as a model for developing countries. In 2011, it was designated as the "reference model for Korea's ODA" by President Lee and in 2013 the government signed an MOU with the United Nations Development Program for the promotion of the movement (Bondaz & Allard, 2014, p. 6).

The South Korean government has actively used its ODA initiatives as a means to advance its practice of niche and network diplomacy. To do so, it has actively used its identity as a bridge country, thus making ODA a major field for South Korea's practice of middle power diplomacy on a global scale. As a result, South Korea has managed to raise its international status and is now recognized as a major actor in the global development field.

SOUTH KOREA'S MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Korea–Latin America relations date back to the late 1950s. The relations were initiated against the backdrop of the Cold War and based on a shared vision of anti-communism and strong relations with the United States (Kim W.-h., 2008). Commercial activities and opportunities were highly limited during this period, and it was not until the late 1980s that trade between South Korea and Latin American countries began to expand. This development was reflected in the diplomatic sphere as President Roh Tae-woo became the first South Korean head of state to visit a Latin American country, when he visited Mexico in 1991. In 1996–1997, Kim Young-sam, accompanied by a great number of business leaders, also made official trips to the region.

South Korea's economic engagement with Latin America in the 1990s remained steady until the Asian Financial crisis in 1997. It was not until 2003 that their commercial relations regained dynamism (Kim W.-h., 2008). South Korea's diplomatic approach to the region significantly changed during the 2000s, especially during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. As South Korea's relations with the region had previously suffered from weak institutionalization, these governments sought to systematize and deepen ties throughout the region by actively utilizing summit diplomacy, economic diplomacy, public and cultural diplomacy, and network and niche diplomacy initiatives.

On the summit diplomacy front, the number and frequency of state visits increased. President Lee Myung-bak visited Peru and Brazil in 2008; Mexico and Panama in 2010; and Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia in 2012. During his visit to Mexico and Panama in 2010, he also met the presidents of all Central American countries. President Park visited Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil in 2015; in 2016, she also visited Mexico. In addition, she scheduled to visit Argentina and Peru for the 2016 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit—a trip which finally did not take place due to South Korea's domestic issues at the time.

Economic relations were diversified and institutionalized through the enactment of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Chile (2004), Peru

(2011), and Colombia (2013, implemented in 2016), while negotiations with Mexico have been underway since 2007. Negotiations with Central American countries[2] began in June 2015, and negotiations with Ecuador began in August 2015. The South Korean government has also regularly supported business forums between South Korea and Latin American countries.

In terms of network diplomacy, both Lee and Park administrations proactively sought to strengthen bilateral ties by identifying strategic partners. Further, they aimed to strengthen multilateral ties by participating in regional organizations. South Korea also sought to facilitate ties between East Asia and Latin America, functioning as a bridge country to achieve this goal.

The early 2000s marked the beginning of a new phase in the ties between South Korea and Latin American countries, especially countries that are now considered South Korea's major partners. Bilateral relations between South Korea and these counties were upgraded to a strategic level. As indicated below, this trend began during the Roh Moo-hyun administration and continued until the Lee and Park administrations.

The significance of these agreements is better understood in the context of South Korea's categorization of bilateral relations. As Jong-yeon Chu has pointed out (2014, p. 18), "the concept of 'Strategic Cooperative Partnership' comes as a second category after 'Strategic Alliance', which is used for the bilateral relation with the United States." The "Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership" holds a similar level of importance.

Examples of South Korea's network diplomacy in Latin America can be found in the former's participation in regional organizations in Latin America. Key features of this approach include requesting permanent membership or observer status, signing MOUs for specific-issue cooperation, hosting high-level summits, and offering financial support to the organizations.

On the trade front, South Korea first approached the Mercosur (Southern

2 This FTA was negotiated as a regional block including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. It was signed on March 15, 2017 and is pending ratification and enforcement.

Common Market).[3] Although South Korea is not an extra-regional member or an observer, it signed diverse MOUs with all members of this institution. In 2004, a feasibility study was conducted on a South Korea–Mercosur FTA, and in 2009 a new MOU for the "Establishment of a Joint Consultative Group to Promote Trade and Investments between the Republic of Korea and MERCOSUR" was adopted. However, due to political conflicts between member countries, the negotiations have been suspended.

In terms of trade, finance, and development cooperation, South Korea has actively collaborated with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), having become a member in 2005. South Korea was the second country from East Asia to join the institution, with Japan becoming a member in 1976 and China in 2009. In March 2015, South Korea hosted the 56th Annual Meeting of the IDB- Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) Board of Governors, held in Busan. The meeting was attended by over 3,000 personalities, including finance ministers, central bank governors, and multilateral organization executives. Three sub-events were also hosted: the IDB-IIC Youth Forum, the South Korea–Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Business Forum, and the South Korea–LAC Knowledge-Sharing Forum.

These events gave South Korea concrete opportunities in terms of network diplomacy, economic diplomacy and, especially, niche diplomacy. In her opening speech, President Park highlighted the importance of "sharing development knowledge and experiences for mutual prosperity" in order to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation between South Korea and Latin America (IDB, "IDB closes annual meeting in Korea", 2015/03/30). Finance Minister Choi Kyung-hwan, who chaired the Board of Governors' meeting, said that the 2015 IDB–IIC "will strengthen Korea's presence in the international economic sphere, in addition to introducing the 'hallyu' culture to increase familiarity with the LAC through both trade and cultural ties." (Korea Herald, "Busan to host IDB-ICC board", 2015/03/18).

A third organization in which South Korea has participated since 2007 is the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the

3 Mercosur was established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Venezuela became a member in 2005.

Caribbean (ECLAC). Since then, South Korea has implemented several cooperation programs with ECLAC, and in 2012 an MOU was signed to expand cooperation through "mutual information exchange, joint research, expert exchanges, dispatch of interns, and seminars." (MOFA, 2014, p. 155).

In terms of comprehensive political, economic, and development cooperation, South Korea has also strengthened ties with the Central American Integration System (SICA)[4], where it was admitted as an observer in 2012. South Korea thus became SICA's third East Asian extra-regional observer, after Taiwan (2000) and Japan (2010). In addition, a Korea–SICA Dialogue and Cooperation Forum has been held on an annual basis since 2003. Presidential-level summits are organized to bolster ties, and various MOUs are also in place between different South Korean governmental agencies and the SICA.

In terms of inter-regional cooperation, South Korea's role in the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) deserves special attention. FEALAC, originally a Singapore initiative, was formed in 1998 as the "East Asia-Latin America Forum." It was renamed in 2001, when the organization's Framework Document was adopted by its 36 members in Santiago, Chile. This is the first inter-regional cooperation mechanism between East Asia and Latin America, and it has charted the course for strengthening cooperation "on important international, political, and economic issues with a view to working together in different international fora in order to safeguard common interests" (FEALAC, "About FEALAC", 2015).

In 2010, South Korea took the initiative of proposing the establishment of a FEALAC *Cyber Secretariat*. The proposal received unanimous support, and the Cyber Secretariat was founded in 2011. This establishment of this secretariat, which is managed by South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' FEALAC office in Seoul, can be directly linked to middle power diplomacy and to what Tiberghien (2013, p. 161) regards as the main roles of middle powers in the twenty-first century: to "propose and create innovative

4 The SICA is a political and economic integration system established in 1993. Its members are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

institutional designs" and "initiate small-scale experiments and host secretariat-type organizations."

South Korea's network diplomacy is heavily intertwined with and complemented by its niche diplomacy through its ODA initiatives. Based on the experience of the transition from a recipient country to an OECD/DAC donor country, South Korea has sought to contribute to the international development agenda by sharing policy lessons and bridging the interests of traditional donors, emerging donors, and recipient countries.

In terms of the volume of aid offered by South Korea to its recipient regions, Latin America occupies only the third position, after Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, continuous support to the region since the late 1980s has led Latin American countries to count on South Korea as a relevant development partner. Moreover, the country's visibility in Latin America has increased due to growing economic ties, network diplomacy, and higher cultural awareness resulting from public and cultural diplomacy. South Korea's participation in the IDB, partnerships with SICA, or the dispatch of experts to ECLAC has further contributed to enhancing South Korea's position as an important partner of the region.

South Korea's ODA to Latin America can be classified into three types: (i) Loans for infrastructure projects through the ECDF (Ministry of Strategy and Finance), (ii) Grant-based community development projects through KOICA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and (iii) Knowledge-Sharing Programs (Ministry of Strategy and Finance). Further, since 2010, South Korea has increasingly emphasized knowledge-sharing, development effectiveness, and sustainable development in its ODA to Latin America, thus reflecting South Korea's priorities as an agenda setter in the global development field.

While the ECDF project began with a loan for Ecuador in 1995, KOICA's activities began with several projects in Central America as early as 1991, when the agency was established. Since 2014, following the publication of the strategy document titled A development cooperation platform that works to bring about a new era of Happiness for All, KOICA has set out to broaden its partnerships with traditional and emerging donors, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors. The following statement should be seen in this context: "In line with South Korea's efforts to

consolidate its unique position as a newly emerging donor, KOICA is committed to serving as an open platform that plays a role as a bridge between traditional donors and developing countries." (KOICA, 2014, p. 7). To this end, the KOICA has prioritized five sectors for its projects in Latin America: Public Administration; Education; Health; Industry and Energy; and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. This represents a considerable expansion in the scope of KOICA-based ODA to the region. In the 1990s, the emphasis was solely on health, education, and community development (Kim W.-h., 1998). In 2014, the highest budget shares were allocated to Health (43%), Industry and Energy (27%), and Public Administration (15%). The Public Administration budget is especially noteworthy in that it supports policymaking (knowledge-sharing) and prioritizes the needs of partner countries, such as public security.

The third pattern of South Korea's cooperation with Latin America, the Knowledge-Sharing Program, began with a project in the Dominican Republic in 2008. Since 2011, the number of KSPs in the region has significantly increased. Between 2008 and 2016/2017, 48 bilateral projects have been carried out in 15 countries, and 23 other projects have been conducted multilaterally through the IDB.

The Knowledge-Sharing Program's main characteristic is that it is initiated upon an official request from the partner country. Thus, the increase in the number of KSPs in Latin American countries indicates their interest in learning from South Korea's development experience. Moreover, it points to the success of South Korea's strategy of positioning itself as a bridge country between developed and developing countries and its role as an agenda setter in the development field. The latter is further illustrated by the emphasis now placed by the IDB on the concept of "development effectiveness," which was introduced by South Korea at the G20 and OECD.

A significant factor for the popularity of KSPs in Latin America (the region with the second-most number projects, after Southeast and North Asia combined) is the extent of development in the region. Although a few countries fall in the Lower Middle-Income bracket, overall Latin America is constituted by Upper Middle-Income countries, including a few High-Income ones. While Southeast Asia and Africa might benefit the most from

ODA in terms of infrastructure and knowledge-sharing initiatives regarding rural development (*Saemaul Movement*), Latin American countries are interested in policy areas such as the economy, finance, industry, education, and science and technology. These issues have been addressed by the KSPs implemented in the region so far.

Nevertheless, given that inequality is an important problem in the region, several countries have expressed their interest in the *Saemaul Movement*, and many community development projects are still implemented by the KOICA. Therefore, South Korea's ODA in Latin America has been able to cater to the diverse interests and needs of the recipients. In addition, South Korea has made efforts to approach countries in this region as an equal and has gone a step further by implementing demand-based ODA through the KSP. By doing so South Korea has accomplished one of the main tasks highlighted by the International Economic Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance: to "Share Korea's economic development experience with developing countries through KSP." (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2015).

Knowledge-Sharing Programs have expanded the reach of South Korea's ODA in Latin America beyond the traditional targets of the ECDF and KOICA, while also helping to strengthen the relations with South Korea's main regional partners. For instance, Brazil had three KSPs (2011–2013), Colombia had five (2012–2016), Mexico had five (2012–2016), Peru had four (2010–2013), and Costa Rica had four (2013-2016). Most of these focused on trade, economic, financial, and industrial policy and science and technology/ICTs. South Korea regards these domains as its area of expertise based on its development experience.

In sum, this discussion shows that South Korea's ODA, especially in Latin America, is increasingly based on the mechanism of *knowledge-sharing*. In this sense, Korea's *development model* is the distinctive feature of its ODA initiatives in the context of niche diplomacy. Further, it shows that Latin American countries increasingly acknowledge South Korea's policy lessons for their own development strategies. In short, ODA embodies South Korea's niche diplomacy and its projection of soft power in Latin America, which, by being intertwined with network diplomacy, may ultimately enable South Korea to enhance its network power regionally and

globally.

CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

This study has sought to analyze the context, process, and mechanisms of South Korea's middle power diplomacy and the influence of this diplomatic outlook on South Korea's approach toward Latin America between the years 2008 and 2016. The following research questions were the explored: (1) How does South Korea understand the concept of middle power diplomacy and how has it influenced its foreign policy strategies? (2) How has middle power diplomacy informed South Korea's approach to Latin America? and (3) What role does ODA play in South Korea's foreign policy strategy toward Latin America?

The study was based on a qualitative analysis of the literature on middle powers and middle power diplomacy. Official statements and government reports and other material relevant to the study of South Korea's relations with Latin American countries were also analyzed. At the outset, it was possible to conclude that South Korea's middle power diplomacy between the years 2008 and 2016 was based on its self-constructed identity as a "bridge country" resulting from its triple experience as a developing, newly-industrialized, and developed country. This identity is reflected in South Korea's middle power diplomacy through its practice of network and niche diplomacy, with emphasis on Official Development Assistance.

In the context of South Korea–Latin America relations, network diplomacy has been practiced at the bilateral, regional/multilateral, and inter-regional levels. Bilaterally, the ties with certain countries were upgraded to a strategic level. At the multilateral level, active participation and the support of regional organizations in Latin America contributed to South Korea's increased presence in the region and its image as a relevant partner. And, at the inter-regional level, South Korea has embodied the role of a catalyzer, facilitator, and manager at the FEALAC. In Latin America, South Korea's network diplomacy is deeply intertwined with the practice of niche diplomacy through ODA—specifically so through the emphasis placed on "knowledge-sharing" as the basis for cooperation with the region.

The results of this study can be summarized in Figure 1:

Figure 1. South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy towards Latin America



South Korea's middle power diplomacy has enhanced the potential of South Korea–Latin America relations. However, to further realize this potential, it is important to increase awareness about South Korea in Latin America. The active use of summit diplomacy initiatives during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations was highly instrumental in this regard. South Korea's political visibility through its participation in regional organizations and inter-regional forums was also significant. Last but not the least, Korean Embassies and Korean Cultural Centers in the region have made key contributions to increase awareness about South Korea though public and cultural diplomacy. Ultimately, the goal is to create a sense of cultural proximity that can boost cooperation by overcoming geographical and language barriers.

It is worth noting that the new South Korean government, inaugurated in May 2017, has removed the concepts of "middle power" and "middle power diplomacy" from its official foreign policy discourse. Instead, the Moon Jae-in administration regards public diplomacy as the third pillar of its foreign policy strategy, along with political and economic affairs. Nonetheless, knowledge-sharing remains a key area of the government's public diplomacy framework. Similarly, ODA remains a high priority for this administration. Indeed, according to the MOFA, "the Republic of Korea attaches great importance to development as part of the nation's grand

vision of a 'Global Korea.'" (MOFA, "ODA Overview", 2017). The MOFA's Website also states the following: "Making the best use of its unique development experience, the Republic of Korea will exert every effort to make meaningful contributions to the international community by playing a bridging role between developing and developed countries." (MOFA, "ODA Overview", 2017).

Thus, while the language of middle power diplomacy has disappeared from official discourse, important elements remain—namely, the prioritization of ODA and knowledge-sharing as key soft power assets. Although the future path of the Moon administration's foreign policy remains unknown, these elements of continuity can be seen as a welcome development in South Korea's foreign policy. Indeed, continuity is a critical factor for the credibility and sustainability of South Korea's foreign policy in the long-term and for cultivating even deeper ties with its vast array of partners across the globe.

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Education as a Soft Power Tool: Korea's Approach toward Uzbekistan

Eriks Varpahovskis

ABSTRACT

Researchers have discussed the significance of education as a soft power tool for decades. These discussions typically focus on higher education and student exchange programs. Middle powers, such as Korea, are constrained from using hard power to achieve their political goals; consequently, middle powers use soft power tools to achieve their political ends. It is important to use soft power strategically and effectively to maximize its benefits. This study explores Korea's approach toward Uzbekistan in the context of education and analyzes Korea's multi-channel education strategy. More particularly, this research shows the ways in which Korea combines selective yet deeply intensive approaches in its engagement with the Uzbek public. Based on this analysis, five main benefits of Korea's approach have been identified: 1) opportunities to establish Korean businesses in Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia with qualified staff; 2) the construction of a favorable image of Korea in the eyes of the Uzbek government and public resulting from the provision of jobs and study opportunities; 3) opportunities to promote Korean culture and language and foster cultural exchanges; 4) the embedment into selected Uzbekistan governing bodies the personnel that were trained by Korea and are qualified to work with Korea; 5) the establishment of strong foundations for future projects.

INTRODUCTION

The capacity to exercise hard power is limited to a very small number of countries. Middle power states such as Korea, therefore, attain their political goals through the exercise of soft power. And education is one of the most important soft power tools. However, the exercise of soft power through education does not produce positive results instantly. To achieve the desired political goals through soft power, it is important to form long-term strategies and develop the capacity to constantly exercise soft power. Over the past 25 years, Korea has developed very close relations with Uzbekistan, and education has been one of the most active and efficient channels of engagement between the two countries. Korea's diplomatic approach toward the Uzbek government and the public has been based on a multi- channel education strategy. Consequently, Korea has emerged as one of Uzbekistan's key strategic partners.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This study is based on the theoretical approaches toward concepts such as soft power and public diplomacy. These concepts enable one to better analyze and understand Korea's education policies that address the Uzbek government and public. The concept of soft power (SP) is most useful to explain and analyze the Korean government's policies toward Uzbekistan. The concept of public diplomacy (PD) is useful to identify and understand the reasons for the Korean government to use education-based policies of rapprochement with Uzbek public, and it is also useful to identify the mechanisms that enable Korea to strengthen its ties with Uzbekistan through educational organizations.

SOFT POWER

SP is defined and interpreted in various ways. Joseph Nye, who coined the term, described it as the capacity to make other nation-states change their minds not by means of coercion or threats but by means of persuasion through attraction (Nye, 2008, pp. 94-95). The capacity to exercise SP and

the means of actual exercise of SP remain highly relevant topics for discussion among researchers. According to Nye, a country that wishes to attract and collaborate with another country should possess certain assets (Ibid.), and the power thus produced is the opposite of coercion: it is co-optive (Nye, 1990, p. 167). Lee Geun suggests that shifting the focus from power to the type of resources used to persuade and attract is a useful way of assessing the characteristic of South Korea's soft power. Moreover, in order to produce and exercise SP, it is necessary to possess so-called "soft resources," which are typically symbolic and not militaristic or financial (Lee, 2009, pp.209-210). Both interpretations might be valid in different contexts; however, this study argues that it is difficult to completely isolate SP from "hard resources" (if we count financial incentives as "hard resources"). Hence, it is more relevant to consider cases in which a country is attracted to another solely based on the lure of nonmaterial resources (Kroenig, McAdam & Weber, 2010, p. 413); however, even attraction with certain cultural values and ideas might occur because of particular source-based interests. Soft power implementing country while approaching publics of other countries might attract them by giving opportunities to improve individual's, family's or own country's well-being through cooperation and partnership. Through improvement of life conditions and financial well-being approached publics become more open to share partner's cultural values and ideas.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

PD is also defined and interpreted in various ways. What follows is an elaboration of the definition and interpretation of PD used in this study. The emergence of PD has occurred at the expense of traditional diplomacy. The practice of PD engenders engagement between governmental agencies and the general public (Snow, 2010, p.70). "New public diplomacy," the most recent form of PD, is characterized by engagement between actors other than governmental agencies and the general public; typically, engagement is initiated by non-state actors (Snow, 2009, p. 6). New PD, therefore, enables governmental agencies and nongovernmental actors to address a wider range of stakeholders (Zaharna, 2011) and cover broader interests than traditional diplomacy (Leonard, Stead & Smewing, 2002, p. 9). New PD

also enhances the credibility of the message relayed to the general public; it also shapes publics' opinion and elicits favorable attitudes (Brown, 2013, pp. 47-48). This study also throws light on the process by which Korea selects and approaches publics. Korea typically targets a larger public in order to maximize the positive impacts of its relations with countries and even business agencies. Public diplomatic initiatives involve more actors and stakeholders than do traditional diplomatic initiatives. Consequently, it is difficult for a state to control the processes of communication and the relationships involved in public diplomatic initiatives. Despite these difficulties, the implementation of public diplomatic initiatives has particular benefits in that it enables long-term strategic relations with other states and their respective populations. This study assumes that PD entails the involvement of various actors—governmental and nongovernmental (non-state) although most acts of PD are initiated by governmental authorities or agents in their pursuit of political goals.

EDUCATION AS A SOFT POWER TOOL

Researchers consider education to be one of the channels through which SP can be generated and exercised. Joseph Nye throws light on how the US uses its education policies, particularly the ones related to higher education, as a channel to spread its culture and political values (2005). According to Stetar, Coppla, Guo, Nabiyeva, and Ismailov, modern universities serve as platforms for individuals to learn different cultural aspects and [re]shape their values (2010, pp. 200-201). Simultaneously, universities become platforms for cooperation as well as competition between SPs (Ibid.). It is worth noting that education, particularly in the form of exchange programs, serves as a two-way communication channel as communication and cultural exchange occur between individuals who travel to another country and the inhabitants of the host country (Snow, 2009, pp. 4-5). Higher education is of particular importance as a tool for soft power. This study shows that Korea has actively employed the higher education channel in its PD approach to Uzbekistan. Simultaneously, Korea's efforts are characterized by means other than student exchanges.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Researchers and policymakers have discussed the significance of education as a tool for SP in an extensive manner. In the context of China's growing economic and military strength, researchers have studied China's exercise and accumulation of SP through education. Studies have mainly focused on of the spread of Chinese language schools (Confucius Institutes) as well as the Chinese government's scholarship and exchange programs (Metzgar, 2016; Paradise, 2009; Polumbaum, 2011; Ren, 2012; Yang, 2010; Yang, 2015). Studies have also identified and evaluated the efficiency of higher education (Altbach & Peterson, 2008) and international exchange programs in the context of their ability to influence the image of a country, in particular the image of the country that implements the SP strategy. Studies have examined the role of education in the SP strategies of countries such as the US (Atkinson, 2010; Snow, 2008), Japan (McConnell, 2008), Australia (Byrne & Hall, 2013; Byrne, 2016), and Korea (Yun, 2015).

Studies have also examined the ways in which countries seek to exercise their SP over Uzbekistan, particularly through channels of education. A review of such studies also reveals that Central Asian countries have been approached by Russia (Fominykh, 2014; Torkunov, 2012) the US, China, Turkey, and Iran, among other countries (Lebedeva, 2014; Plotnikov, 2016; Stetar et al., 2010). These studies, however, do not focus on Korea's presence in Uzbekistan's education sector. Conversely, several other studies discuss Korea's presence in Central Asian countries and its exercise of SP in the region, particularly in Uzbekistan (Calder & Kim, 2008; Fumagalli, 2016; Hwang, 2012). Studies also highlight the impact of the so-called "New Wave" of Korean culture on this region (Lee, Kim & Yang, 2015; Lee, 2009). Korea's exercise of SP over Uzbekistan through education has not been examined enough. This study, therefore, aims to examine Korea's use of education as a SP tool in its relations with Uzbekistan.

METHODS AND DATA

The present study is an in-depth case study that aims to depict and explain

Korea's use of education as a SP tool in its relationship with Uzbekistan. The case study format is useful as an explorative approach to examine political processes, interpret the processes, and translate meanings onto specific contexts (Peters, 2013, p. 157). Descriptions and explanations add value to a case study if they are systemized (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 45). The present case study offers a "thick description" of the studied phenomenon. And unlike multi-case studies, single case studies allow the qualitative analysis of contextual and influential factors (Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006, pp. 20-21).

This study is based on an explorative analysis of data, which includes previous analytical studies dedicated to the same topic or a related topic, statistics provided by governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and other sources such as news and statements provided by various authorities.

ANALYSIS & DISCOURSE

BACKGROUND

Uzbekistan declared its independence in 1991, just as the Soviet Union stood at the brink of its collapse. Uzbekistan's initial experience as an independent country was markedly different than its pre-independence experiences, particularly in terms of establishing relationships with other countries. Given Uzbekistan's involvement with the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation's relations with independent Uzbekistan was vastly advantageous to the former in terms of generating and exercising SP. For instance, Russian was the second most widely spoken language in Uzbekistan, and it was the first language or "second mother tongue" for ethnic minorities in Uzbekistan (Fierman, 2015, p.56). Many Russian language schools were established, and Russian was also the main language of higher education (IFRW, 2009). Nevertheless, after independence, Uzbekistan promoted Uzbek as part of its nation-building strategy. It also officially switched from the Cyrillic alphabet to Latin (Schlyter, 2001, pp. 11-12), and this led to "de-russification" of the education sector. However, Russian is still widely used as a means of communication, particularly in "prestige domains" such as higher education and urban administration

positions (Fierman, 2015). In spite of losing some of its linguistic advantage, Russia's higher education channel remains one of its footholds. And this enables Russia to employ education as a SP tool. The CIS-orientation of politics was re-invoked and emphasized in the mid-2000s when Central Asia's decreased interest in Russian culture and language was considered a threat to national security (Fominykh, 2014, p.28). After independence and following the introduction of a national strategy regarding language, the study of English as a second language became popular. Proficiency in English was also useful in accessing higher education. Consequently, the following foreign universities opened campuses in Uzbekistan: Westminster International University, Tashkent (opened in 2002); Inha University, Tashkent (2014); Management Development Institute of Singapore, Tashkent (2007); and Turin Polytechnic University, Tashkent (2009) (UniRank, 2017). Webster University is also expected to open a campus in Tashkent (Webster University, 2017, September 22). Uzbekistan also houses branches of Russian universities: Moscow State University, named after M. Lomonosov (2006, Tashkent); Russian University of Oil and Gas, named after M. Gubkin (2007, Tashkent) (Fominykh, 2014, p.29); and Russian Economic University, named after G. Plekhanov (2001, Tashkent) (REU, 2017).

Cultural engagement between Koreans and Uzbeks first occurred in the late 1930s when Koreans living in the Far East were deported to Central Asia[1] (Kim, 1999a). At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse, some Koreans were even born and raised in Uzbekistan, where they have continued to live after Uzbekistan's independence. In spite of their weak numbers,[2] the Korean diaspora actively engages in small and medium-sized businesses, particularly in the urban regions. The Korean diaspora also occupies middle- and higher-administration positions in the national and local governments (for more details please see Kim, 2011). Furthermore, following the USSR's dissolution, Uzbek Koreans established Korean

1 For more please see history of immigration of Korean (Kim, 1999b), memoirs based research (Kim, 2016, June 8; Kim, 2016, June 14; Kim, 2016, June 21)

2 An estimated 150,000 ethnic Koreans live in Uzbekistan. Following the collapse of the USSR, it was estimated that about 180,000 ethnic Koreans live in Uzbekistan (Yong & Han, 2015)

culture centers around the country. They also established cultural and business ties with organizations representing the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Yong & Han, 2015). Active cooperation at the highest levels was established between the Uzbek and Korean governments immediately after the USSR's dissolution.[3] The Korean government also gradually established a relationship with the people of Uzbekistan. Education turned out to be one of the most important fields of engagement. A detailed description of Korea's use of education as a SP tool in its relations with Uzbekistan is presented below.

HIGHER EDUCATION: GOVERNMENT AND UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS

Higher education is considered to be the key source of SP when education is used as a SP tool (Nye, 2005; Snow, 2009; Stetar et al., 2010). Korea actively uses the education channel to establish deeply strategic relations with Uzbekistan. To explore the nuances of the Korea–Uzbekistan relationship, different aspects of higher education are discussed. According to statistics from Korea's Ministry of Justice, the number of Uzbek students in Korea is steadily growing, and currently more than 2,300 Uzbek students are availing of higher education in Korea (please see Table 1). In addition to the growing number of international students receiving undergraduate and graduate degrees in Korea, the number of students enrolled in language courses is also increasing. The Korean government expects that it will have housed 200,000 international students by 2023 (ICEF Monitor, 2015). This may be possible if we consider that in August 2017, there were over 95,000 international students with a D-2 visa[4] studying in higher education institutions and that more than 42,000 students hold a D-4 visa[5], most of them are students of language. Although students of language are not enrolled in higher education institutions, they should be considered as potential international students because they are prone to prefer to continue their studies in Korea. Changes and reforms in university regulations are

3 For example, the first President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, had visited Korea in 1992, and Kim Young-sam, then President of Korea, visited Uzbekistan in 1994 (MOFA Korea, 2017).

4 D-2 visa holders: People studying in universities or institutions to obtain undergraduate or graduate degree

5 D-4 visa holders: * People enrolled in language courses

planned to increase the number of international students in Korea; this is expected to make it easier for students to find employment after graduation. In addition, the changes are expected to make it easier for universities to market and expand study programs and attract students through various scholarship and support programs (ICEF Monitor, 2015). Many Uzbek students continue to enjoy the benefits of the various scholarships they receive in Korea. There are several Korean government scholarships, including KGSP[6], which includes full cover of tuition fee, life expenses, and other expenditures. There are also other government-based programs that Uzbek students can enroll in; partial and full fee waivers are available, and some life expenses are paid for (Study in Korea, 2017). In addition to these government-based scholarship programs, there are university scholarships that offer fee waivers; these may be partial or full waivers depending on a student's GPA (Study in Korea, 2017; ICEF Monitor, 2015). According to officials, Korea is interested in emerging markets. And by luring more international students, it aims to reduce its culture gap and overcome language barriers while entering these markets (ICEF Monitor, 2015). This also entails on-the-spot employment of foreign graduates by Korean companies in Korea and by their overseas businesses.

HIGHER EDUCATION: KOICA-SCHOLARSHIPS

The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) is salient in the context of Korea–Uzbekistan relations. The KOICA is a governmental agency, which aims to help developing countries in eliminating poverty and establishing socioeconomic growth. This is primarily an approach to establish friendly relations with developing countries (KOICA, 2017a). Support is extended to developing countries in different ways—particularly through loans, grants, sources, and education. The KOICA's "CIAT"[7] scholarship program is relevant in this context. This program offers students tuition fee waivers during their study in Korea and coverage of life and transportation expenses. To be eligible for this scholarship, one should be "a government official, an employee in the public sector, or a researcher in a

6 Korean Government Scholarship Program

7 Earlier, it was called Global Trainee Program.

state institute working in his/her home country with a bachelor's degree or higher"; in addition, one should also be "nominated by [one's] government" (KOICA, 2017b). The selected person can choose from about 20 graduate programs. These programs are strongly related to the development of human capital and the fulfillment of long-term developmental needs of the recipient's country (Ibid.). The number of scholarships, however, is limited, and the selection process is highly competitive. Through the KOICA scholarship program, Korea typically approaches individuals already working in the government. Recipients of the scholarship are required to continue working in their respective departments and institutions in Korea after completing their studies. Thus, the program seeks to empower government servicemen with international education and additional experience.[8] As of 2014, "1400 specialists of different ministries and agencies of Uzbekistan […] have undergone trainings in South Korea through KOICA's programs," (Lee, 2014, August 29) and by 2016, Korea had trained 1800 specialists (Fledu.uz, 2016, November 7). On average, at least 100 Uzbek specialists representing various ministries and agencies undertake internships in South Korea every year (Uzbekistan Today, 2015, December 16). In addition, the KOICA has planned the construction of an electronic library for Uzbekistan, in which 220 libraries will be unified (Ibid.).

HIGHER EDUCATION: INHA UNIVERSITY IN TASHKENT (IUT)

In 2014, Inha University opened its branch in Tashkent. The university continues to develop and expand. By September 2016, it had only 694 students and three departments[9] (Inha, 2017). The university aims to develop human capital and generate highly qualified professionals for the technology, industry, and business-related fields (IUT, 2017a). IUT is a product of collaboration involving the Uzbek government, various national companies, and Inha University (Korea). Students of IUT are offered grants

8 A KOICA scholarship seeks to offer recipients additional knowledge. KOICA centers and Korean organizations such as POSCO aim to achieve this end.

9 Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering (CSE), Department of Information and Communication Engineering (ICE), School of Logistics (SOL) are active and a Graduate school is expected to open soon.

by its founding companies,[10] which represent the telecommunication, transport, energy, mining, chemical, and finance industries. Grant holders are required to work with the grant-giving organization for a period of 5 years (IUT, 2017b). The IUT is "Korea's first international collaboration in higher education at University level." It is expected that IUT will generate staff for Korean companies, which operate not only in Uzbekistan but also in the rest of Central Asia (Inha, 2017). IUT helps Korea increase its SP influence on Uzbekistan. For instance, Uzbek students completing their study at IUT are not only qualified to work with Uzbek organizations in the fields of technology, industry, and business; they are also qualified[11] to work with Korean companies that operate in Uzbekistan and other countries of Central Asia.

HIGHER EDUCATION: OKF AND DIASPORA

The Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan represents a small part of the latter's population (it is estimated to be less than 1% of the whole population). The Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan is very active nonetheless. They are mainly an urbanized and well-organized[12] demographic involved in businesses. Some Koreans are also part of Uzbek governing bodies. Furthermore, Uzbek Koreans have popularized Korean traditions in Uzbekistan for decades now (Yong & Han, 2015). The Korean government has special approaches toward Koreans living in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, the Korean government's policies support the return migration of foreign-born Koreans[13] (Kim, G., 2017). On the other hand, the diaspora is seen as an element that links the Korean government, the Uzbek public, and the Uzbek government (OKF, 2017a). The Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF) is a government-led organization that engages and supports Koreans living outside Korea. In the context of higher education, the OKF operates as a grant-giving authority for foreign-born Koreans and helps them in

10 Such as the Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications, Uzbektelecom, Uzbekneftegaz, Uzbekenergo, Uzkimyosanoat, NGMK, AGMK, Uzbekistan Airways, Uzbekistan Railways, and NBU

11 The IUT's engineering programs are certified by ABEEK (Accreditation Board of Engineering Education of Korea) (Inha, 2017).

12 Ethnicity-based associations

13 Koryoin or Koryo-saram

completing their higher education in Korea.[14] Recipients of the scholarship may choose to stay in Korea after completion of their studies—they are not bound to go back to Uzbekistan, or other countries.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Besides higher education channels, Korea engages with the Uzbek public through language and culture education. Currently Korean is one of the most popular and most studied foreign languages in Uzbekistan. As per estimates, there are 90 to 158 Korean language centers[15] in Uzbekistan, with at least 15,000 students enrolled in them (Azizov, 2017, March 9; Bae, 2008, April 22; Central Asia-Korea, 2017). Learning Korean also enables students to learn about Korean culture and traditions. The high interest in learning Korean was a result of the following factors: 1) popularization of Korean culture through Hallyu[16]; 2) employment generated through collaboration between the Korean government, business corporations, and the Uzbek government and the fact that businesses requires knowledge of Korean; 3) increasing numbers of working migrants from Uzbekistan in Korea (similarly, the role of Uzbeks and Koryoins who return to Uzbekistan after fulfilling their contracts); 4) cultural events organized by Uzbek Koreans; 5) the willingness of Uzbek Koreans to maintain traditions and the benefits of proficiency in the Korean language; 6) the growing demand for higher education and preference to study in Korea (Central Asia-Korea, 2017; Golos Uzbekistana, 2014, January 3; Korean Culture Center, 2009, June 23; Yong, 2015). The OKF is enthusiastic in its support of Korean culture and organizations that promote the Korean language; more precisely, it supports educational organizations. The OKF also supports activities organized by overseas Koreans (OKF, 2017b). In addition, the OKF organizes youth and teen camps. The "OK Friends Homecoming camp" is one example in this context. This camp is meant for Koryoin children, and it enables them to learn Korean, Korean culture, and engage with school-

14 Koryoins who study in Korea usually transfer from a D-2 visa to an F-4 visa; the latter is typically given to overseas Koreans (Immigration Bureau Korea, 2017)

15 In 2016, Korean was taught in 13 Universities and 28 schools, lyceums, and colleges. Korean is also taught at culture centers and other education institutions (Azizov, 2017, March 9).

16 Korean Wave

going students from South Korea (OKF, 2017c). The Korean government has demonstrated its interest in the younger generations of Uzbekistan, and it engages with Uzbekistan citizens of different ages, including teenaged schoolchildren.

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: VOCATIONAL CENTERS

As part of the "Country Partnership Strategy of the Republic of Korea for the Republic of Uzbekistan 2016–2020," Korea helps Uzbekistan improve the development of human resources for national competitiveness (ODA Korea, 2017, p.3). Consequently, vocational training centers have been established in Tashkent and in Samarkand. Three more centers will be opened in Shakhrisabz, Urgench, and Fergana Valley (Tashkent Times, 2017, April 18). The centers offer six-month long retraining programs "in the specialties and professions that are in demand in the labor market" (Ibid.). This is a KOICA initiative, and it is called the World Friends Korea program (WFK) (Kim, J., 2017). The establishment of vocational training centers is part of Uzbekistan's strategy to become an upper-middle income country by 2030. The Uzbek government has been tackling unemployment, and there is a need for qualified and re-trained workers for both current and future governmental projects (ODA Korea, 2017, p.5). Korea assists in the establishment and running of these educations centers. In doing so, it generates employment and simultaneously prepares qualified staff for Korea's businesses and collaborative projects with the Uzbek government and enterprises.

WFK: VOLUNTEERING, KOREANS GO TO UZBEKISTAN

The Korean government's education initiatives impact not only the Uzbek public; they also stimulate engagement between South Koreans and the Uzbeks. World Friends Korea, a provider of overseas voluntary service, offers eight different voluntary programs under which South Korean volunteers are sent to a country in need of assistance (WFK, 2017a). According to statistics provided by WFK, in October 2017, 561 Koreans participated in its programs devised for Uzbekistan. And 374 volunteers contributed in the field of education, 38 dealt with public health, 14 were involved in the agriculture and fisheries fields, 20 dealt with public

administration, and 15 served in the field of industrial energy (WFK, 2017b). Besides improving life conditions and accelerating progress in countries where it assists, WFK, through its programs, also serves as a tool for culture exchange, which aids mutual understanding between countries (WFK, 2017c).

CURRENT LEVEL OF COOPERATION

As is apparent, Korea has engaged with Uzbekistan through different levels of education. This approach represents a "win-win" situation for the Korean and Uzbek governments. It also represents a "win-win" situation for the Korean government and the Uzbek public. South Korea is currently involved in developing the energy industry, particularly the gas sector: Uzbekneftegas with Kogas constructed Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex (Joint venture of Uz-Kor Gas Chemical) (Sheludyakova, 2016, May 18; Ramani, 2015, September 13). Uzbekistan has planned the construction of a giant 4-gigawatt solar plant, which is expected to be completed by 2030. Korea has also agreed to invest $300 million in a solar power project in Samarkand. Korea is also involved in developing the automobile and textile industries in Uzbekistan. In addition, Korea has actively participated in the renovation and development of Uzbekistan's infrastructure; this has entailed the construction and renovation of roads, renovation of the airport, and modernization of the energy and manufacturing industries (Lee, 2014, August 29; Ramani, 2015, September 13). Cooperation has also been extended to other industries that require high-quality personnel, such as e-government and telecommunications (Jafarova, 2014, November 10; Lee, 2015, September 7; Netmanias, 2015, December 5). As strategic partners, Uzbekistan and Korea have been involved in over 400 joint venture enterprises and numerous multimillion-dollar collaborative investment projects in various fields and industries (Jafarova, 2014, November 10; Lee, 2014, August 29; Netmanias, 2015, December 5; Ramani, 2015, September 13). Their partnerships record an annual turnover of over $2 billion (Lee, 2015, September 7). Korea is also Uzbekistan's third biggest import partner (only China and Russia are bigger) (Ramani, 2015, September 13).

BENEFITS OF MULTILEVEL EDUCATION APPROACH

Such cooperation and deep strategic engagement may not be possible without the use of education as a SP tool, and the following functions have been fulfilled through the education channel:

1) Companies require highly qualified specialists in various fields to initiate and complete these investment projects. The Korean government has helped address this need through various scholarship programs and by establishing institutions of higher education. Such measures have prepared new personnel for projects not only in Uzbekistan but also in the rest of Central Asia.
2) Korea contributes to the construction of its own image as a friendly, strategic partner of Uzbekistan. Engagements with the Uzbek public, generating employment, and providing educational opportunities contribute to this end. Uzbekistan is currently in need of employment and education opportunities for its population (ICEF Monitor, 2012; Kommersant.uz, 2017, January 17; UNDP, 2017).
3) Owing to the constant and intensive cooperation between governments and various organizations, Korean culture and language have been promoted and popularized. This in turn has fostered mutual understanding between the representatives of Uzbek and Korean cultures.
4) By training Uzbek specialists employed with different governmental ministries and agencies, Korea has provided the Uzbek government with individuals who are qualified to facilitate projects initiated by Korea.
5) The long-lasting and mutually beneficial partnerships at the government level and Korea's permanent engagement with the Uzbek public have enabled Korea to elicit favorable perceptions. This in turn serves as a foundation for further projects.

It should be emphasized that the Korean government employs a mixed approach toward selecting publics for its public diplomatic policies. On the one hand, Korea is sharply focused on young, talented people with technical

and administrative skills. It mainly prefers people with an interest in working with Korean enterprises and joint Uzbekistan–Korean enterprises. Further this selectivity expands to currently employed government workers in designated governing bodies. On the other hand, Korea introduces a more massive approach to engage with Uzbekistan's public by supporting language and culture centers and by launching vocational training centers. This mixed approach contributes to the creation of favorable contexts of engagement between countries. In addition, in the context of Korea's use of education as a SP tool in its relations with Uzbekistan, it can be observed that education serves not merely as an ideational power that shapes opinions and wins hearts on the basis of the attractiveness of ideas, values, or cultures. Education itself is a powerful incentive as it may provide employment and even enable people to fulfill their dreams. An educated workforce also contributes to the development of a country.

CONCLUSION

When scholars talk about the use of education as a SP tool, they mainly focus on exchange programs and their impacts. In addition, the ideational aspect of the impact is also emphasized. Korea's use of education as a SP tool goes beyond exchange programs. Korea utilizes education not only as a "soft source" but also as a "hard source" of power. Korea has implemented a multilevel education approach in its relationship with the Uzbek government and public. Several Korean governmental agencies and government-supported organizations such as KOICA, OKF, and IUT provide scholarships, training, and educational opportunities to Uzbek citizens. Many recipients of aid and scholarships constitute the core personnel involved in joint ventures undertaken by the Korean and Uzbek governments. Furthermore, government officials trained by Korea are required to facilitate joint development projects. In addition to the higher education opportunities it presents to the Uzbek public, Korea offers vocational training and re-education programs and establishes language and culture centers. These measures guarantee deeper cultural exchange and stronger ties between Uzbekistan and Korea.

In the context of the Korea–Uzbekistan relationship, education is not merely a "soft source." Enabling a positive perception of Korea is important; however, it is necessary to understand that education should also be considered to be a financial incentive. Korea's use of education as a SP tool enables it to build a favorable image because it provides its partners employment opportunities. Recipients of aid and scholarships have the opportunity to earn more after availing of higher education in Korean universities. They are prospective employees of Korean enterprises operating in Uzbekistan and other countries of Central Asia.

APPENDIX

Students from Uzbekistan in Korea by year (both male and female)	D-2 visa holders: People availing of undergraduate or graduate education in Korea	D-4 visa holders*: People enrolled in language courses *Starting 2015 published statistics do not indicate whether a visa holder has D-4 or D-4-1 or other types of D-4 visa
August 2017*	2309	1678*
September 2016	1467	821*
September 2015	964	513*
September 2014	644	385
September 2013	483	305

Source: Ministry of Justice of Korea (2017) http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/BoardList.do?strOrgGbnCd=100000&strRtnURL=MOJ_40402000&strFilePath=moj/&strNbodCd=noti0703

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PyeongChang 2018 and South Korea's Strategic Use of Soft Power

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INTRODUCTION

Organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics follows a legacy of hosting mega sporting events. It is bound to draw the world's attention. This paper identifies how South Korea, following the success of the 1988 Summer Olympics, has come to regard sports and mega sports events as a tool to both exercise and generate soft power. How and to what end does South Korea employ mega sports events in its soft power strategies? What possible political ends does South Korea pursue through these strategies?

This paper relies on exploratory research based on analysis of secondary data comprising of official press and media releases regarding the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. Important here is the following limitation: the paper is written in the period leading up to the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, and therefore, it cannot gauge the target audiences' responses to South Korea's attempts to employ soft power during or after the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. The paper's scope is therefore limited to an analysis of the ways in which the South Korean government has sought to apply its soft power. Furthermore, it is not possible for the paper to properly evaluate the efficacy of this strategy in all cases.

The paper is divided into two core sections, which are further divided into several other sections. The first core section focuses on defining the Olympics and the national and international importance of the 1988 Summer Olympics in the context of soft power. This section first analyzes

the characteristics of mega sports events and the Olympic Games in particular in the context of soft power. Secondly, it analyzes the significance of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul to South Korea and South Korea's international image. The second core section identifies the political ends that South Korea has sought to achieve through its exercise of soft power in relation to the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics so far. This section first analyzes the manner in which the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics has been utilized as a medium to "sell" a specific image of South Korea as well as South Korean culture. Following this, it then analyzes ways in which the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics may be used as soft power tool to address South Korea's regional relations with China and Japan. Finally, this section identifies ways in which soft power can be generated through the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics to initiate a dialogue with North Korea.

For the purpose of this study, it is important to use and understand specific definitions of soft power and its exercise. Nye's definition of soft power is both widely recognized and used. Soft power comprises an actor's—usually a state's but not necessarily so—ability to attract others non-coercively and persuade them to prefer and pursue the actor's interests. It is the actor's "pull" factor where hard power is an actor's "push" factor. Three main resources of soft power are available to states: its culture, political values, and foreign policies. In order for soft power to "work," however, the intended targets must perceive its exercise as credible and legitimate. Key to achieving credibility or legitimacy is the actors' capacity to "walk the talk." Culture, if exercised as soft power, needs to be "attractive to others"; political values are only legitimate when a country "lives up to it home and abroad"; and foreign policies need to be perceived as "legitimate and having moral authority" by the public (Nye, 2011, pp. 82-85).

Soft power, in other words, is the power of attraction, and attraction depends on three factors: "benignity," which is characterized by mutual good will in interactions between actors; "competence," which is a manner of doing things that leads to admiration and respect; and "charisma," which refers to the manner by which an actor engages with ideals and values, preferably in a way that inspires other actors (Nye, 2011, pp. 90-92). However, these are all subjective factors. Therefore, power of attraction

depends not only on an actor's conduct but also on the intended target and its interpretation of said actions. Soft power can also operate through other ways as follows: through persuasion (using manipulative arguments to change other actors' minds) and through framing (setting an agenda or narrative that emphasizes some aspects of a story and hides others) (Nye, 2011, pp. 92-93).

As the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics are a state-led project, it is also important to consider ways in which states can actively apply soft power. The most direct way for states to apply or exercise soft power is through public diplomacy. Public diplomacy therefore necessitates the promotion of the correct narrative and the creation of an environment of credibility based on morally agreeable international relations (Nye, 2011, pp. 100-105).

Remarkable is that Armitage and Nye consider overdependence on soft power to be disagreeable. Instead, they advocate a combination of soft power and hard power in an ideal, strategic mix that is called smart power. The authors suggested that smart power strategies depend on the creation and maintenance of alliances, partnerships, and institutions. As well as aid to global development, the implementation of public diplomacy initiatives, economic integration and technological innovation (2007, pp. 5-8). Also important in this context is the notion of "a marketplace of ideas." Kroenig et al. suggested that for a state to influence other actors, the state and the intended targets must interact in a marketplace of ideas, where competing narratives and ideas fight for legitimacy, on which the success of soft power depends (2010, pp. 414-415).

The following section will discuss the characteristics of mega sports events and show how the Olympics qualifies as a mega sports event. It will also exemplify how mega sports events enhance and produce soft power.

MEGA SPORTS EVENTS, THE OLYMPICS, AND SOFT POWER

This section explains ways in which mega sports events and soft power are related to one another. It also explains ways in which mega sports events enable host countries to enhance and produce soft power. Particularly, the significance of the Olympic Games as a transnational actor and a soft power

tool is explored. In this context, the Olympics acts as a source of soft power for host countries. Moreover, it acts as a tool through which host countries can amplify their existing soft power by addressing people, institutions, and other actors at a global level. This paper discusses the factors that make the Olympics an exemplary mega sports event, which serves as a source and medium of soft power.

One way for states to apply soft power is through public diplomacy. Public diplomatic initiatives are to be understood as activities that "create a favorable impression and increase understanding among foreign audiences" or as activities that revolve around nation branding and the promotion of tourism (Potter, 2009, p. 51). Mega sports events, given their global scope and reach, create such opportunities and engender a performative politics of attraction. Hosting mega sports events allows host countries to adopt the event's universal values (e.g. fair play) as their own and champion them. Doing so increases their attractiveness and produces a sense of sameness between the actor and its intended target (Grix & Lee, 2013, pp. 6-8).

The fact that mega sports events are increasingly international and multicultural enables them to draw the attention of the global public towards themselves and the host country for an extended period of time (e.g. through radio, television, the Internet, or social media). Thus, mega sports events serve as a global platform for the hosting country to promote itself, its culture, and its image. Mega sports events are thus a communicative tool through which cultural exchange can occur and which possesses the potential to charm viewers (Parry, 2006 & Grix & Lee, 2013, p. 7-8 & Dyreson, 2008, p. 2117). In other words, mega sports events allow the host country to engage in nation-branding activities. Nation branding is to be understood as a process through which nations project a desired image of themselves to their intended targets (Fan, 2010, p. 101). This is evident especially in the opening ceremonies of mega sports events, which are considered crucial for the "construction, celebration and mass communication of a positive account of the history and culture of the host nation to the publics of other countries." Through mega sports events, host countries can charm the public of participating countries with their culture and promote themselves through "inbound tourism, increased trade, and inward investment" (Grix & Lee, 2013, p. 7-8).

What sets the Olympic Games apart from other mega sports events is that the former is attached to a set of ideas and principles that form an ideology, i.e. Olympism (Loland, 1995, p. 49). Olympism is a philosophy that is both idealistic and universalistic in nature. It is rooted in Hellenic democratic values and post-war internationalism and politics, which propel sports as a driving factor of peace and development. As such, it promotes universal values such as worldwide peace, friendship, and "mutual understanding" (Roche, 2002, p. 194-195). These ideals of Peace and Unity form a significant part of the essence of the Olympic Games, symbolized by its five interlaced rings, which symbolize the five continents in unity, and the Olympic flame (*Olympic Charter*, 2017, p. 23-24). This ideological background offers a great ideational power to host countries.

These Olympic values are (partially) legitimized by the endorsement and cooperation of the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee's continued and devoted support to development programmes promoted under the slogan "Peace Through Sport" and the reinstitution of the Olympic Truce (represented by the dove of peace), which guarantees that participating athletes are free and safe to do so and offers an opportunity for contact with conflicting communities (Reid, 2006, p. 209 & "Olympic Truce," 2017 & "Peace Through Sport," 2017). However, this legitimacy has also been questioned as the idea of impartiality through the Olympic Truce is controversial—after all, the Olympic Games' promotion and endorsement of worldwide peace is a political act in itself (Reid & Evangeliou, 2012, p. 410). Additionally, several studies argue that the Olympic Games have been unable to retain its impartiality at all times—for instance, during the Cold War and Hitler's regime (Hoberman, 2008, Guttmann, 1988, Keys, 2012, Kass, 1976 & Krüger & Murray, 2003).

THE LEGACY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN SOUTH KOREA

The section ahead explicates (i) the legacy of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul; (ii) the reasons behind its success; and (iii) its importance to South Korea, its government, and its national image. The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics was the first mega sport event hosted by South Korea; and it has

become a symbol of South Korea's transformation from a developing country to a developed country. The South Korean government wanted to host the games to accomplish three goals: to reproduce the economic success of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics (although in a distinct Korean manner), to use the games to alleviate tensions with North Korea, and to establish itself as an advanced nation. The 1988 Summer Olympics was considered a national development project from its initiation. To this end, infrastructure development programs and beautifying projects (such as the Han River Development Project and extensive infrastructure projects for roadsides, the subway, and international transportation) were undertaken; these efforts were accelerated by South Korea's economic boom and rapid industrialization. This allowed South Korea to project itself as a developed country to the international public (Larson & Park, 1993, pp. 150-155 & Joo et al., 2017, pp. 41-42).

The years leading up to the 1988 Olympic Games were also marked by severe domestic political unrest over South Korea's dictatorship, which led many to wonder whether South Korea would be allowed to host the games. As a result, several other countries offered to host the games instead. According to Larson and Park, the possibility of losing the chance to host the games was influential enough to have led to the sudden political reforms that occurred in South Korea, particularly the June 29 Declaration of 1987 (1993, pp. 159-162). Additionally, South Korea also regarded its chance to host the 1988 Summer Olympics as an opportunity to address its *Nordpolitik*, push for peace (with "Toward One World, Beyond all Barriers" as its slogan), and establish diplomatic relations with former Socialist bloc nations, such as the Soviet Union and China (Larson & Park, 1993, p. 171-172).

Finally, the 1988 Summer Olympics became a huge success because it was staged during a revolutionary time for the global communications industry. This in turn helped set the stage for South Korea's information society. As a result, the 1988 Summer Olympics became an unprecedented grand and global television spectacle at a scale (Larson & Park, 1993, pp. 2-4 & pp. 123-124). This in turn wiped away South Korea's reputation as a war-torn, politically unstable country. Instead, it was able to project an image of Seoul as "a pearl of a city—modern, active, prosperous and

peaceful." This change in image reportedly led to increased respect for South Korea as a nation, its people, and more importantly its products (Larson & Park, 1993, pp. 189-191 & Bridges, 2010, p. 65). The advent of the television transformed the Seoul Olympics, at least at that time, into "the biggest ever Olympics" (Bridges, 2010, p. 56).

The 1988 Summer Olympics was thus a huge source of national pride for the South Koreans (creating a collective memory that exists to this day), and it also allowed South Korea to establish itself as an advanced country. Where previously South Korea had been distant and isolated from global thinking, it came to be seen as an ideal tourist destination, thus creating a positive legacy for Korea (Bridges, 2010, pp. 65-66). In this manner, the Olympics served as a medium through which South Korea could place itself on the international scene by projecting an image of itself as positive, industrialized, and peace-minded country. This image resounded with its global public. Despite that the exact circumstances of the 1988 Summer Olympics and its exact results will never be perfectly replicated, it has created a medium through which the South Korean government can reinvent its national image through the hosting of mega sports events. Furthermore, it has enabled South Korea to shape itself into a sports powerhouse (Bridges, 2010, p. 66 & KOCIS, 2017).

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, NATION-BRANDING AND SELLING SOUTH KOREAN CULTURE

The Olympic Games allow South Korea to rebrand itself vis-à-vis the international audience. Moreover, South Korea has used mega sports events similarly before: (i) by hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics to establish itself on the international radar and (ii) by hosting the 2002 World Cup to repair South Korea's global image in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. It can be said that South Korea uses these sports mega events to "reinvent itself" after bad press (Bridges, 2010, p. 66). This may also be the case regarding the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. Although South Korea's bid to host the Olympic Games was most likely based on different intentions, recent bad press may persuade South Korea to use the Olympics

as a form of "damage control" of its international image following increased tensions with North Korea and the political scandal that eventually led to former President Park Geun-hye's impeachment (Lee, 2017). Although South Korea cannot control North Korea's actions and missile tests, it reflects badly on the South Korean state and creates a narrative of danger and conflict around the nation. Countering this image with a narrative of peace through the medium of the Olympic Games may be necessary to repair and improve international opinion on South Korea.

Additionally, the South Korean government has also sought to expand on the Olympics' use as a public diplomacy tool by branding the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics as a "cultural festival." To this end, PyeongChang has been promoted as the ideal host location for all types of cultural events. It is claimed that PyeongChang represents the best sides of South Korea's traditional as well as modern arts and culture (e.g. the G-500 event, the PyeongChang Biennale, the K-Pop DreamConcert, PpyeongChang K-Pop Festival, etc.) (Woo & Lee, 2017 & "2018 PyeongChang K-pop Festival," 2017). The venue in PyeongChang has also been used to draw both national and international attention to local cuisine and delicacies (Kim et al., 2017). Other public diplomacy projects to promote the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics (by implication, the promotion of South Korea) have included the Charming Korea project conducted by the Youth Public Diplomacy Team in Visegrad countries and the performance of traditional Nongak throughout Europe while wearing t-shirts advertising the Olympics (MOFA, 2017 August 17 & MOFA, 2017 August 29 & MOFA, 2017 August 14).

The 2018 PyeongChang Olympics has already been used to promote South Korean culture and to brand an image of Korea. First, this has been done by projecting South Korean values and symbolism onto the traditional Olympic symbols. The official logo for the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics has been designed to suit this end. The logo brings together the global and the local, by connecting universal values such as openness and unity with the Korean alphabet used directly in the design ("Introduction | PyeongChang 2018," 2017). The use of the Korean alphabet in the logo, an aspect of Korean culture linked to one of its most beloved kings and a symbol of national pride for South Korea, will be highly instrumental in turning the global audience's attention to the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics.

As official sponsors such as Coca Cola acquire the logo for their advertising campaigns (Bridges, 2010, p. 59), one can assume that the Korean alphabet will find its way into the homes of billions of people around the globe. This is desired (and perhaps expected) since advertising is considered to be the primary way for the international public to directly encounter the Olympics (Hiller, 2012, p. 11). This will set the worlds eyes not only on the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics but also on South Korea and its culture.

The Olympic medals have also been used to achieve this political end. The medals not only feature the Korean alphabet, they were also designed by a Korean national. The ribbons of the medals are made from traditional Korean textile, and the cases in which they are kept are based on Korean architecture ("Korean Culture Celebrated," 2017). By incorporating traditional Korean culture in the medals, South Korea demands that international attention be given to its nation and culture at every medal awards show during the Olympics. The medals draw considerable amounts of attention from the audience and may be seen as a prime marker of the Olympics since every athlete participating in the Olympics strives to hopefully obtain one. Naturally, as the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics is yet to kick off, it is difficult to evaluate other means that South Korea may use to promote its culture. It is also difficult to predict the international public's experience and appreciation of the event. Thus far, it can only be said that South Korea has invested time and effort to integrate traditional South Korean culture with the universally known Olympic symbols. The efficacy of these strategies, particularly their potential to raise interest in Korean culture and its potential to increase South Korea's attractiveness to a global audience, remains to be seen.

Moreover, just as South Korea increased and improved its infrastructure in the build-up to the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, the South Korean government has improved infrastructure for the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics as well. A new high-speed railway connecting Incheon Airport to PyeongChang Olympic Village has been constructed. Additionally, the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics also serve as a means to "promote the ICT and related convergence industries" of South Korea ("Introduction | PyeongChang 2018," 2017). Undoubtedly, South Korea was a leader of the Third Industrial Revolution (also known as the digital revolution). With the recent

advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the South Korean government once again seeks to project itself as one of the countries that leads and symbolizes the revolution. Plans to push this image include plans for 5G wireless communication, which is to be pitched at the PyeongChang 2018 Olympics before its public release the following year (Sohn, 2017).

Employing 5G wireless communication at the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics makes for an effective way to emphasize South Korea's reputation as a technologic stronghold. It also serves as a way to introduce innovative South Korean Internet technology to the global public. Due to the wide scope of the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics and the novelty of 5G wireless communication as a commodity, international media coverage may confirm South Korea's image as an innovator in technology (assuming that the launch of the 5G wireless communications is successful). Additionally, the coverage may open a path for international economic relations with other states or international businesses interested in buying the product. Finally, it may also lead to cooperative initiatives between international business or institutes and the South Korean institutes involved in the development of the technology. However, none of this guarantees the success of the 5G wireless communication as a product, and much depends on the success of the product at the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. If the 5G wireless communication test fails, it may delegitimize the discourse on South Korea's status as an international technology stronghold in the marketplace of ideas.

Finally, there is also the issue of how South Korea utilizes the Olympic value of peace to project an image of itself as a peace-loving nation towards the global public. South Korea does not have to look far to find a medium to promote PyeongChang 2018 as the "Peace Olympics." It can be found at the heart of the Olympic Games. According to the *Olympic Charter*, Olympism forms the core philosophy of the games, promoting a lifestyle that focuses (among other things) on a "respect for universal fundamental ethical principles" and "promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (2017, p. 11). PyeongChang functions as a symbolic place for the promotion of peace. It borders North and South Korea and was also one of the areas contested by both countries during the Korean War. It is also part of the Gangwon province, which is still

administered by both North and South Korea (Kim, 2017). The significance of South Korea's image as a peaceful nation is discussed in more detail below. The section also entails ways in which South Korea can use the Olympics to open a dialogue with North Korea.

SOFT POWER AND KOREA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

This section concerns itself with the use of the Olympics as a soft power tool that can be wielded to ameliorate and relieve regional tensions with China and Japan. It also focuses on its potential use to strengthen already existing bilateral relations and alliances with China and Japan. Finally, it focuses on the use of the Olympics as a soft power tool to enable South Korea to become an influential power in the region. In 2009, researchers recommended that South Korea use its soft power to make up for its lack of hard power in comparison to China and Japan and to strategically position itself in a role of regional arbitrator to mediate between China and Japan. At the time, South Korea's soft power in China ranked higher than that of Japan. Similarly, Korea's soft power in Japan ranked higher than that of China. This indicates that South Korea's possible role as a mediator in the region may not be all that farfetched (Lee, 2009, pp. 3-5).

Although relations between South Korea, China, and Japan are more tense at the moment than they have previously been (due to China's disagreement over THAAD and a Japan-South Korea dispute over comfort women and the Dokdo Islands), there is a belief that the Olympic Games could serve as a stage for amelioration and close cooperation. The upcoming Olympic Games set the stage for an East Asian Olympic marathon: South Korea is set to host the Winter Olympics in 2018, Tokyo will host the 2020 Summer Olympics, and Beijing will host the 2022 Winter Games. This allows the three nations to be joined by the uniting power and universal values of sport—i.e., "there is a need to take advantage of these sports events in the region that will take place every two years" (Kim, 2017).

Steps have been taken to enhance Japan-South Korea relations through public diplomacy. In a meeting between the delegates of the Japan–Korea

Cultural Foundation and South Korea's Foreign Vice Minister Cho Chyun, the prospects for cooperation through sports were discussed. This is crucial as both countries will be hosting the Olympics in the upcoming years (MOFA, 2017 September 18). This indicates that hosting the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics may help establish new bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan. Additionally, many of the events at the Korea-Japan Festival in Seoul honored both the upcoming PyeongChang and Tokyo Olympics, thus demonstrating that sports connects the two countries. Korea, Japan, and China have also promised to "push ahead joint cultural events…" in light of the forthcoming Olympics (Lee & Kim, 2017). Although these back-to-back Olympic events pit the three nations in competition with each other to establish themselves within the region, one cannot dismiss the potential for cooperation that the events may facilitate.

Alliances and partnerships between the host countries and other countries can also be strengthened through attendance at the Olympics. Attending each other sports events may improve foreign diplomacy and strengthen bilateral bonds between the countries. Attendance signifies goodwill and benignity. For example, China's participation in the 1988 Summer Olympics "was greatly appreciated by Seoul as it made these games among the most well-attended in recent history" (Cha, 2002). In return, South Korea strongly supported the following 1990 Asian Games in Beijing. Although the 2002 World Cup did not worsen or improve the bilateral relations among China, Japan, and South Korea (Cha, 2002), perhaps the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics may facilitate benign interactions among these nations. Attending and promoting the Olympic Games of the other nations may also establish regional credibility and legitimacy.

SOFT POWER AND OPEN DIALOGUE WITH NORTH KOREA

Over the years, mega sports events have become a medium through which South Korea has been able to initiate and establish contact with North Korea. Mega sports events have nurtured an atmosphere of contact between both countries. North Korea and South Korea's interactions at mega sports events has grown from North Korea's non-attendance at the 1988 Summer

Olympics in Seoul to North Korean and South Korean athletes marching under a united flag on multiple occasions. Although such instances have not always reaped the intended results and they certainly do not imply political cooperation or amelioration, as showcased by North Korea's continued missile tests and displays of hard power, the symbolic value of athletes uniting under a single flag is significant. Even when that unity only lasts for the duration and the purpose of a mega sports event (Kim, 2017 & Jung, 2013).

The PyeongChang 2018 Olympics thus represents an opportunity for dialogue between North and South Korea. In the words of the official PyeongChang 2018 Olympics site, the Olympics functions as a "stage open for communication between South and North Korea and the world" ("Introduction," 2017). Instrumental in potentially achieving this feat is South Korea's continued attempts to push the 2018 Olympics as the "Peace Olympics" and encourage North Korea's participation in the games (Kim, 2017 & "S. Korea vows to make every effort," 2017). In this context, Olympism and its rhetoric of peace are a viable resource of ideational soft power, readily available for South Korea to tap into, and fostered through years of tradition. The fact that the South Korean government seeks to involve North Korea in the 2018 Olympics allows it to claim this source of soft power for its own. Doing so portrays South Korea as a host country that respects the principles and values at the core of the Olympics. Furthermore, if the organizers of PyeongChang 2018 succeed in bringing North Korean athletes to PyeongChang for the Olympics, South Korea can claim to be successful in upholding Olympic values. Considering North Korea's recent missile test launches and tensions with the United States, it appears unlikely that the international audience may deem North Korea's participation in the Olympic Games as a credible means to promote peace. It may, however, help ameliorate the public's views and opinions on South Korea.

More importantly, the Olympic Truce may offer South Korean diplomacy the chance to produce a culture of peace with North Korea (Reid, 2006, p. 209). In other words, the Olympic Truce sets a narrative that depoliticizes any possible dialogue between South and North Korea at the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. In this case, the Olympic values would function as a go-between when politics and official diplomacy fail to

improve relations between North and South Korea (Kim, 2017). Simultaneously, the chief organizer has stated that the issue of North Korea's participation in the 2018 Olympics has been approached with "the Olympic spirit"—in other words, with political impartiality (Joo, 2017). As mentioned, this is highly ironic since the promotion of peace is itself political.

Although it is impossible to predict whether the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics will succeed at establishing a window for dialogue between South and North Korea, using mega sports events for diplomacy with North Korea has not always worked out in the past (Jung, 2013). This in turn indicates that there are limits to the power of attraction and soft power.

CONCLUSION

This paper has established that South Korea has attempted to project its culture and history onto symbols of the Olympic Games. In doing so, it seeks to promote its culture to the global public and project itself as a dynamic culture. However, it is not possible, at this point in time, to predict the efficacy of these strategies. Since the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics have not yet begun, South Korea may seek to promote its interests through as of yet unknown mediums, such as opening and closing ceremonies, for example. So far, the 2018 Olympics have been used for public diplomatic activities and the promotion of South Korea's landscapes, food, and cultural arts.

Another possibility is that South Korea may employ the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics to launch itself as a revolutionary in new technologies and seek a global market for its products. Further research on this dimension of the Olympics would be promising. Furthermore, South Korea has sought to project itself as a peaceful country, in part to establish itself regionally and to seek contact and communication with North Korea through the ideational concept of the Olympic Truce. To do so, South Korea has tapped into the vast reserves of ideational power that comes attached to the Olympic Games and its universal values. In this context, it is worth mentioning that hosting the Olympics allows a nation to generate new soft power.

A last interesting factor is that South Korea seems to be pursuing the same political goals it sought to achieve through the 1988 Summer Olympics (increasing infrastructure, launching an image of itself that is peaceful in nature, and an image of itself that seeks to mediate tensions in the region and ameliorates South Korea's own undemocratic reputation through sudden political upheaval). Further research on South Korea's use of the Olympics as a source and tool of soft power is required and encouraged. It might also be interesting to research whether South Korea has attempted to pursue the aforementioned political goals during its hosting of other mega sports events, seeking to experience the success of the 1988 Summer Olympics once again.

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Teamwork Makes the Dream Work: Assessing the Potential of Sports as a Tool of Public Diplomacy in Inter-Korean Relations

Sarah Kunis

ABSTRACT

This paper will explore the potential of using sport as a tool of public diplomacy in the case of relations between North Korea and South Korea. Although the two Koreas remain politically divided, sport has the ability to overcome many of the limitations of traditional public diplomacy and therefore can play a unique role in influencing public opinion and shaping the relations between the two countries. This paper will explore the mechanisms of how sports diplomacy had an impact on improving inter-Korean relations during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and 2014 Incheon Asian Games. By providing opportunities for interaction between the two Koreas to take place despite the current state of political stalemate, sports diplomacy, with its high visibility due to media coverage, provides an effective and low-cost way to keep alive the spirit of unity and pan-Korean nationalism between the two countries.

INTRODUCTION

It was a selfie that momentarily caught the world's breath and captured the imagination of millions of Koreans. In any other context, two young girls, posing shyly for a self-portrait, or "selfie," complete with a peace sign,

would have been a commonplace occurrence, especially among youths. However, beyond the fact that these two girls were world-class gymnasts competing in the 2016 Rio Olympics, the more astounding fact was these two girls were North and South Korean athletes. Their selfie was unique in that it was able to capture the Olympic spirit of building peace and cooperation and their young and optimistic smiles briefly roused the hopes of millions of Koreans who remain separated from their families by the 38th parallel.

Indeed, given that opportunities for interaction between youths from both sides of the Korean peninsula are so few and far in between, the role of sport in uniting these two youths in a display of inter-Korean unity is a topic worthy of further exploration. Sport has long played a role in uniting nations and cultures under a banner of cooperation and teamwork. Although there are undoubtedly negative aspects of sport, as it can encourage destructive competition, sport as a tool of public diplomacy should not be readily dismissed as fanciful or futile. The effects of sport linger on far after the sporting events' conclusion and far beyond the borders of the playing field. And some of these effects are positive and beneficial: "...sport events do not only provide a stage for political and ideological rivalries but can also facilitate cooperation, increase understanding, bridge profound differences, break down stereotypes, and confine conflicts to the playing field rather than the battlefield" (Merkel 2008: 290).

RESEARCH QUESTION

Can sport be used as a vehicle for public diplomacy to improve relations in the case of the two Koreas? Using two case studies from the 2004 Athens Olympics Games and 2014 Incheon Asian Games, this paper will examine how sport was used as a tool of public diplomacy to improve relations between the two Koreas. The aims of this paper are to explore how sports diplomacy has been utilized in the past and ultimately to seek out possible future avenues of public diplomacy between the two Koreas.

STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

With the goal of understanding and exploring the role of sport as a tool of public diplomacy in Inter-Korean relations, this paper will proceed to

provide a literature review of collaborative public diplomacy in order to create a theoretical framework in which to analyse sports diplomacy. The literature review will be followed by a brief historical background of inter-Korean relations to set the stage for the two case studies. After analysing the two case studies, the paper will conclude by emphasizing the role of sports in public diplomacy, and at the end also very briefly open up the discussion of potential avenues for the future employment of sport as a tool of public diplomacy between the two Koreas.

LITERATURE REVIEW

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Given the nascent academic emergence of the field of sport diplomacy, the main theoretical framework will be derived from more established concepts of new public diplomacy. Over the past decades, the definition of diplomacy has been expanded from its original concept of traditional diplomatic statecraft conducted between state actors. The rise of "new diplomacy" can be characterized by the emergence of non-state actors and the increased accessibility of information and access to platforms that facilitate global interactions and communication due to technological advancements driven by the internet.

Brian Hocking, one of the most prominent authors in the field of new public diplomacy, has described how a rapidly transforming global environment is creating a schism between the traditional concept of diplomacy and the emergence of a new concept of diplomacy conducted on multifaceted levels among various policy networks by "stakeholders who possess interests and expertise related to them" (Hocking 2008: 66). He finds that the main differences between the two different strains of diplomacy are the patterns of participation and communication. These "stakeholders are viewed less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages than possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes" (Hocking 2008: 66).

Cowan and Arsenault expand on Hocking's concept of the multi-stakeholder model of diplomacy by classifying three layers of public

diplomacy as monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. They define collaboration as "initiatives in which people work together on a joint venture or project" and the benefits include that fact that collaboration "provides an equally critical and, in certain cases, more effective approach to engaging with foreign publics...and creates a sense of trust and mutual respect" (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11). Furthermore, collaboration goes beyond one-way asymmetrical models of traditional diplomacy by encouraging active participation through two-way symmetrical models:

> "Collaborative projects almost without exception include dialogue between participants and stakeholders, but they also include concrete and typically easily identifiable goals and outcomes that provide a useful basis and structure upon which to form more lasting relationships. Individuals who engage in conversation may each leave the room with a better understanding of the other. Individuals who build or achieve something together, whether it be in building a home, a school, or a church; in composing a piece of music; or in playing side by side on a sports team, are forever bound by their common experience and/or achievement" (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 21).

Among the several shapes and forms of collaborative diplomacy, sport fits nicely into collaborative diplomacy due to its natural facilitation for relationship building: "sports, particularly sporting events that feature cross-cultural or cross-national teams, can also provide fertile ground for relationship building" (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 25). In order to expand more on the specific role of sport in public diplomacy, the following section will review the nascent literature on the relationship between sport and diplomacy.

SPORT AS DIPLOMACY

At first glance, the concept of sport as diplomacy may seem quite counterintuitive, as sport, in stark contrast to traditional image of stuffy diplomats meeting in conference rooms, can occur anywhere, from the multimillion dollar jumbo stadiums built for the masses or in dirt fields

among barefoot schoolchildren. One of the prominent features of sports diplomacy is its flexible nature:

> "The edges to the *field* of sport and diplomacy are not yet marked; but as anyone who has ever played or observed pick-up soccer, basketball, cricket, or any other sport for that matter, knows, one does not need fixed lines on the field of play for the sport to play out. The accepted protocols of sport transcend the responsibilities of nation-states, and international sporting federations and at lower levels are ungoverned except by the participants: the goalposts are jumpers, the footpath one boundary, the school wall another, and 'the next goal wins'" (Rofe 2016: 216).

Nonetheless, the emerging scholarship on the intersection between sport and diplomacy have led to clear demarcations on the role of each in influencing the other.

Firstly, in understanding the relationship between sport and diplomacy, two different types of sports diplomacy must first be delineated. The first one is the more conventional and well-known sports diplomacy that is deliberately deployed by governments as a tool of diplomacy. The second type is more specifically known as "international sport as diplomacy" and is conducted by non-state actors within the global arena of international sporting events (Murray and Pigman 2013: 1099). Examples of actors within the realm of international sport as diplomacy include the international football organizing body FIFA and International Olympic Committee, and the role of these non-state actors include "the diplomatic activities that occur to make international sporting competition possible" (Murray and Pigman 2013: 1099).

For the scope and purposes of this paper, the focus on sports diplomacy will pertain to the former rather than the latter type, as the primary goal of this paper is to examine the role of sports in public diplomacy between North and South Korea. Although international non-state actors play a crucial role in orchestrating and facilitating international sporting events that bring together North and South Korea, the focus and analysis of this paper will be the interactions that take place between the two countries

during or after the sporting competitions take place. Nonetheless, this paper does not dismiss or minimize the important role of non-state actors in sports diplomacy, as:

> "sports diplomacy can be instigated by non-governmental organizations or competitors and then embraced by government officials for their potential value as a diplomatic mission. The most famous example of this is the April 1971 visit by the US Table Tennis team to China...Ping-Pong diplomacy paved for the way for US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's July 1971 visit and the more famous visit by US President Richard Nixon in February 1972" (Murray and Pigman 2013: 1101).

Murray and Pigman also describe four unique ways sports can contribute to advancing a state's public diplomacy agenda. Firstly, keeping in line with the rise of new public diplomacy, sport can be a useful instrument in the new realm of collaborative public diplomacy and "sports diplomacy embodies a proactive government response to the common argument that diplomacy is irrelevant, obsolete…" (Murray and Pigman 2013: 1102). Secondly, due to their high visibility, athletes can easily harness their popularity into more diplomatic roles and are therefore natural spokespeople for public diplomacy. Thirdly, global sporting competitions attract publics all over the world. The massive number of spectators who partake in watching the Olympics or World Cup provides a perfect opportunity and platform for launching public diplomacy initiatives. "Sporting contests taking place in any arena on the planet connect an audience in a shared experience provided by media outlets that are themselves global corporations" (Rofe 2016: 217). Lastly, diplomacy and sport share many areas of common ground, notably in that "sport is a pacific means of international exchange short of open conflict" and the personal qualities of an "open, genial, and civil manner" are required of both diplomats and sportspeople alike as both are responsible for representing their country (Murray and Pigman 2013: 1103).

Within the realm of sport diplomacy exists the problem of endogeneity- are relations improved due to sport or do better relations lead to sport? In

the specific case of the two Koreas, Jung (2013) finds that there needs to be a certain level of state cooperation already present for sport to occur in the first place. Countries can choose to not participate in sport from the get-go if political relations are in a dire state and the well-known example in the case of inter-Korean relations is the North Korean boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Specifically, Jung's analysis of the case of the Koreas concludes that it was "not sport itself that brought the South-North exchanges but rather only after the two Koreas made political decisions was sport taken into consideration as a tool for fulfilling policy goals pursued by the government of the two Koreas" (Jung 2013: 322). Therefore, it must be acknowledged that a certain level of political and diplomatic relations must be present before sport can happen.

Before proceeding to the historical background on inter-Korean relations, the limitations and negative aspects of sports must be briefly touched upon. Anyone who has had the experience of attending a hotly contested sports match between rival teams can easily picture the uglier side of human nature sports can bring out from both athletes and spectators. The competitive nature of sport can quickly devolve from good clean sportsmanship into the dark side of violence and hatred. Sport can also fan the fires of nationalism, as George Orwell once famously noted the ability of "international sport to give rise to the unsavory aspects of nationalism" (Rofe 2016: 222). Sports can often foster a zero-sum mentality of winners and losers, which goes against the very essence of diplomacy's core practices of negotiation, compromise, and mutual benefits. It is important to keep in mind the limitations of sport as an instrument of public diplomacy to avoid grandiose and idealistic notions of sport diplomacy, as it cannot substitute or replace the important role of traditional diplomacy. Nonetheless, the literature review established the theoretical framework of collaborative diplomacy as the foundation of sport diplomacy and outlined some of the advantages unique to sport in advancing the agenda of public diplomacy and improving relations between countries. The following section will shed further light on the role of sports diplomacy in the specific context of North and South Korea.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although Korea has a rich history stretching back hundreds of years and has developed its own distinct language and alphabet, the Korean peninsula has endured several invasions, and was most notably colonized by Japan from 1910 and until the end of World War II. Japan's defeat post World War II invited Soviet and American troops to enter the country and Korea soon became ideologically divided between the communist North and democratic South. By 1948, two separate governments were established: The Republic of Korea in the southern half of the peninsula and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the northern part. By 1950, Korea was embroiled in its own war after troops from the north invaded the south. The Korean War, which pitted troops from North Korea, aided by China and the Soviet Union, against their southern countrymen and UN troops, dragged on for three years until the signing of the armistice in 1953 marked the end of the fighting. The armistice officially divided the country at the 38th parallel. In the decades following the division of the peninsula, South Korea has greatly outstripped the North in terms of economic development, while the North, led by Kim's autocratic regime, has prioritized the development of nuclear weapons over economic development. As a result, South Korea's estimated 2015 GDP per capita of $36,500 is over 20 times larger than North Korea's estimated $1,800 (Retrieved from CIA World Factbook).

POLITICAL RELATIONS AND REUNIFICATION

The political relations between the South and North have endured several ups-and-downs. For the majority of the period following the Korean War, relations have remained hostile and cold and the rift between the two countries has only deepened. However, in the late 1990s, South Korean president Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine" policy of active and positive engagement with the North led to a brief thaw in relations, and the first ever inter-Korea summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in 2000, followed by the opening of the industrial complex Kaesong in 2003.

Reunification of the Korean peninsula has been the long-expressed ideal objective of both governments. The South Korean government's Ministry of Unification states its vision as: "realizing a new unified Korea that ensures

everyone's happiness" (Ministry of Unification Vision Statement). On the other hand, North Korea has maintained that the reunification process must be conducted without the interference of foreign powers: "The DPRK's stand is to realize reunification independently through concerted efforts of the north and the south with mutually agreed mode of reunification and to proceed in that direction...On the contrary, the current South Korean authorities are pursuing 'system unification' which is, in essence, an idea to cooperate with foreign forces to eliminate the north's system and to impose its own ideology and system on the north" (DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). In that sense, there are still fundamental and deep-rooted differences regarding the possibility of reunification between the two Koreas and political dialogue is often hamstrung by these opposing perspectives.

SPORT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS

Throughout the years, the two Koreas have had several opportunities to meet on the sports field and there have been various examples of cooperation in the sports arena between the two countries. "After the Cold War and up to now, both South and North Korean players have competed in international sport events. South and North Korean players entered the stadium together at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics...at the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships, the two countries created a unified team and competed with other countries" (Choi, Shin, and Kim 2015: 1317). In addition, "when the two Korean teams marched together at the 2000 Sydney, 2004 Athens, and 2006 Turin Winter Olympic opening ceremonies they displayed a white flag with the shape of the Korean peninsula embroidered in a deep blue colour" (Merkel 2008: 298).

Despite the past examples of successfully sports diplomacy, the recent state of sports diplomacy between the two Koreas remains at a stalemate. The 2016 White Paper on Korean Unification released by the South Korean Ministry of Unification included a section on Sport Exchanges that outlined the joint activities conducted in 2015 by the ROK government and the private sector to promote sports exchange between South and North Korea, "which included extending invitations to Pyongyang to participate in various football, taekwondo, and wrestling tournaments" (White Paper on

Korean Unification 2016: 72). Despite the joint cooperation between the ROK government and South Korean non-state entities, the efforts failed to elicit a favorable response from North Korea and ultimately North Korea declined to participate in the majority of South Korea's sports overtures during 2015.

Notwithstanding the current stagnant state of sports diplomacy between the two Koreas, the subject should not be dismissed. The advantages of using sports diplomacy as opposed to the more traditional forms of political diplomacy are numerous. Long before the first official dialogue took place between North and South Korea in 1971, sports were seen as channel of cooperation between the two Koreas, as:

> "there has been an expectation that sport events can be used as a tool for dialogues or improving the relationship. This is partly because a sport agenda places less burden on the actors when compared with political, economic, and military ones. Further, in the sport arena, there is no pending issue that must be solved. Furthermore, sport can have the effect of giving feelings of unification to the people of a divided land and can have a great ripple effect. The usefulness of sport in South–North relations lies in its combination of high visibility and relatively low cost" (Jung 2013: 308).

In the particular case of the two Koreas, it is through the "sustained use of sport as a foreign policy tool on the divided Korean peninsula" that has kept alive the "celebration of strong ethnic ties and a common cultural heritage...and the desire for reunification in the public discourse" (Merkel 2008: 293).

Given the volatile nature of political relations between the two countries, this paper is driven by the question of how sports can play a role in encouraging public diplomacy. In order to more fully explore the role of sports diplomacy and look for the avenues of cooperation between the two Koreas, an in-depth examination of two sporting events that brought the two Koreas together through sport will be examined in the following section. The justifications for picking the particular cases of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and the 2014 Incheon Asian Games include the following

reasons: (1) the two sporting events represent both international and regional sporting events; (2) they also take place under different political administrations for both North and South Korea and therefore reflect different political leaders; (3) and finally, the events take place a decade apart and therefore take into account the dimension of time in the inter-Korean relationship.

CASE STUDIES

2004 ATHENS OLYMPIC GAMES

Given the enormous number of spectators who tune in to the Olympic Games via television and other sources of media, the media plays a crucial role in shaping the narrative behind the sporting events. The 2004 Athens Olympic Games drew much worldwide attention and fanfare, as the Games returned to their birthplace and for the first time, limited online video coverage of the games was permitted. In the case of media coverage of sporting events between the two Koreas, the media has been very active in framing the inter-Korean relations in light of the current political state of relations. In the decades immediately following the end of the Korean War, the ideological and political tensions between the two countries were evident in the media depictions of North Korean athletes at international sporting events:

> "As the two Korean states experienced severe ideological conflict during the Cold War, an anti-communism ideology dominated in South Korean society until the late 1980s. In this context, negative images of North Korean athletes, which cast them as a 'Northern Monster', frequently appeared in the South Korean media coverage of international sporting competitions, including the Olympic Games. In addition, media coverage echoed the dominant state ideology, which claimed that South Korea was the only legitimate state that could represent the Korean nation at international sporting occasions" (Lee and Maguire 2011: 849).

However, South Korean media depictions of North Korean athletes have not remained fixed since the 1980s and have changed to reflect the contemporary state of relations. The thaw in political relations that occurred in the early 2000s also can be seen in the media coverage of sporting events. The 2004 Athens Olympic Games are a prime example of how the media was able to reframe inter-Korean relations in a more positive light. Due to the fact that North Korean media is not easily accessible to foreigners, this case will concentrate its analysis from the South Korean media perspective and highlight one particular case of South Korean media treatment of the North Korean judo athlete Sun-hui Kye.

During the Athens Games, the North Korean judo athlete Sun-hui Kye's advancement to the final gold medal round sparked intense South Korean media coverage and more importantly, shaped the dialogue on inter-Korean relations: "Although the North Korean team is officially a different national team, the South Korean television supported Kye as if she was a member of *our* team. In this way, as the South Korean media discursively recognized the North Korean athlete as a member of 'our national' team, the politics of unified identity emerged" (Lee and Maguire 2011: 856). By celebrating and supporting the achievements of North Korean athletes, the South Korean media created an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries. Without the South Korean media's role in shaping the narrative, sports diplomacy would have not as been effective in influencing public opinion:

> "Insofar as a unitary Korean nationalism is concerned, North Korean athletes were not portrayed as foreign athletes. Rather, both North and South Korean athletes were considered as members of a unified Korean national team. It can be argued that, by representing North Korean athletes in this way, South Korean media played a key role in disseminating the idea of a unitary Korean sporting nationalism" (Lee and Maguire 2011: 858).

Although the positive media coverage of North Korean athletes and unified Korean nationalism may be largely limited to the duration of sporting events, their impact does not immediately end and continues to build

momentum, even continuing for the next sporting event. “Newspapers have started to treat North Korean sportsmen and women as high profile celebrities and as if they were their own. The coverage of both TV and print media is extremely favourable, enthusiastic, and positive, often stressing the deep bonds between the two Koreas” (Merkel 2008: 301).

The positive effects of North-South Korean interaction during the 2004 Athens Olympics was not restricted to the media. Important people-to-people interactions among the North and South Korean athletes took place as well. It is necessary to remember that the Olympic Games are important in that they allow “an open exchange of information between individuals which has not been permitted for over half a century” (Van Tassell and Terry 2012: 817).

Quantitative Measurements

One method of examining the impact of the Athens Olympics games on South Korean attitudes towards North Korea is through public opinion polls taken shortly before and shortly after the Olympic games, which took place between August 13-29, 2004. Opinion polls conducted by the East Asia Institute and Chicago Council on Foreign Relations between July 5-16, 2004 revealed that South Koreans held relatively optimistic attitudes towards their North Korean counterparts. When asked about to rate their attitude on a thermometer, South Koreans gave North Korea 45 degrees, much higher than ratings towards Iraq and Muslim people, which reveals that South Koreans find North Koreans to be a much more familiar and friendly face, despite the divisive political rhetoric.

Regarding South Korean attitudes towards reunification, 16% of those surveyed expressed that they would support reunification with North Korea even with a substantial increase in taxes to cover the extra economic costs of North Korean reconstruction, while 54% would support reunification if the tax increase was not substantial, and only 30% responded that they would not be willing to bear any extra economic burden in terms of reunification.

However, the overwhelming majority of South Koreans (74%) did not express confidence in the longevity of the North Korean regime and instead



Figure 1-10

(Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and East Asia Institute 2004)

were optimistic about its eventual collapse. In summary, the state of South Korean public opinion before the 2004 Athens Olympic games indicated a lukewarm interest in North Korea, especially attitudes about reunification and a sizeable majority did not believe that the North Korean regime would endure.

Another public opinion poll conducted by the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) during the time period of June-August 2004 surveyed the opinions of 2,000 adults aged 18 and over residing in South Korean households. In response to the question "What do you think North Korea is

to us?" the survey revealed the following results:



Source: (Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), 2004)

This indicates that the majority of South Koreans (over 60%) expressed positive attitudes towards North Korea while nearly 40% of South Koreans mistrust North Korea. Given that the time period of this survey overlapped with the Athens Olympic Games, this survey provides a slightly positive snapshot of South Korean attitudes towards North Korea both before and during the Athens Olympics.

SUMMARY OF 2004 ATHENS OLYMPIC GAMES

The Athens Olympics was not unique in the sense that it was not the first or last time Korean athletes from both countries were brought together, but the intense global coverage of the Athens Olympics in particular elevated the symbolic importance of people-to-people interaction among North and South Koreans. This is important to reshaping not only South Korean public views towards their northern neighbors, but also reshaping global opinions and attitudes about North Koreans, who still remain shrouded in mystery for most of the world.

2014 INCHEON ASIAN GAMES

Since 1951, the Asian Games, organized by the Olympic Council of Asia, has brought together athletes from 45 countries across the Asia region every four years and includes over 40 sports. To date, South Korea has successfully hosted three Asian Games (1986 Seoul, 2002 Busan, and 2014 Incheon) and North Korea has been a consistent participant in the regional Asian games and has taken part in the last five consecutive Asian Games since 1998. In the most recent 2014 Incheon Asian Games, North Korea took home 36 total medals, ranking 7th overall, while South Korea took home 228 medals total, ranking as the second nation overall (Retrieved from Olympic Council of Asia).

However, arguably, the more interesting results from the 2014 Incheon Asian Games were not the medal standings, but the unprecedented participation of North Korea's top officials:

> "During the Incheon Games, North Korea's top officials, including Byeong-Seo Hwang, general political director of the military, Ryong-Hae Choi, a party secretary and Yang-Geon Kim, a secretary in charge of relations toward South Korea, had made an exceptional visit to Incheon and had meetings with officials from the South Korean government...the participation of some of North Korea's high-ranking officials at an international event held in South Korea was the first such major event since the division of the two countries" (Choi, Shin, and Kim 2015: 1317).

The visit was seen as "an invaluable opportunity to reopen a blocked conversation channel between the two sides" (Lee 2015: 11). The result of this ad-hoc meeting was the planning of another high-level meeting to take place in the coming weeks. Unfortunately, the meeting never took place due to the untimely skirmish between North and South Korean soldiers at the DMZ that occurred a week later. Yet the fact that North Korean government officials used the Asian games as an opportunity to reach out to its southern neighbor underscores how sports can provide alternate channels to conduct public diplomacy. By breaking tradition and establishing the possibility of future meetings and cooperation, the North Korean government signaled its

willingness to use sports diplomacy as well.

It is too early to tell if this occurrence will be repeated in future sporting events featuring the two countries, but it does provide positive hope. This event also emphasizes how sporting events increase people-to-people interactions between the North and South, ranging from the direct engagement of athletes, to the wave of media coverage provided to viewers back home in the two countries, and in this case even brought top-level government officials to the table.

QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENTS

In order to assess the impact of the Incheon Asian Games on South Korean attitudes towards North Korea, survey results from before and after the Asian games will be examined. The Incheon Asian Games took place between September 19- October 4, 2014. The Asan Institute conducts surveys of 1,500 Korean adults over the age of 19 shortly before and shortly after the Incheon Asian Games.

According to the Asan Report on "South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification" released January 2015, or two months after the conclusion of the Incheon games, South Korean public opinion was not greatly swayed by the impact of sports diplomacy during the Incheon games:

> The visit by a high ranking North Korea delegation following the close of the Incheon Asian Games did little to sway public opinion on North Korea. Inter- Korean relations remained relatively unimportant when compared to other challenges facing the country. The visit also failed to shift public attitudes across a variety of more specific issues (Kim Jiyoon 2015: 10).

Nonetheless, the South Korean public opinion regarding North-South relations demonstrated a consistent desire to pursue the avenue of diplomacy, especially in the form of a South-North summit. Following the results of the survey below, after the Incheon games, those with the opinion that a South-North summit was "unnecessary" decreased slightly from 13.1% to 10.8%. The staggering majority, around 81%, believed that a

summit between the two countries was necessary. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the role of sports diplomacy in providing an opportunity for the two countries to interact, which was seen in the visit of high ranking North Korean officials to the Incheon games. Unfortunately, the agreement for further South-North summit talks fell through almost immediately with the resumption of North Korean ballistic missile tests.



(Kim Jiyoon 2015: 28)



(Kim Jiyoon 2015: 23)

This poll above indicates that the majority of South Koreans expressed dissatisfaction towards President Park Geun-hye's hardliner policy towards North Korea and the conclusion of the Incheon games led to an increase in dissatisfaction, from 44.7% on September 10 to 47.7% on October 8, 2014.



(Kim Jiyoon 2015: 24)

This poll reaffirms the results from the previous poll regarding dissatisfaction of Park Geun-hye's North Korean policy. Although the public was split among the different policy approaches of harder line, maintaining current status quo of policy, and pursuing a softer line of policy, the majority (around 38%) expressed a desire for a softer line. However, this slightly decreased after the Incheon games and more people expressed their desire for a harder line policy (increase of around 2% from September 10 to October 8) and even more expressed uncertainty in their preferred policy stance (increase in around 4% after the Incheon games).

SUMMARY OF 2014 INCHEON ASIAN GAMES

It is also important to be reminded of the broader context of North-South relations during this period. North Korea had conducted several missile tests after its third nuclear test in 2013 and in the run-up to the Incheon games, had most recently conducted missile projectile tests on September 6, 2014,

mere days before the start of the Asian games. Given this context, the South Korean public was far more wary and mistrustful of any diplomatic overtures on the part of North Korea.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Thousands of Korean families remain separated after the division of the Korean peninsula. The political efforts and traditional diplomatic initiatives to better inter-Korean relations have not produced any lasting changes but there is room for sport to make up for the gaps: “In the case of the two Koreas, more than 50 years of complete social and political separation and maintenance of divergent political systems and ideologies have inevitably created social and political gaps between the two states and their people, and sport serves as a mechanism to aid in bridging that gap” (Van Tassell and Terry 2012: 815).

Despite the limitations of sport as a tool of public diplomacy, there are oft-overlooked advantages. These advantages include the ability of sport to occur outside the realm of politics and therefore transcend the limitations of traditional diplomacy. Sports can open up other opportunities of cooperation and diplomacy when the traditional venues of political and economic cooperation fail. In the case of the two Koreas, the freeze in political relations after North Korea’s defiant continual development nuclear weapons testing led to a moratorium in the joint operation of the Kaesong complex, which froze economic relations as well. Nonetheless, despite the current dire state of relations, sports diplomacy can offer a refreshing option in an otherwise stale and decaying public diplomacy agenda: “The prospects for changing the frozen relationship between the two Koreas are gloomy and it is strongly suggested that either of the two Koreas should try to change the present game structure of deadlock into another. During this procedure, sport can be used as an effective tool for inducing a change in attitude” (Jung 2013: 322).

The incentives for both sides to continue using sport as a tool of public diplomacy are plentiful. The South Korean government already incorporates sport diplomacy in its engagement strategy with the North and has also

sought the assistance of non-state actors in the private sector as well. For North Korea, sport is an easy method of gaining the "political legitimacy conferred automatically on any country invited to field a team...and the North Koreans appear to believe that sport diplomacy will boost their attempts to establish formal government-to-government or international nongovernmental relations while maintaining strict control over the limited and selective people-to-people contacts" (Merkel 2008: 303).

This paper has found that at both international and regional sporting events, specifically the two case studies of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, the opportunity for diplomacy increases between the two Koreas and therefore sport furthers the agenda of public diplomacy in three main ways: (1) Sport allows for interaction between the two Koreas to take place despite the current state of political stalemate; (2) sports diplomacy provides an effective and low-cost way to influence the publics of both countries through media coverage; (3) and finally, sports diplomacy fosters the most salient way to keep alive the spirit of unity and pan-Korean nationalism between the two countries.

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Sports and Public Diplomacy: The 2002 FIFA World Cup (Korea/Japan) from Korea's Perspective

Sang Jun Lee

INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy has emerged as a significant framework among both scholars and practitioners in this age of globalization (Cho, 2010). Culture, education, and the culinary arts, among other avenues, have been studied in depth as tools of public diplomacy (*ibid*.). In this context, it is intriguing to consider whether sports can become a powerful diplomatic tool to enhance credibility and to facilitate dialogs and engagement. That the public and civil society actively participated in the 1988 Seoul Olympics was evident; however, the global sporting festival has been largely shaped by government action and policies (Manheim, 2012). Since the turn of the new millennium, the Korean government has emphasized the role of sports in building relationships with foreign publics.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the elements that constitute Korea's use of sports as a tool of public diplomacy and the factors influencing its efforts in this regard. This discussion is carried out under the framework of global sporting events. The 2002 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup held in Korea and Japan was an international football event hosted by the Korea Football Association (KFA) and the Japanese Football Association. Various other actors, such as the domestic publics, the South Korean and Japanese central governments, and civil societies, were also involved in the hosting of this event. The discussions in this paper are based on an evaluation of the literature on

topics such as sports–public diplomacy, public diplomacy, and sports diplomacy. As public diplomacy is a multifaceted discipline, a wide range of literature from the realm of the social sciences has been strung together; the case study has also been extensively analyzed.

Sport occupies a central position in the context of this study because it "has always been a part of political life and as such an important factor in diplomacy" (Deos, 2013: 1). The 2002 FIFA World Cup was chosen as the subject of the case study because it provided significant economic, social, and political opportunities for the hosts. Public diplomacy necessarily involves the cultivation of long-term relationships; therefore, the participation of a wide range of actors is integral to the successful implementation of a public diplomacy initiative. The World Cup, given the range of actors involved in its hosting, is certainly relevant in this context. This study examines the role of global sporting events in the cultivation of long-term relationships. The KFA and the Korean government have endeavored to cooperate with other countries in football exchange programs (Jung, 2011). Thus, this study is based on the following research question. For the purpose of clarity, the question is divided into two parts. First, to what extent can the 2002 FIFA World Cup be considered a public diplomacy initiative of the Korean government? Second, what specific impacts did this global sporting event have on Korea's public diplomacy?

This paper draws from the analyses and works of Zaharna (2013), Fitzpatrick (2007), and La Porte (2012). The impact of the 2002 FIFA World Cup on public diplomacy is analyzed using the following three pillars: credibility, legitimacy, and relationships. This paper also relies on secondary resources and synthesizes the information obtained through informal contacts with three diplomats who were heavily involved in the organization of the event. Overall, this study is based on an interpretive and analytical approach. Secondary data from relevant journal articles as well as newspaper articles and papers published by the government detailing the impacts of the event have also been analyzed. The paper is structurally divided into two parts. The first part involves the literature review, which includes discussions on sports diplomacy, public diplomacy, Korea's public diplomacy, the role of sports, and the characteristics of global sporting events. The second part involves a deep analysis of the short- and long-term

impacts of the 2002 FIFA World Cup based on the three-pillar framework. Finally, the key implications of the nexus between sports and public diplomacy are discussed.

SPORTS DIPLOMACY VIS-À-VIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Several studies have examined the ways in which sport can be used as a tool for soft power (Aryabaha, 2016) in order to shape diplomatic outcomes. However, these efforts have largely focused on the relations between sports and traditional diplomacy (Cho, 2010). Public diplomacy has not been defined in a unitary or an all-encompassing manner; critics also allege that public diplomacy is a euphemism for propaganda (Chih, 2008). Despite these issues, the salience of public diplomacy in diplomatic discourse cannot be dismissed (Maxim, 2012). According to Huigh (2011), the salience of public diplomacy is inevitable given the global societal changes; the author also argues that changes in the concept and practice of diplomacy are "part of wider evolutions in the society" (63). Mellissen (2011) has been at the forefront of public diplomacy studies, having coined the term "new public diplomacy," which refers to engagement of and collaboration with the public by not only the state but also non-state actors. New public diplomacy also regards the facilitation of long-term relationships as one of its goals. Furthermore, given the multiplicity of international connections via online communication systems (Castells, 2010), more emphasis is placed on the process of collaboration in public diplomatic initiatives. Public diplomacy is no longer solely regarded as the state's product (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008; Zaharna, 2010). Hence, new public diplomacy inherently engenders a bottom-up perspective, empowering non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals. New public diplomacy reinforces values as well as norms and makes use of social capital to trigger a "network of relationships" (Taylor and Kent, 2013: 104). From the perspective of new public diplomacy, domestic publics and non-state actors can function as "bridges" (Zaharna, 2013: 156) and "agenda-setters" (Grix et al., 2013) to engage foreign publics [however, there are structural criteria that determine whether non-state actors can

perform these roles (La Porte, 2007)]. The involvement of non-state actors bolsters the legitimacy of public diplomacy initiatives. Consequently, the following three concepts are rendered important in this context: credibility, legitimacy of state action, and the forging of positive and productive connections with individuals and groups (Zaharna et al., 2013: 1).

As public diplomacy engenders the creation and facilitation of networks, culture and education are commonly used as tools for the initiatives. Sport, a relatively foreign topic within the domain of public diplomacy (Theis, 2013), can also be used for purposes such as influencing the state's image and gaining social capital (Deos, 2013: 1174). Murray (2012) argues that sports diplomacy can be seen as a panacea for the problems of estrangement and as a catalyst of mutual dialogs. However, Murray (*ibid*.) also points at the relatively under-explored convergence between sports and public diplomacy. Deos (2013) examines the impacts of the 2011 Rugby World Cup held in New Zealand. The author analyzes the interactions among foreign publics, domestic publics, and non-state actors during the event using the relational public diplomacy framework. The author finds that the interactions fostered goodwill, and, in doing so, demonstrates the close links between public diplomacy and sports. A reason for the interconnectedness between sports and public diplomacy is that "sport in general is related to a country's political development and its sense of nationhood" (Cha, 2009: 1581). Cha (*ibid*.) identifies three components that constitute the sport–diplomacy nexus: (i) the capacity of sport to reflect identity, (ii) the capacity to acquire power by successfully hosting sporting events, and (iii) the capacity of sport to trigger ideational changes. Although these three components do not fully reflect the facets of public diplomacy (for instance, sport as power can be misleading as power denotes coercion, even though Batora's definition throws light on how public diplomacy enhances soft power attributes), they help aid discussions that seek to examine the impact of sports on public diplomatic frameworks (Heere, 2012). Thus, public diplomacy initiatives promote a nation's brand internationally via dialogic channels (Jung, 2011). Likewise, sport provides impetus for ideational change in the relations between foreign publics and domestic institutions, as was the case with the 1988 Seoul Olympics (Cha, 2009) and the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Sports and public diplomacy are closely related, and when the

two interact in an effective way, they can foster mutual relationships across networks.

THE ROLE OF GLOBAL SPORTING EVENTS

According to Roche (2000), global sporting events or mega-sporting events are uniquely staged macro-level events that involve an international gathering of athletes, media, and citizens. The Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are two of the largest global sporting events, viewed by millions, if not billions, of people. Inevitably, these global sporting events have a significant impact on the hosts. Their economic, political, and cultural aspects receive extensive media coverage and are depicted globally (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Close, 2010). Furthermore, to determine whether an event qualifies as a mega event, the following characteristics must be considered: (i) the levels of organizational complexity and the number of participants (internal characteristics) and (ii) the attractiveness and the impact of the host(s) (external characteristics) (Roche, 2000). Global sporting events have become a crucial facet of the global society as a result of (i) mass communication between organizers [host city, region, or nation; international sporting organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA; and non-state actors such as sport NGOs]; (ii) the relational aspects of the events, which involve public–private elements, such as merchandising, broadcasting, and ticketing (Horne, 2004); and (iii) "valuable promotional opportunities" (*ibid*: 40).

The following three perspectives are commonly employed in the analysis of global sporting events in relation to public diplomacy. First, global sporting events are highlighted as a public diplomacy initiative. Second, global sporting events are regarded as semi-catalysts of public diplomacy, and any public diplomacy outcome is regarded as unintentional. Third, global sporting events are excluded from the domain of public diplomacy or the two are treated as being weakly linked, if not entirely unrelated fields. Several studies show that the third perspective can be dismissed (Murray, 2012; Cha, 2009; Roche, 2000). The other perspectives are considered valid, although the first perspective is gaining more

importance due to the politicized and strategic nature of hosting a global sporting event.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AND APPROACHES TO SPORTS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

Korea's public diplomacy revolves around complexities, connections, and identity (Chung, 2011). Despite the Korean government's efforts, scholars argue that Korea "lacks a consistent conception of or concrete strategy for public diplomacy" (Cho, 2010: 277). The impacts of the Public Diplomacy Act are yet to be gauged, but Korea's perspective of public diplomacy is narrow. Most of its resources are focused on cultural elements, such as Hallyu (*ibid*.).

If cultural diplomacy is at the center of Korea's public diplomacy initiatives, assessing how sport is used as a public diplomacy asset is vital in understanding the sport–public diplomacy nexus. Korea's status as a middle power has been strengthened as a result of having hosted various international events. However, hosting a large number of events does not necessarily enhance the legitimacy or credibility of a state (Chung, 2010). Chung (2010) argues that Korea uses global sporting events to directly address its international image, especially since sport is not as politicized as culture. It can be said that Korea's sport diplomacy was established during the North-South Korean Sporting Talks, which were held at the time of the Cold War. However, Korea's sport diplomacy took a huge step forward when it hosted the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Cha, 2008). Korea's sport diplomacy is largely shaped by governmental organizations and civil societies. The Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism manages Korea's sport diplomacy. Korea's sport diplomacy initiatives have evolved steadily since the establishment of the Sporting Department. During the 60s and the 70s, particularly during the Park administration, the department was managed by the Ministry of Education. The main objectives of this department include (i) facilitating sporting exchanges as well as building networks in the country and (ii) establishing bilateral and multilateral relationships at the international level, particularly via taekwondo (MCST, 2016). The Korean

Olympic Committee (KOC) functions as the main civil sporting body; it also collaborates with the International Affairs team.

Although several agencies in the country throw light on sport's capacity to foster diplomacy, Korea lacks professional personnel to liaise with international organizations. Moreover, the government's initiative to address this issue through the Five Years Plan on National Promotion of Sports has not fully materialized (Chung, 2011). The KOC trains its employees through exchange programs and workshops; however, budgetary issues and lack of access to resources plague these efforts (Han, 2016). That Korea lacks experts in the field of sport diplomacy was revealed during the Incheon Asian Games held in 2014. Structural issues, particularly fragmentation between the various stakeholders, have also been identified as crucial problems (Hays, 2013). Overall, Korea has acknowledged that sport can be a useful tool to promote national interest; however, better coordination and more coherence are needed to launch global sporting events as a public diplomacy initiative.

GLOBAL SPORTINGEVENTS

Sports diplomacy has triggered important diplomatic exchanges. "Ping-Pong Diplomacy" between the U.S. and China during the Cold War (Gerin, 2007) and "Cricket Diplomacy" between Pakistan and India are prominent examples. In the context of global sporting events, the FIFA World Cup in Brazil and the Olympic Games in China represent important developments in the field of sports diplomacy. In Brazil's case, prior to hosting the World Cup, the government had highlighted four uses of sports as a diplomatic tool (this was based on the "investment in culture" framework): (i) sport as a tool for development, (ii) sport as a tool for soft power, (iii) sport as an instrument to promote dialog between societies, and (iv) sports as a tool to promote peaceful relations at the international level (Castro, 2009). As a result, Brazil identified global sporting events as the medium to establish a positive national image and, ultimately, enhance its "prestige, visibility and credibility" (*ibid.*: 30). These objectives can be attained only if an international stage is available to the actors, both foreign and domestic

publics. However, it must be noted that despite the mega event's capacity to signify Brazil's international position as an emerging power, issues such as local protests condemning high rates of inequality, complexities surrounding the construction of stadiums, and high crime rates have also shaped Brazil's image.

China, too, conducts public diplomacy via global sporting events. The events are seen as an outlet to promote mutual understanding and to gain support for Chinese interests (Gonesh and Melissen, 2006). Aryabaha's (2010) study on the impact of the 2008 Beijing Olympics on public diplomacy projected China as a "progressive developing country" (3). Networks among the state, domestic publics, and Chinese living abroad played a crucial role in promoting Chinese culture; they also helped China address criticisms. However, unlike Brazil, China's public diplomacy initiatives were limited to the state level. Therefore, its initiatives do not satisfy most criteria of "new public diplomacy" (*ibid., 2010*). Furthermore, the Beijing Olympics did not succeed in fostering relationships given the Chinese government's inflexible political stance concerning its neighbors. The Olympics was geared more toward national image and pride. Recent global sporting events have shown that sports can become a public diplomacy asset, although differences exist in terms of its impact and role. The 2002 FIFA World Cup provided similar outcomes regarding national image, but the way in which relationships with foreign publics were forged in the long run has placed Korea in a unique position on the international stage.

HOSTING THE 2002 FIFA WORLD CUP: PROCESS AND DEVELOPMENT

The World Cup was hosted by Korea and Japan and has largely been described in Korea as "the biggest party since the start of the new millennium" (The Korean Herald, 2002). Indeed, the World Cup was a massive global festival; in particular, it was an opportunity Korea had to seize. According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2002), ideological elements that unified people and united the nation orchestrated the whole process of

hosting the mega event, from the bidding process to the construction of the stadiums. The interplay among private organizations, public institutions, and citizens enabled the effective execution of logistical events as well as shows designed to attract foreign publics, such as tourists, expats, and foreign students in Korea. Foreign publics living overseas were targeted through mass media (Kim, 2016).

Hosting the World Cup was not an easy process for Korea or Japan. FIFA's decision to allow two nations to co-host the event raised eyebrows (Kinsey, 2016). The historical and political problems between the two countries were also frequently cited. Concerns were raised when the two countries argued over issues, such as the order of the names of the countries, ticket revenue, mascot(s), and visa arrangements (Joo, 2012). From Korea's perspective, the World Cup was a bid to acquire the image of an economically developed state and to project to the world its capability to host a global sporting event. Korea invested nearly $2 billion on new stadiums to fulfill FIFA's requirements (*ibid.*); this indicates that hosting a global sporting event as a public diplomacy initiative is a costly affair.

IMPACTS OF THE 2002 FIFA WORLD CUP AS A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE

The World Cup had both short-term and long-term impacts. In this paper, the term "short-run" is used to denote short-term economic benefits, including revenues from ticketing and tourism and cultural benefits of the events that were organized as a result of the World Cup. According to Melisson (2005: 21), the term "short-run" encompasses "short term needs," and this engenders a focus on outputs; hence, the use of measures such as "value for money." Long-run impacts include benefits from social capital via relationships and political benefits such as mutual understanding. Pammet (2013) lists the components of long-run impacts of public diplomacy. As per the author, media tracking can be used to assess such impacts; media tracking is not the same as media coverage since media tracking involves changes in the nature and tone of coverage. Changes in the opinions of the influencers (leaders) and concrete changes in national

policies are some of the other measurements that can be used in this context. Such a categorization of the impacts of the World Cup makes it easy to understand how the three components of the analytical framework—credibility, legitimacy, and relationships—have been shaped. By doing so, it is possible to assess the extent to which the 2002 World Cup could be regarded as a Korean public diplomacy initiative.

The short-run effects of the World Cup were that nearly a million tourists visited Korea, and nearly 600 million people viewed the event at some point (Han, 2016). Korea, therefore, received unprecedented global attention. Domestically, the direct economic benefits of the World Cup boosted GDP growth by 0.74% (Shin, 2008). The consumption level of the domestic public can be cited as a key reason for this growth; foreign publics' purchase of Korean products and services also contributed to this growth. The short-term effects also include the increased frequency of regional festivals, which have captivated foreign publics, providing an outlet for tourists to consume and be exposed to brand "Korea." For instance, the regional authorities of Jeju Island have capitalized on the World Cup by hosting several local festivals to promote Jeju's produce (Kwon, 2013). However, it must be noted that some of these festivals were not attended by foreign participants, and at times, the festivals were plagued by tensions between private and public institutions in the region. Besides economic impacts, short-run cultural impacts have also played a significant role in tailoring Korea's image abroad. Cho's (2011) ethnographic study of the social phenomena depicts the landscape of cultural impacts. The first impetus was provided by the phenomenon of "street-cheering" (길거리응원 in Korean), which was also called "The Red Wave." Many national newspapers, Chosun Ilbo in particular, have described this phenomenon as an inflammation of nationalism through mass mobilization (Shin, 2008). This has undoubtedly called into question the principles underlying the hosting of a mega event. According to Kim (2007), the street-cheering culture was much more than mere nationalistic fervor, since it represented the amicable relations between domestic publics and foreigners, and shaped the perception of Korean culture overseas. Essentially, the culture reinforced Korea's image. For example, an Irishman interviewed during the World Cup considered Korean culture phenomenal (Lee and Lowe, 2010):

By then, I had become enthralled with South Korea,
a small country attached to China…
To image a country with so much energy!
Can you believe that? The epitome of innocence!
Are they really the 'devil', the 'Red Devils'?

The short-term effects were noticeable: the economic and cultural benefits transformed Korea from a relatively unknown country into a global renowned one.

Let us now deal with the long-run impacts. It seems inevitable that short-run benefits would evolve into long-run benefits. However, this was not necessarily the case. After the World Cup, MunhwaYondae (Citizens' Network for Cultural Reforms) proposed the channeling of the positive spirits of the World Cup to promote cultural education and exchanges with foreign publics (Joo, 2012). However, fragmentation of governmental bodies responsible for cultural policies and lack of coherence plagued these efforts (*ibid*.). According to Gursoy (2006), the high economic expectations have not been fulfilled, and the domestic public has expressed dissatisfaction regarding the overall long-run impacts. In terms of political dimensions, the Korean government adopted a "two-track approach" to enable collaborations between state bodies and civil societies in order to foster cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan. With the exception of a few formal talks and informal rounds between the two nations, co-hosting the mega event did not alleviate the historical and political turmoil, including issues pertaining to comfort women and Dokdo (Cho, 2008). In terms of promoting Korea, the World Cup was undoubtedly a success. Kinsey and Chung's (2013) study of the factors affecting Korea's national image shows that the World Cup was a positive factor, receiving a factor score of 1 (where a positive number denotes positive impacts). By discussing the key impacts of the mega event, the study also reveals that a global sporting event is more than a sports gathering; it is argued that a mega event influences the society in various ways.

ASSESSING CREDIBILITY, LEGITIMACY, AND RELATIONSHIPS

To examine how the World Cup shapes Korean public diplomacy, three components of the public diplomacy framework—credibility, legitimacy, and relationships—need to be considered. First, in terms of public diplomacy, credibility refers to the trustworthiness of a nation; thus, in terms of hosting global sporting events, this means effective management. This is important because organizing international events can help secure the approval of foreign publics (Jung, 2011). In Korea's case, the World Cup provided an impetus for public support. This gain has two dimensions: (i) the support of foreign publics and (ii) the support of domestic publics. Public diplomacy entails the facilitation of networks between foreign publics and domestic institutions as well as citizens. The World Cup enabled the facilitation of these networks in three ways: (i) through the commercial initiatives of the private sector, (ii) through the street-cheering culture led by domestic publics, and (iii) through governmental exchanges with elite foreign nationals. In doing so, the World Cup gained credibility. Therefore, foreign publics were drawn to Korea's attributes, and this enhanced Korea's image.

Second, the host of a global sporting event is required to comply with the internationally approved system of sporting norms; doing this reinforces legitimacy. In the context of public diplomacy, legitimacy refers to the extent of citizens' genuine confidence and support (La Porte, 2007). The World Cup was also Korea's bid to gain the confidence of its citizens and other foreign nations. Korea successfully hosted the event; it also capitalized on the event to enhance its economic, social, and, ultimately, national status. Non-state actors such as NGOs and private corporations have gained the domestic public's support, and this has, in turn, enhanced their legitimacy. They have also conducted various public relations events through which they did not pursue public diplomatic objectives. The events, however, inadvertently produced results that fulfilled public diplomatic objectives to a certain extent. As a result, Korean products such as electronics and cosmetics have grown popular among foreign customers. By adhering to the international guidelines and regulations in its efforts to host the World Cup, Korea has been able to enhance its global status.

Third, in terms of the significance of building relationships through

public diplomacy, Fitzpatrick (2007) suggests that relationship management theory (Ledingham, 2003) could provide a rigid conceptual foundation for "ethically and effectively achieving a nation's foreign affairs objectives" (14). A relational paradigm, the author suggests, provides a "defining worldview characterized by symmetry and mutuality and a unifying, holistic framework to support the strategic dimensions of public diplomacy" (*ibid.*: 14).

In Korea's case, the 2002 FIFA World Cup provided various opportunities for a wide range of relationships and networks. First, the increased interactions reinforced the relations among agenda-setters such as the KFA; the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism; domestic publics; and other non-state actors. Second, Korea–Japan tensions were alleviated on a temporary basis; however, historical conflicts between the nations trumped the efforts to host the World Cup. Finally, and most importantly, good relations were forged with foreign publics. The impacts of these positive relations are mixed as Korea's political situation with North Korea has received global attention.

IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED: CAN SPORT BE A LEGITIMATE TOOL FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

This section deals with the key implications of Korea having hosted the World Cup. In doing so, this section also analyzes whether sport can be a legitimate tool for public diplomacy. There are three key implications.

First, the 2002 FIFA World Cup has ultimately enhanced Korea's reputation and has attracted as well as engaged with an unprecedented number of foreigners (Kim, 2016). However, this does not mean that the World Cup was intended as a public diplomacy initiative. KFA collaborated with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism to raise Korea's status in sports. It also sought to capitalize on the event; it sought to improve its performance in football, and it also wanted to successfully host the event (Hays, 2013). Although the event was not intended as a public diplomacy initiative, the results can be seen as public diplomatic outcomes.

Second, since the World Cup, Korea has hosted numerous other events,

such as the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, the 2011 World Championships in Athletics in Daegu, and the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, which will be held in 2018. The World Cup provided the impetus to utilize global sporting events as public diplomacy acts and triggered more collaborations among governmental agencies, private organizations, and citizens in this regard. For instance, during and after the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, the hosting committee inaugurated the Vision 2014 program (Han, 2016). This program was established to help athletes; they were provided sporting facilities and gear. Moreover, it aimed to stabilize the relationship between the Korean government and the partnering nations as well as manage the relationship between the Korean government and foreign publics (*ibid.*). Recently, boxers from Bhutan were invited to Korea to access the Korean boxing facilities and to participate in Korean boxing tournaments (*ibid.*). As a result, this program has been labeled a good example of sports public diplomacy.

Third, the relationship between sports and public diplomacy, as seen through the case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, indicates that sport is a mutual, fungible, and fluid facet of the current social construct. Therefore, networks between governments and non-state actors can be easily formed using sport as a public diplomacy initiative. However, hosting an event such as the World Cup requires the participation of the host nation's football association, the government (specifically, the ministry that is in charge of sports and culture), and, importantly, a supra-national governing body, such as FIFA or the IOC. Thus, the act of hosting a global sporting event is a politicized one; it limits the participation of non-state actors, domestic publics, and even diasporas to a certain extent.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was not to evaluate the success of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, or the associated campaigns and events, from an economic, social, or political perspective. The aim was to determine to what extent the event was a public diplomacy initiative in order to draw lessons for future research on the sport–public diplomacy nexus. Overall, in the short term,

the World Cup was a success in terms of its engagement with foreign publics, including tourists and foreigners, foreign governments, and international bodies. The World Cup had a positive economic effect on Korea, and according to Cho (2010), its revenue amounted to 1% of Korea's GDP in 2002. Moreover, it also facilitated national integration, which was projected to foreigners as one of the event's goals. Long-term relations between Korea and foreign publics were sought to be established. Longevity and the capacity to sustain relation-building activities were the key limitations in that they could not be achieved. Korea–Japan relations were halted due to persistent historical and political conflicts. The relations between state and non-state actors were obstructed by systemic issues, such as poor budgetary support. Ultimately, though the 2002 FIFA World Cup did enhance Korea's credibility and legitimacy, this result still does not imply a clear-cut correlation between the World Cup and public diplomacy.

One of the main objectives of this paper was to understand the impact of sports on public diplomacy. The three key implications highlight the following about the sport–public diplomacy nexus in the Korean case.

First, the World Cup had unintended public diplomatic outcomes. Second, the World Cup provided the impetus for the Korean government to explicitly use global sporting events as public diplomacy initiatives. Third, sport provides many opportunities for various actors and stakeholders to participate in public diplomacy initiatives. However, given the politicization of the act of hosting sporting events, the capacity of non-state actors and domestic publics to host such events is limited.

Furthermore, we must clarify that it is not that "public and traditional government-to-government diplomacy operate exclusive of each other" (Does, 2013: 1183). Global sporting events offer opportunities for traditional diplomacy between governmental bodies, but more importantly, they are public in nature; in other words, one cannot exclude publics and non-state actors. Therefore, sports and public diplomacy are interrelated. In the case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the Korean government and the KFA realized the potential to enhance Korea's reputation and worked alongside private corporations, citizens, and civil society networks to highlight its "unique culture, art, history and values" to attract foreign publics. In conclusion, this research asserts that sports diplomacy can be a "valuable instrument of

public diplomacy" (*ibid*.). Sport is mutual and fluid in nature. Global sporting events possess the capacity to subtly communicate with foreign audiences and forge new relationships and networks with them and domestic actors, including the government and NGOs. The short-term and long-term impacts of sports on public diplomacy and nation branding vary with each country. Although this study endeavors to depict the landscape between sports and public diplomacy, further analysis is needed. In particular, a comparative analysis of global sporting events that are different from each other in terms of characteristics and constituents is essential. Moreover, this research is based on the analysis of secondary research; primary research methods such as questionnaires for quantitative analysis could have been used in this context. Overall, this paper offers new insight regarding the sport–public diplomacy nexus, although much of this research is based on the economic and socio-cultural impacts of the event on Korea.

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Annyeonghaseyo to the Digital Sphere: The Online Public Diplomacy of the Korean Diaspora in the US

Eduardo Luciano Tadeo Hernández

ABSTRACT

Drawing from Manuel Castells' definition of public diplomacy, we consider the centrality of non-state actors and their digital activity as fundamental characteristics of the new diplomatic paradigm. In this study, we analyze the means by which the Korean American diaspora creates its own public diplomacy through digital narratives, in which it expresses interests, values, and ideas to represent itself in the American Society.

Key words: public diplomacy, non-state actors, Korean diaspora, United States, digital narratives, ethnography, Internet.

INTRODUCTION

Since the nineteenth century, various national communities have gained political independence in the international system. The political situation in each new nation-state requires the local elite to promote nation-building and seek recognition from the international community. Diplomacy plays a crucial role in achieving recognition, and diplomats, therefore, are instrumental in promoting national interests overseas.

The diplomat, writer, and politician of British origin, Sir Harold George Nicolson, defines diplomacy, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, as

"the management of international relations by means of negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomat"(1942: 15). Nicolson understands the diplomatic practice as belonging to actors who represent a specific government and seek to preserve the national interest of that government. For this reason, when he considers the case of diplomats who have lived outside their country of origin for a long time, he argues that loyalty to the government of their original country is the sovereign antidote diplomats must always preserve (1942: 129).

Nicolson's concept of diplomacy and the diplomatic practice itself have changed as a result of the social transformations in the international scene; its communicative practices and the relations between actors who take part in diplomacy have adapted to the diverse historical contexts. To understand the current context, it is necessary to comprehend the role of technology in communication and its effects on culture. In this regard, Jesus Martín Barbero claims that in the twenty-first century,

> There's a new place for culture in society when the communication technological mediation stops being merely instrumental to thicken, densify and become a structure, because technology does not mean today new machines or appliances, but new ways of perception, of language, new sensibilities and writings [...] this is leading to the disappearance of frontiers between reason and imagination, knowledge and information, nature and artifice, art and science, expert knowledge and profane experience (2002: 32-33).

The disappearance of frontiers in the social realm affects also the diplomatic practice; technology has enabled the emergence of new modes of sending and receiving messages through global communication networks. Today, it is anachronistic to think of diplomacy as a process conducted solely by governmental actors; it is equally anachronistic to not consider the various new technologies and forms of communication. The practice of diplomacy has been transformed by diverse international interactions. Indeed, "our historical context is marked by the contemporary processes of globalization and the rise of the network society, both relying on communication

networks that process knowledge and thoughts to make and unmake trust, the decisive source of power" (Castells, 2009: 16). The Internet has become an "ideal space for the redefinition of the concept of identity […] the identities produced (on the internet) will always be soft, <<data bodies>> used to poetize about the multiple and the collective" (Prada, 2015: 155). The identities within and beyond the frontiers of the nation-state are constantly changing; diplomacy, too, is significantly affected by these developments.

In practical terms, the practices of both state actors and non-state actors amount to networked communication diplomacy. In academia, the concept of public diplomacy is used to address the new diplomatic practice and the constant changes in this practice. In this paper, we propose that public diplomacy is a process conducted by governmental and non-governmental actors of the same national heritage. We argue that public diplomacy involves the use of diverse means of communication aimed at advancing interests, expressing values and ideas, and enabling mutual understanding among actors. Our argument is inspired by Manuel Castells' approach:

> Public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public […] The implicit project behind the idea of public diplomacy is not to assert the power of a state or of a social actor in the form of "soft power." It is, instead, to harness the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures in the hope of sharing meaning and understanding […] (public diplomacy is) networked communication and shared meaning (2008: 91).

We argue that the Korean diaspora conducts its own public diplomacy in the digital arena, creating narratives that represent its diverse nature, values, and ideas and interests in the United States. For the reader to understand the basis of this assumption, we have structured the text in the following manner. First, we focus on the recent history of the concept of public diplomacy. Second, we analyze studies that focus on South Korea's public diplomacy and the participation of non-state actors. Third, we discuss the concept of diaspora and some facts about the Korean diaspora in the US.

Fourth, we reflect on the ethnography of the Internet, the method employed in this study. Fifth, we discuss the Korean American narratives on the Internet, before offering our concluding remarks.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CONTEXT(S)

The genesis of the concept "public diplomacy," as Nicholas Cull shows, lies in diplomatic speeches and newspaper articles. For instance, London Times used the term "public diplomacy" in 1856 as a synonymy of civility. In 1871, the term appeared in The New York Times, intended as a critique of secret political processes. Later, during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson used the term in The Fourteen Points to refer to diplomatic practices. The term retained its Wilsonian connotation even after the Second World War. It then came to be related to claims for open diplomacy (2009: 19-20). This connotation, however, did not last long. As the international system came to be characterized by a bipolar dynamic, the practice and concept of public diplomacy were subject to further changes.

During the height of the Cold War in the 50s, the connotation "noticeably shifted [toward] the realm of international information and propaganda" (Cull, 2009: 21). Philip M. Taylor argues that the bipolar condition of the international system at the time was just right for the emergence of propaganda:

> This was a war on the mind, a contest of ideologies, a battle of nerves which, for the next forty years or so, was to divide the planet into a bi-polar competition that was characterized more by a war of words and the threatened use of nuclear weapons rather than their actual use […]As a consequence, international diplomacy appeared to be developing by the 1950s into a great game of bluff, counter-bluff and double bluff all set against a climate of terror. Because both sides had to project the impression that they were, in fact, serious and that this was *not* a game of bluff, an atmosphere was created in which propaganda could only flourish […] Both in Russia and America, as well as in their alliance blocs of NATO and the Warsaw

> Pact, it was imperative to convince people that fear of the enemy was genuine, legitimate and justified (2003: 250-253).

Propaganda became an important instrument of communication during the war. It acquired a very negative meaning since it represented the attempt to influence the general public through unidirectional communication. The international radio and television were widely used for this purpose. Following the advent of mass media, "propaganda became the continuation of politics by other means" (Taylor, 2003: 268).

As propaganda was seen in bad light, scholars in the US used the term "public diplomacy" to refer to the government's communicative practices. Thus, the contemporary meaning of public diplomacy has its historical and geopolitical roots in the US (Cull, 2012; Nye, 2008; Sánchez, 2011; Melissen, 2012). As Nicholas Cull points out, Edmund Gullion, an American career diplomat, is believed to have coined the term when he founded The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. The center aimed to dispel the notion that the United States Information Agency (USIA) indulged in propaganda. It was an academic undertaking based on a political motive. Cull writes,

> The reason that the term "public diplomacy" took off in 1965 was that there was a real need for such a concept in Washington DC. A dozen years into its life, the United States Information Agency needed an alternative to the anodyne term information or malignant term propaganda: a fresh turn of phrase upon which it could build new and benign meanings. Gullion's term "public diplomacy" covered every aspect of USIA activity and a number of the cultural and exchange functions jealously guarded by the Department of State. The phrase gave a respectable identity to the USIA career officer, for it was one step removed from the "vulgar" realm of "public relations" and by its use of the term "diplomacy," explicitly enshrined the USIA alongside the State Department as a legitimate organ of American foreign relations (2006).

In 1965 a new director of the USIA was appointed, Leonard H. Marks, who

"integrated the agency into policy as never before […] (and) also deployed a new weapon to build the USIA, a newly minted term to describe its activities: public diplomacy" (Cull, 2008: 255). Marks identified a tool in the academic sphere to legitimize the activities of the agency he represented. This allowed him to defend other issues that emerged later, such as the preferential treatment of USIA officials at the expense of officials representing the Foreign Service of the State Department. Finally, in 1968, as a result of his efforts, USIA officials were legally recognized as information officials of the Foreign Service of the State Department (2008: 261).

> Marks also used the term "public diplomacy" to legitimize American international communication. He did so at a time when "the very debate about international communications became entangled in the divide, with the Americans arguing for a free flow of information while the Soviets felt this would jeopardize their position in the competition" (Taylor, 2003: 264).

Thus, the contemporary connotation of the term "public diplomacy" is clearly associated with the American experience, but its use has been expanded internationally. Indeed, "the term public diplomacy was little used outside the USIA until the 1980s. By the 1990s it had also entered common use overseas in official circles" (Cull, 2008: 260).

After the end of the Cold War, the international system was temporarily characterized by a period of unilateralism. The triumph of the United States served as an impetus for capitalism and democracy. In this context, public diplomacy assumed greater relevance and figured prominently in attempts to rethink the bipolar world. Today, it "has become the most debated topic in the field of international communications since the cultural imperialism thesis calls for a new world information order in the 1970s and 1980s " (Taylor, 2009: 12).

The twenty-first century can be characterized as a multipolar international system. The concept of public diplomacy has gained yet more relevance due to democratic and globalization processes, proving that academic debate is situated in a specific historical context. In this regard, Jan Melissen claims,

> Recent debates on public diplomacy reflect an increasing coincidence between the ministries of foreign affairs, on the sense that (public

> diplomacy) it is often condition to the cultivation of extra governmental networks and to the satisfactory collaboration with national actors of civil society […] the democratization in the formulation of foreign policy puts in perspective the need for domestic participation, because the mundialization of communi-cation and its international reach, erase the limits between national and international publics and political environments (2012: 96-99).

In the context of globalization and the mundialization of media, the relevance of new actors has become fundamental for diplomacy, in general, and public diplomacy, in particular. The new strain of public diplomacy, which deals with new actors and environments, is a highly debated topic today (Melissen, 2005, 2011). With these concerns in mind, discussions in academia also focus on other relevant international experiences. Thus, even though the US revived the academic debate in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Taylor, 2009; Snow & Taylor, 2009; Cull, 2008), the research agenda remains broad and diverse, and research is conducted in other countries as well. Other actors and regions have been accorded importance in the study of public diplomacy. It is in this context that South Korea's increasing importance to this field should be viewed. In the following section, we analyze some of the studies that focus on Korean public diplomacy; more specifically, we examine their analysis of non-state actors, including the Korean diaspora.

SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: TOWARD A NON-STATE ACTOR APPROACH

Studies that focus on South Korea's public diplomacy typically emphasize the Korean government's interest in this practice, especially during Lee Myung-bak's tenure as President. More studies have been conducted on South Korea's public diplomacy since 2010 (Ayhan, 2014; Kang, 2015). Nevertheless, studies on South Korea's public diplomacy date back to the 90s. Jarol B. Manheim's (1990) study published in *The Western Political Quarterly* is seminal in this context. In this pioneering study on South

Korea, the author regards public diplomacy as a governmental strategy to gain the favor of public opinion and the media for national interest. Manheim studies the 1988 World Olympics as a public diplomacy strategy and points out that the Korean government thought "the games would provide legitimacy at home and protection from a hostile sister state, and would serve notice to the world of Korea's arrival as an economic power" (1990: 282). However, things did not work out that way as the Olympics brought about political change in the country (1990: 291). This was one of the few studies of public diplomacy published during Korea's transition to democracy. Interestingly, Manheim reveals in a footnote that his research was supported by the Korean Overseas Information Service, the International Cultural Society of Korea, and the Korea Press Center. This shows that these institutions focused on the traditional form of public diplomacy at the time. Manheim's study, therefore, consciously or otherwise, reveals that non-state actors play important roles in public diplomacy measures.

Manheim argues "that diplomacy is communication applied to the relations among nation-states" (1990: 279), revealing that his work belongs to the discipline of communication. In fact, most recent studies of public diplomacy in Korea belong to the discipline of communication (Ayhan, 2014; Cha, Yeo, & Kim, 2014; Khan, Yoon, & Park, 2014; Lee & Ayhan, 2015; Lee & Jun, 2013; Yun & Vibber, 2012; Yun, 2012). Among studies based on a communicative dimension, those that reflect the transcendental position of public relations in public diplomacy stand out (Ayhan, 2014; Cha et al., 2014; Lee & Ayhan, 2015; Lee & Jun, 2013). Studies that explore the nature of diplomacy are also based on the perspective of international relations (Cho, 2012; Kim, 2012).

Studies based on an international relations perspective and those belonging to the discipline of communication focus on Joseph Nye's notion of soft power. This notion argues that actor *a* can influence actor *b* and make him act according to *a*'s interest by means of attraction based on culture, political values, and foreign policy (2016). In fact, Nye himself has examined public diplomacy from the perspective of soft power, claiming that this practice is integrated by daily communications, strategic communications, and the development of lasting relationships with key individuals (2008: 101-102). Nye regards public diplomacy as an activity

that is primarily state-centered, but also considers the growing importance of non-state actors: "public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the role of credibility, self-criticism, and the role of civil society in generating soft power" (2008: 108).

Several studies about Korean public diplomacy are based on the state-centered approach. For instance, Kim Taehwan, who served as the Director of Public Diplomacy Department of the Korea Foundation in 2012, wrote an article for Korea Observer, in which he proposed a conceptual model for Korea's public diplomacy. He claims that the following elements should be considered: setting diplomatic goals, targeting subjects and objects, thinking about resources, and considering soft power assets and carriers or mediums (2012: 530-531). He argues that it is possible to differentiate between the communicative dimensions of traditional public diplomacy and the most recent form of public diplomacy:

> whereas old public diplomacy tends to rely on top-down unilateral communication […] to deliver the subject messages, new public diplomacy resorts to open communications, in which the subject and object of diplomacy communicate and interact symmetrically and bilaterally in two-way exchanges (2012: 533).

The article of Kim Taehwan gives a very rich contextual and historical framework on the development of public diplomacy in South Korea. It also proposes a very specific model to analyze the developments these practices are likely to undergo. In contrast, Cho Yunyoung offers a very critical reading of South Korea's governmental management of public diplomacy. One of his most important critiques is based on the fact that different governmental agencies are involved in public diplomacy, thus creating a diffuse objective for diplomatic action (2012: 289). In addition, he argues,

> So far, the government has pushed ahead with public diplomacy in a narrow sense, seeing it in terms of cultural diplomacy.[1] But cultural

1 To sustain such a claim in 2017 would be anachronistic. Recently, Enna Park, Ambassador

> diplomacy is largely dominated by cultural contents, which the government tends to rely on the private sector to produce. Hence, in the South Korean case, while the government is supposed to initiate public diplomacy, its strategy is vulnerable to the circumstances of the private sector (2012: 277).

This last statement is important for various reasons: Firstly, because it shows that the South Korean government regards cultural diplomacy as a resource located within the larger umbrella of public diplomacy.[2] Similarly, Kang Hyungseok remarks that "since the Korean Public Diplomacy Forum in 2010, there have been significant conceptual shifts regarding Cultural Diplomacy within the foreign policy framework. Cultural Diplomacy has become a sub-category of public diplomacy" (2015: 443). Secondly, it exposes the fact that non-governmental actors are relevant not only as receptive diplomatic targets but also as protagonists of these diplomatic practices. With this in mind, Cho Yunyoung regards public diplomacy as "a process used by the government or private constituencies of a nation to promote the national interest by propagating the nation's cultures, ideology, values and systems as well as the national goals through the horizontal and interactive mutual exchanges" (2012: 280).

Horizontality and interactive exchanges are certainly crucial for South Korean public diplomacy. Some researchers have found the right environ-

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for Public Diplomacy of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered a talk in Los Angeles at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, where she explained that the public diplomacy of South Korea today follows three lines: 1. culture-oriented public diplomacy, 2. knowledge-oriented public diplomacy, and 3. policy-oriented public diplomacy. In addition, she mentioned that the Korean government is working toward Public Diplomacy 3.0, meaning that it will try to contribute to the global public goods (USC Center for Public Diplomacy, 2017).

2 This way of understanding cultural diplomacy is part of a larger debate on what is public diplomacy and how cultural diplomacy is related to it. For instance, Villanueva argues that, in Mexico, both diplomacies should be considered differently: "Cultural Diplomacy is responsible for the artistic, cultural and scientific fields, preparing educational exchanges and developing official discourses about the national and cultural identities of the country. On the other hand, Public diplomacy would operate as an information agency where official communications, public relations and the image of the country abroad can be assessed and disseminated" (2007: 47). The Korean case cannot be read under this proposal. We consider that the difference of conceptual interpretations is framed by the countries or actors, and in the case of Villanueva, the objects of study are Mexico and Sweden.

ment for these conditions in the digital space. Khan et al. conducted one of the few mixed method research projects. Based on the analysis of the use of Twitter by the South Korean and American governments, they report that "Korean ministries were well connected in a dense network of ministries […] In addition, the Korean government used Twitter to encourage collective cooperation between ministries […] (and) made more extensive use of Twitter based on push and networking strategies" (2014: 74).

The recognition of the importance of the digital space has occurred in tandem with that of the importance of non-state actors in public diplomacy. In this context, Heewon et al. (2014) developed a qualitative analysis based on theories of communication, specifically from the perspective of public relations. They studied the official homepages and blogs managed by foreign embassies in Korea. Hence, their research is not about the public diplomacy of Korea but about that of embassies located in Korea. In addition, it confirms the importance of non-state actors in public diplomacy measures.

Recent studies have focused on the significance of digital space in this context. Melissen and Keulenaar (2017) even claim that the concept of digital diplomacy should be studied as a separate field. They do not regard digital diplomacy as a mere extension of public diplomacy. Particularly, they argue that the Internet plays a fundamental role in Korea's techno culture and digital diplomacy. Although they are primarily concerned with governmental actors, they argue that non-state actors play an important role within this environment, sometimes under the coordination or influence of the former. They regard the Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK) as "the best example of a South Korean NGO practicing digital people-to-people diplomacy" (Melissen & Keulenaar, 2017: 5).

Several scholars consider non-state actors to be targets of governmental agencies or groups that can aid the official public diplomacy of South Korea (Ayhan, 2014; Cha et al., 2014; Lee & Ayhan, 2015). Ayhan, for example, argues that non-state actors possess certain unique resources, which in turn enhance the government's public diplomacy resources, such as "credibility, neutrality, efficacy, flexibility, political, financial and human resources, mobilization capacity, expertise, specialization (know-how), networks, reach and influence" (2014: 133). The author suggests that the importance

of diaspora is based on the fact that they "know the local culture and have access to and relationships with both ordinary people and influential networks in other countries [...]. Diaspora communities and international networks can influence other states and international institutions for the advantage of the home state" (2014: 132). Hence, the diaspora as well as other non-state actors, including missioners, pop stars, enterprises, universities, sports personalities, and foreign scholars, are positively relevant as long as they help the government achieve its goals. However, the author also warns governments to "be careful in setting standards regarding with whom they can work as partners […] (because) non-state actors' interests, goals and activities can also be seen as suspicious and counterproductive, placing the state's interests in jeopardy" (2014: 134). Seong-Hun and Vibber argue, from the perspective of sociological public diplomacy, that "people flow can be either the most conducive or destructive channel of soft power, eclipsing mediated channels through which the country projects images and information abroad on the attractiveness of its soft power resources" (2012: 78). For instance, they argue that migrants, by bringing experiences to their host country in a back-and-forth manner, can both enhance and tarnish its image.

The interests of non-state actors are not necessarily the same as those of the states or the state actors. Indeed, they can even be opposed to each other. Lee and Ayhan argue that "there are domestic and foreign non-state actors (including diaspora communities both at home and abroad) […] (who) can be regarded as potential partners if there are mutual interests while it is also very likely for them to be competitors or adversaries (2015: 63). The authors do not merely consider this as a practical possibility. They, in fact, take it further conceptually by proposing a multidimensional concept of public diplomacy: "(it) is a tool used by state and non-state actors for objectives such as advocacy, influence, agenda-setting and mobilization; reinforcing other foreign policy objectives; promotion and prestige; correcting misperceptions; dialogue and mutual understanding; and harmony based on universal values" (2015: 60). They also acknowledge that non-state actors may conduct their own public diplomacy measures.

Seong-Hun considers the importance of relational public diplomacy and adopts a highly critical approach to the concept of soft power. The author

argues that sociological public diplomacy, which may be related to people in movement or the phenomenon of migration, "must elude the grip of soft power and instead seek out relationship-centered theories and practices, a progressive move that could level out the historically uneven playing fields of public diplomacy" (2012: 2212). To abandon a hierarchical notion of public diplomacy in favor of a relational one seems necessary to address non-state actors' diplomacy.

The literature on public diplomacy in South Korea involves both a state-centered approach and approaches that focus on non-state actors. Non-state actors may either cooperate with the government or be protagonists of public diplomacy on their own. The role and significance of non-state actors deserve more attention. Although there is already awareness about the importance of the digital platform for the practice of diplomacy, we have not been able to identify studies that consider the Korean diaspora as a protagonist of public diplomacy with its own interests, values, and ideas. In the next section, we explain what we mean by Korean diaspora and throw light on the relevance of studying the Korean diaspora in the US.

KOREAN DIASPORA, THE OTHER KOREA

The question of diaspora poses important challenges to a researcher. It is defined in different manners, and depending on the definition used, some actors would have to be excluded from the analysis. In this paper, we use two definitions to understand the meaning of this concept. First, we draw from Karim, who argues that a characteristic that reveals the diasporic condition is the "transnational group's non dominant position in (the) global cultural context" (2003: 1-2).

In 1997, Craig S. Coleman published a study on American perceptions of Korea and Koreans. He found that some of the images of Koreans in America were related to Los Angeles Riots, Korea Town, and the Korean American Small Business. In addition, he discovered that Korean Americans were considered to be preoccupied with the political and social issues of Korea, paying little attention to issues particular to the US (1997: 224-228). The study revealed that the American society had little knowledge of Korea

or Koreans. This may have been due to Koreans' status as a minority compared to other ethnic and cultural groups. However, it is important to focus on the Korean government's, as well as the diaspora's, limitations in representing themselves to the American society. This is not to imply that no effort was made by the government or the diaspora; it is only intended to show that their narratives did not reach a large audience.

Let me now introduce the other definition of diaspora this research draws from. Vaaradarajan argues that diaspora refers to "emigrant communities (or) populations that originate from a nation-state that is different from the one where they reside" (2010: 8). She claims that this category does not involve a "cohesive, or […] static collectivity naturally connected to the their real or imagined homelands" (Varadarajan, 2010: 9). Although we do not agree with the author's argument that there exists a political project that links the emigrant communities with their homelands, we do agree that the concept of diaspora should be looked at in a broader manner, and its diversity should be emphasized. Intergenerational relations are essential in the context of Koreans in the US.

The history of the Korean diaspora, in general, and the migration to the US, in particular, reveal the influence of political, economic, and social factors on their migration. We can divide the history of the Korean diaspora into four periods: 1) between 1860 and 1910, the last years of the Choson dynasty, 2) the period under Japanese colonial rule, which led to the relocation of peasants and labor, 3) between 1945 and 1962, the period after liberation when the South Korean government formulated its first emigration policy that enabled migration to the US and Canada; 4) the period since 1962, as migrants moved to Australia, New Zealand, and countries in South America (Kim, 2011: 23).

The first migrants to the US arrived in Hawaii as sugarcane plantation workers. More Koreans migrated to the US after the Korean War. At the time, Korean orphans were also adopted by American families. Another important point in Korean migration to the US would come in 1965 (Kim, 2011: 25). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 provided the momentum for Korean migration to the US, since it eliminated the national quota system to enter the country. Between 1985 and 1987, over 35,000 Koreans are believed to have arrived in the US, making Korea the third

largest immigrant nation in the country after Mexico and the Philippines. This increase can also be explained by the family reunification policy of the US government (Yoon, 1993).

According to the 2010 US Census, the Korean diaspora is constituted by 1.7 million people. It is composed by more people from South Korea than from North Kore and it represents the fifth most important Asian group in the country (Pew Research Center, 2012). Although located in several different states within the US, the Korean American population is highest in California (505,225 people) and New York (153,609). In 1910, however, Hawaii (4 533 people) and California (304 people) housed the largest number of Koreans (Korean American Story, 2014).

This long history of migration to the US has diversified the experiences of Korean Americans. It can be said that they "have had to confront intergenerational differences related to identity, language, and culture with an immediacy that was not as acute for some of the other older Asian American Populations" (Gail & Natividad, 1995: 122).

Since the latter half of the twentieth century, the Korean diaspora has been more vocal in discussions in global cities. For instance, the artist Paik Nam June, who lived in different global cities, including New York, became the father of video art. Lim Hye-ok, a Korean American curator, employed the concept of Minjung Art for the first time in 1988, in an alternative space in New York (Kim, 2011: 82, 83, 114). These events helped create a different image of Korea. Some Korean Americans became aware of the role and importance of media in projecting their image and interests in the US. For instance, Elaine Kim, a professor of Asian studies, was involved in the production of four books and four 30-min television programs dealing with employment opportunities for Asian American women. She also supported the production of the documentary *Sa-I-Gu: from Korean Women's perspective,* to offer a Korean and gender-based interpretation of the LA Riots in 1992 (Gail & Natividad, 1995: 655). Additionally, several associations formed by Koreans have been crucial in the creation of Korean communities and solidarity networks overseas. Lately, associations have been recording their narratives on the Internet. How does one study these digital narratives created by Korean Americans? In the next section, we focus on the methodology.

ETHNOGRAPHY FOR THE INTERNET: TO LOOK AT KOREAN AMERICANS ON THE WEB

The importance of the digital world in one's social life has increased over the last few decades. Scholars have debated extensively about the digital world and the appropriate methodology to study it. The method discussed in this section embodies the concerns represented in these debates. It is also seminal in the context of thinking about the digital world, and more specifically, about the Internet, as an object of study; called *Ethnography for the internet*, it is useful to understand the Korean American narratives in the digital context.

Hine states the following in her pioneering study on Virtual Ethnography: "In its basic form ethnography requires a researcher to immerse into the studied world during a given time, and take into account relations, activities and meanings that are created between those that participle in the world's social processes" (2004: 13). Recently she has updated her understanding of the method, calling it Ethnography for the internet <for the embedded, embodied and everyday internet> (Hine, 2015).

Thus, when looking at Korean American public diplomacy on the Internet, relations, activities, and meanings become essential to identify their ideas, values, and interests through their narratives. However, we must be aware of the implications of using the Internet. Hine warns that "the interactive media like internet, can be understood […] as culture and as artifact" (2004: 81). Research on the Internet, then, might be construed as an extension of social life, as a cultural world, or simply as a medium—a tool, basically. In addition to the realities of the Internet, it is also important to consider offline realities.

We recognize that the digital environment has a unique dynamic that transforms social interaction. Thus, narratives of diaspora on the digital environment have singular characteristics. On the other hand, we follow Martel's argument that the "internet and digital issues are […] rooted in a territory; they are territorialized" (2014: 21). Thus, we consider the diaspora is territorially located, so the way the use the internet is related to that localization. An offline/online approach is employed to collect data as the narratives, conversations, and images one might find on the web are

important. However, it is also relevant to consider interactions and meanings produced in geographically located spaces. The following reflections on the Korean American diaspora are the result of the preliminary immersions in the digital sphere.

FIRST IMMERSIONS: KOREAN AMERICAN VOICES

We conducted a preliminary immersion on the Internet and found that there are several websites of the Korean diaspora in the US. Some of the sites are related to organizations that work with different goals, but most locate themselves between spaces, i.e., between the United States and Korea, not in geographic terms, but in cultural terms.

Various associations support Korean Americans in the US; The Council of Korean Americans is one such association. It aims "to assert a strong, clear voice on issues vital to Korean Americans while helping them engage in American society to achieve meaningful success" (2017). The Council of Korean Americans functions primarily as an advocacy organization, and their most important work is not in the digital sphere. Although they do not really have a significant amount of narratives on the web, they do contribute to making the Korean American Voice be heard in different spaces within the US. There are other projects, however, that are based on collecting narratives on the Internet.

I AM KOREAN AMERICAN (IKA) is an example of a digital narrative project. IKA defines itself as "an on-going web project that aims to collect brief profiles of Korean Americans […] (to) showcase the diversity and many interesting personalities of the Korean American population" (Barrel Project, 2013). Thus, we find stories that in fact represent the diversity of the diaspora, all of them written in English. Some of the stories, which are included in the Profile section, focus on Korean adoptees, Korean American identity, Life in America, ownership of businesses, family-related issues (Korean and American), Korean Reunification, and LGBT issues. Although Korean Americans from various regions of the US share their stories, the most important ones seem to be shared from California, New York, New Jersey, Washington, Virginia, and Minnesota. The website also contains

further divisions within the Profiles section, such as Entrepreneurs and Musicians. Project and Causes is another section that is particularly interesting, as it allows users to advertise their websites and announce their goals, which range from art promotion to enhancing the presence of Korean history in the US. Note that IKA is primarily an online project, and the digital space is owned by Barrel, a creative agency located in New York city.

KoreanAmericanStory.org presents narratives in a more institutionalized and multisided[3] manner. It is a non-profit organization based in New York, and was founded in 2010. Although most of the narratives are easily accessible through the website, their Facebook page is where the community conducts most of its interactions. Their mission is "to capture and preserve the stories of the Korean American Experience" (2017). Their aim is to represent themselves in and to the US. The Legacy Project was initiated to capture the stories of Korean Americans through video recording. The videos, recorded in English, are edited before they are shared on the website or other digital platforms. Some of the stories on the website are also written in English. The videos and written stories are catalogued in different ways: literature, art, and music; multiracial; history and culture; adopted; LGBTQ; Politics; and Korean American Story. The diverse nature of these topics also represents the concerns of the Korean diaspora in the US and the memory of the imagined nation of Korea. The narratives created through podcasts, however, are a little different; they are mostly in Korean. Nonetheless, the participants sometimes mix Korean and English in the podcasts. In addition to these activities, the organization is also involved in geographically located events, such as the Annual Gala of Korean American Story, panels with Korean Americans, associations with film festivals, etc. Several activities have taken place in New York. The Korean diaspora communicates with the Korean American Community and with the American community at large through these activities.

These examples make it clear that, when studying the digital space, it is not possible to forget the territorialized spaces. Moreover, when dealing with public diplomacy, we need to focus on non-state actors, especially the

3 They share stories on the webpage, Twitter, Vimeo, and Facebook.

diaspora.

CONCLUSION

Although the contemporary concept of public diplomacy has its roots in the US, the international debate currently deals with the experience of different regions, new actors, and diverse media of communication. South Korea is, in this sense, a great case study to track advances in the practice of public diplomacy and the developments in the academic debates on this field. A public diplomacy law enacted last year (2016) gives the Foreign Minister authority to direct the public diplomacy programs of the country. This might help solve the problem associated with government diplomacy: the lack of organization of public diplomacy tasks.

Other actors, besides the government, have become visible in the international scene. These actors undertake their own public diplomacy measures, which are aimed at promoting their interests, ideas, and values. This development can also be attributed to the network society and digital world, which has facilitated global communication.

Thus, we have argued that non-state actors representing the Korean diaspora in the US have acquired the capability to organize and represent themselves in and to the US. In doing so, they construct an image of the diaspora and an alternative image of Korea. We know that more extensive offline/online research is needed, but from this first immersion, we can approach the online activities of Korean Americans from a more descriptive viewpoint. We know they are very active and interested in a wide range of topics that can be framed between cultural spaces. The digital narratives of Korean Americans are also a form of public diplomacy in that they promote their interests, ideas, and values through a diasporic network based on digital communication. The digital space has given the diaspora a chance to not only connect but also project their image within the US.

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Non-state Actors Case Study: Korean Quarterly, the Voice of Korean Adoptees in U.S.

Seong Hee Oh

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota has the largest concentration of adopted Korean children in the United States (Nelson, 2009), and several communal activities tailored for Korean adoptees are conducted in the region. Many adoptive parents have introduced their adopted children to Korean communities and cultural activities. Due to these efforts, Korean adoptees are able to address their own questions regarding their identities in the spheres of international and interracial life. Consequently, most Korean adoptees consider themselves Korean-American Adoptees—neither as Korean nor American (Beaupre et al., 2015). In other words, they are a new identity group who share aspects of both nationalities and are foreign in nature.

It has been six decades since the first legal adoption of Korean children,[1] and the adoptees are now adults. Due to the educational efforts of adoptive parents, many Korean adoptees have become leaders in their chosen fields and have a unique perspective of the world. This paper focuses on a group of Korean-American adoptees, who are considered an important target of public diplomacy measures. *Korean Quarterly* (*KQ*), a newspaper founded by adoptive parents of Korean children in Minnesota, can be viewed as a non-state actor of public diplomacy. The newspaper has published the opinions of the Korean-American adoptees for over 20 years, and it serves

1 In 1955, Harry Holt became the first person to officially adopt a Korean child in the US (Yoo & Lim, 2016).

as the voice of Korean adoptees in the US.

In the context of the changing sociopolitical environment, recent studies about public diplomacy (PD) emphasize the importance of non-state actors in PD measures (Lee & Ayhan, 2015). Furthermore, Lee and Ayhan (2015) argue that collaborative measures with non-state actors are necessary to address the limitations of the state's diplomatic initiatives. In addition, they point out that there are very few studies about the necessity of public diplomacy activities. Therefore, drawing from Lee & Ayhan's theoretical discussion of relational, networked, and collaborative public diplomacy, this study regards *KQ* as a non-state actor of public diplomacy measures aimed at Korean-American adoptees.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

When it comes to traditional diplomacy, the diplomatic act is defined as a government-to-government undertaking; in other words, governments are regarded as the sole actors. The definitions of public diplomacy can be divided into two groups. The first group represents definitions that regard PD as official, state-centered, government-to-public interactions that are linked to a state's foreign policy outcomes (McPhail, 2011:89). The second group of definitions recognizes new actors, a variety of objectives, activities, and strategies. These definitions represent what is called "new public diplomacy" (Melissen, 2005).

In their article titled Why Do We Need Non-state Actors in Public Diplomacy, Lee and Ayhan (2015; 60-61) show that recent studies about new public diplomacy focus on the "relational, networked, and collaborative approaches" to public diplomacy. They also throw light on the emergence and significance of non-state actors in the context of new public diplomacy. Non-state actors are categorized as non-representatives of the state, and this includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).

Traditional diplomacy was practiced exclusively by governments. Given the advent of globalization and the information age, the public is more

involved in political decisions and exercises direct or indirect influence over foreign policy decisions of other countries. Public diplomacy, therefore, emerged as a sub-concept of diplomacy, and it was intended to reinforce traditional diplomacy measures. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that public diplomacy may have various objectives, ranging from advocacy to the promotion of universal values (Lee & Ayhan, 2015).

The authors have identified three characteristics of new public diplomacy regarding non-state actors: relational public diplomacy, networked public diplomacy, and collaborative public diplomacy.

Relational Public Diplomacy. Lee and Ayhan draw from seminal works in the field of public relations to state that relationship management is the primary goal of new public diplomacy (Ledingham, 2003; Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Fitzpatrick, 2007). Long-term relationships among non-state actors are also highlighted as an important issue in the context of relational public diplomacy. While diplomacy measures undertaken by a government may be viewed with mistrust (Nye, 2004) and "public skepticism" (Leonard et al., 2002; 54), diplomatic measures undertaken by non-state actors are considered credible. Non-state actors are also regarded as more neutral and more inclined toward universal values. For public diplomacy measures to have long-term effects, it is important to communicate, not convince; it is equally important to not simply declare but in fact listen, share meaning, and understand (Castells, 2008).

Networked Public Diplomacy. Lee and Ayhan (2015) also argue that, in the globalized world, public diplomacy is practiced in a complex network environment where domestic and foreign non-state actors are considered potential partners of the state in public diplomacy measures, pursuing either similar or different objective. *Credibility* and *centrality* are regarded as important characteristics of the networks. Credibility, which is also involved in relational public diplomacy, is a consequence of the dense relationships. Furthermore, a state's credibility, which is otherwise associated with the negative connotation of propaganda, may be enhanced by emphasizing that public diplomacy can achieve goals other than national interests. Centrality is also an aspect that highlights the limitations of a state. States are limited in terms of their human and financial resources, technical capabilities, and issue-specific knowledge. Non-state actors, therefore, can be involved as

gatekeepers in collaborative public diplomacy measures. Non-state actors have high centrality in networks that involve *structural holes* and the *cultural holes*.

Collaborative Public Diplomacy. The necessity of collaborative public diplomacy between states and non-state actors is emphasized in the above sections. Lee and Ayhan point out that it is important to acknowledge limitations in order to increase the efficacy of collaborative public diplomacy. In other words, each party needs to recognize its limitations; by doing so, state agents and non-state actors can complement each other. As mentioned above, the state's capacity to maximize potential public diplomacy outcomes is limited, especially in the case of long-term outcomes (Lee & Ayhan, 2015; 65). Therefore, non-state actors can collaborate with the state to overcome the latter's limitations. Collaboration is crucial because non-state actors are typically associated with concepts such as democratic values, representation, citizenship, social capital, a sense of belonging, community values, and social integration. In contrast, the limitations of non-state actors, particularly nonprofits, include factors such as "insufficiency, amateurism, particularism and paternalism" (Lee and Ayhan, 2015; 66). State agencies may find collaborations expensive, while it is also difficult to identify the best candidates among numerous nonprofits. However, it is argued that collaboration should not be discouraged despite these obvious challenges.

Lee and Ayhan also offer a typology of collaboration between state and non-state actors. The typology is based on two dimensions: (i) the party whose objectives are prioritized and (ii) the party that proposes collaboration (Lee & Ayhan, 2015; 69). The typology includes four quadrants: (1) Main objectives of "State"—Proposal by "State," (2) Main objectives of "State"—Proposal by "Non-state actors," (3) Main objectives of "Non-state actors"—Proposal by "State," and (4) Main objectives of "Non-state actors"—Proposal by "Non-state actors." Lee and Ayhan (2015; 70) conclude that the most efficacious collaboration occurs in case (3) when state agencies actively seek partners and non-state actors may have the freedom of autonomy as well as the state agency's support.

Lee and Ayhan argue that more empirical studies need to be conducted regarding collaborative public diplomacy, especially given the rising importance of public opinion. They also highlight a need for more research

on specific NGOs. Based on these suggestions, this paper presents a case study of non-state actors, more specifically, the case of *KQ* and its potential collaborative value.

RESEARCH DESIGN: (INSTRUMENTAL) CASE STUDY

In order to illustrate the validity of the theories of non-state actors discussed above, this paper presents an instrumental case study. According to Stake (1995; 3), the instrumental case study is most effective when it is used to address the need for a general understanding of a research question. In this paper, the characteristics of a non-state actor are studied to support the arguments offered by Lee and Ayhan.

Selection of cases: Nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and inter-governmental organizations are all examples of non-state actors; individuals as well as formal and informal nongovernmental entities are also considered to be non-state actors (Lee &Ayhan, 2015; 58). Non-state actors have a wide range of main objectives, and they are also structurally diverse. The present paper focuses on the public diplomacy measures that address Korean-American adoptees.

While the traditional definition of public diplomacy considers it state-centered and a form of government-to-public interaction, "new" public diplomacy "seeks to build a public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard in spite of their various origins, distinct values, and often contradictory interest" (Castells, 2008; 91). Organizations that address or cater to Korean adoptees in the United States are examples of this type of public sphere, especially because they seek to address adoptees and adoptive families from various racial and social backgrounds.

Furthermore, Korean-American adoptees have multiple social identities. They are not just Korean or American. They are a newly identified social public. They belong to transnational and transracial families, and misconceptions about their own identities are unavoidable. In order to address Korean adoptees' identity problems, adoptive families have built organizations to unite and connect adoptees in the same geographic area (Nelson, 2009). And such efforts have produced a new Korea-related

culture.

The culture of the Korean diaspora is an area of focus for Korean studies (Yoon, 2005). In the era of globalization, where even the culture in the Korean peninsula has been westernized and transformed, the culture of the Korean diaspora contains more Korean-identified aspects than the culture in Korea. This is so because the Korean diaspora has constantly attempted to discover and maintain its own identity within a multicultural context. This is also true of Korean adoptees communities overseas. In Minnesota, which is home to the largest community of Korean adoptees in the US, various organizations seek to cater to Korean adoptees. Some of these organizations are Korea Culture Camp[2], AK Connection[3], and Jang-mi Korean Dance & Drum[4]. Most organizations seek to address the identified problems faced by Korean adoptees. In other words, the purpose of the organizations is to introduce the participants to other Korean adoptees and their families.

KQ is a non-profit publication; it serves to record the experiences and opinions of Korean-Americans, Korean communities, and Korean adoptees. Unlike other organizations, *KQ* brings the issues of Korean adoptees into the public sphere through publication. The organization also attempts to raise awareness of social issues by relaying the voice of social minorities in the United States beyond adopted children. *KQ* addresses the issues faced by the former *comfort women* in Korea. Most interestingly, the head of the organization is not of Korean ethnicity; contributors include non-Korean-Americans, Korean-Americans, and adopted Koreans.

In this globalized world, where Korean culture has spread to various parts of the globe, many non-native Korean actors occupy the public sphere in Korea. Therefore, *KQ's* case demonstrates the extended sphere of

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2 Korean Culture Camp is one of the oldest culture camps in the United States. It was founded in 1977 by parents of adopted Korean children as a way to sustain the children's connection with their birth country. Every June, participants are involved in a week-long camp, which focuses on Korean culture, traditional music, dance, foods, etc. (www.kccmn.org)

3 AK Connection has served as a resource for adult Korean adoptees in Minnesota since 2000. This organization hosts parties for Chuseok, meet-ups, and various cultural events. (www.akconnection.com)

4 The Jang-mi Korean Dance & Drum group was created in 1984 as a way for Korean Adoptees to learn about their heritage and have weekly community with families like their own. (www.koreanheritagehouse.com)

international non-state actors as well as the new sphere of Korean-American adoptees.

Data Gathering: In order to examine whether *KQ* qualifies as a non-state actor, data was gathered from (1) the organization's webpage, (2) published copies of *KQ*, and (3) its social network (Facebook) page. Furthermore, Martha Vickery, the editor of *KQ*, was interviewed in depth.

PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC VALUE OF KOREAN QUARTERLY AS A NON-STATE ACTOR

The history of Korean adoptees in Minnesota dates back to the Korean War. International adoption of Korean children began as a result of the war, especially since many children were left parentless. United States servicemen are known to be the first unofficial adopters of Korean children; they mainly adopted Korean children orphaned by the war (Yoo & Lim, 2016). However, why Minnesota became a sort of homeland for Korean adoptees can be explained by the state's historical, structural, and sociocultural aspects (Nelson, 2009). The state has housed a large number of immigrants from Europe, especially Scandinavians and Germans, who have remained highly open to adoption as they do not have social conventions against adoption or non-biological kinship (Nelson, 2009). In addition, several adoption organizations such as the Lutheran Social Services and the Children's Home Society initiated a Korean adoption program after the Korean War. Thus, Korean orphans came to be the first Korean adoptees in Minnesota.

As several Korean adoptees made Minnesota their home, they faced racism and experienced identity crises as Asians living in an environment dominated by Caucasians. Most Korean children in Minnesota were adopted by Caucasian families. Adoptive families, therefore, faced the common challenge of resolving the identity crisis of their children. Therefore, they founded organizations such as the Korean Culture Camp and other groups with a focus on Korean art and culture. Consequently, Minnesota came to the house the highest number Korean adoptee communities.

Meanwhile, there was an American couple that adopted two Korean

children in the 90s. Utilizing their expertise in journalism, the couple established *KQ* in 1997, with help from Korean adoptees. In the United States, where various ethnicities coexist, a mixed identity is quite common. The couple realized the need to define the Korean-American identity. As Korean adoptees entered adulthood and even became the leader of society, *KQ* established a space for Korean-American adoptees to share their unique perspectives as leaders of the Korean-American society. The newspaper publishes the opinions of Korean adoptees regarding social issues, especially the relationship between Korea and the US. Furthermore, the organization addresses non-Korean-Americans with Korean children. Korean-American adoptees and their families are encouraged to share their opinions through the newspaper.

The adoption community in the United States is an extended public sphere that consists of Korean adoptees as well as other Korean-Americans, including first and second generation Korean immigrants. In addition, the American families of Korean adoptees with their diverse ethnic backgrounds play a significant role in this community. In this environment, Korean-American adoptees are not considered bicultural (Korean and American). Instead, their identities are shaped by the hybrid culture they inhabit.

Typically, Korean adoptees and their respective communities are considered overseas Koreans. Public diplomacy measures seeking to address Korean adoptees have focused on finding the roots of Korean adoptees. Hence, the programs limit themselves by only inviting Korean adoptees to their motherland and by helping them to find their birth family. Such public diplomacy measures are old-fashioned and operate with short-term goals. Today, however, *new* and *communicative* public diplomacy has emerged as salient practices. The *old* form of public diplomacy involved unidirectional communication of the state with the public (the target). Therefore, characteristic measures of *old* public diplomacy have Korean adoptees as their target. However, in the case of *new* public diplomacy, new actors and various means of communication are recognized. In other words, diplomatic measures are expected to engage Korean adoptees in the communication process and also consider their opinions on extended social issues.

Therefore, it is valuable to recognize Korean adoptees as new actors especially as non-state actors of new public diplomacy. What follows is an

argument to highlight the public diplomatic value of *KQ* as a non-state actor.

Relational Value: As a non-profit organization, *KQ* is funded by donations; it is sustained by the efforts of volunteers and contributors.[5] The newspaper is divided into two sections. The first part contains columns addressing social and political issues. Contributions are voluntary, and contributors represent various ethnic backgrounds, with Korean adoptees, Korean-Americans, and non-Korean-Americans being the primary contributors. The second part pertains to the arts and entertainment. It focuses on introducing Korean culture and arts, such as Confucianism, Shamanism, and Korean films.

In *KQ*, the flow of information is not unilateral. It is open to ideas and contributions from people with diverse affiliations, and participants have equal status. Martha Vickery, the editor of *KQ*, mentioned that the contributors are very loyal as they author columns, even though the publication is managed by volunteers.

The columns are published quarterly, and they deal with a variety of issues. Most common topics include the relations between Korea and the US, matters related to North Korea, Korean domestic politics, and inter- national issues. Likewise, ideas and opinions are shared on *KQ*'s social networks. *KQ* has two social network channels[6] as well as an official web page.[7] In the digital era, the mass media, internet, and wireless comm- unication networks are included in the public sphere (McChesney, 2007). Thus, *KQ* maintains channels of communication through its online activities.

In addition, *KQ* publishes information about communal activities and cultural events. It publishes information on Korean cultural events in Minnesota. On occasions, it also participates in or organizes cultural events.

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5 The board of *KQ* consists of 3 Korean Adoptee and 3 Korean Immigrants. The newspaper is managed by 3 main staffs (2 adoptive parents of Korean children and 1 Korean Adoptee), 9 regular writers (2 Korean adoptees, 4 Korean-Americans and 3 non-Koreans), and one-time contributors from local and over the United States. ("Korean Quarterly Board Biographies, Staff, and contributor Information," offered by *KQ*)

6 Its official Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/KoreanQuarterly) promotes the publication every time it is published. The group page shares information and news about Korea. (https://www.facebook.com/groups/48418565496)

7 http://www.koreanquarterly.org

In the interest of *relationship management*, new public diplomacy emphasizes communication and the sharing of meaning. In other words, conversations between actors and targets influence political decisions. As a non-state actor, *KQ* has collected the voices of Korean-American adoptees for over 20 years. As Lee and Ayhan (2015) argued, the "long-term" relationship is the best property of non-state actors. That is, *KQ* offers 20 years' worth of the perspectives of Korean-American adoptees.

Networking Value: By virtue of its journalistic activities, *KQ* could connect with other Korean adoptee organizations in the US. As mentioned above, *KQ* primarily engages Korean adoptees, Korean-Americans, and Americans with adopted Korean children. However, its readership is not limited to the Midwest; readers in South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, Netherland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark also access *KQ*.[8]

According to Martha Vickery, the magazine also has readers in Scandinavian countries. Since 2001, *KQ* has maintained relations with several organizations related to Korean adoptees in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—countries with the second largest population of Korean adoptees.[9] *KQ* also has attended conferences organized by Korean adoptee communities, such as the International Korean Adoptee Associations. It has also participated in conferences organized for Korean adoptees by Scandinavian organizations. *KQ* has extended its network by connecting with the organizations in other countries.

KQ's global network indicates its network density and centrality. To direct public diplomacy measures toward Korean adoptees all over the world, it is important to maintain effective communication channels with stakeholders. However, the state has a limited network, and it is difficult for the state to approach all stakeholders. The state can, however, listen to and communicate with the stakeholders through *KQ*. Furthermore, *KQ* is capable of addressing not only the *structural hole* but also the *cultural hole* as it forms the Korean-American culture in the United States as well.

Collaborative Value: *KQ* acts not only for the rights of Korean adoptees but also for the rights of social minorities, such as North Korean

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8 Korean Quarterly Tenth Anniversary Montage (https://youtu.be/c0h16OsA6ZA)

9 Soyoun Park, "I am a Korean Adoptee", The mundus collection 2015, published on Aug. 27. 2015

refugees, former comfort women, and victims of racism. Vickery states that *KQ* does not merely disseminate news; it seeks to evolve by addressing public demand and public opinion.

As Lee and Ayhan (2015; 63) have argued, the objectives of public diplomacy should be extended beyond national interests, especially since public diplomacy is seen as a manifestation of the state's self-interest. *KQ*'s sphere of activity is of universal value and could be effectively used to overcome the state's limitation.

Collaboration implies mutual effort. However, theories of public diplomacy are usually presented from the state's perspective. Given the claims that the public diplomacy initiatives are "mainly financed by [the] state" (Lee & Ayhan, 2015; 66), collaboration is presented as the exclusive property of the state. Moreover, given the differences in scale between state and non-state actors (NGOs), the state only considers the disadvantages of collaboration. Similarly, non-state actors regard the state's contributions to collaborative efforts as mere grant support. As a result, collaboration has often been conflated with outsourcing.

KQ has also received grants from the Korean government. In need of funding to sustain its publishing activities, *KQ* approached the Korean Consulate in Chicago for support. The Consulate proposed an open-call application. According to Lee and Ayhan (2015; 69), this amounts "Passive Collaboration"—proposed by a non-state actor with the main objectives of the non-state actor. Passive collaboration is typically short-term as the state, for its part, does not determine any specific objective. Furthermore, Vickery suggests that she does not expect the proposal of specific grant programs given frequent changes within the administration.

Administrations consider long-term political goals or a long-term political vision untenable. Typically, goals are framed according to the foreseeable duration of an administration. For public diplomacy measures, however, a long-term vision is of utmost importance in order to foster a long-lasting relationship with the public. Therefore, the author would like to argue that effective collaboration could be actualized by encouraging the state to frame long-term visions, while non-state actors make themselves available for collaboration.

KQ is currently attempting to digitally archive its articles. The publication

has been voluntarily released to the public; it can be found in libraries, institutions, shops, and the streets. Without a digital archive, it is difficult for the public to access 20 years' worth of articles written by Korean adoptees. The archive project is potential of great interest to the state. The project expands the state's public diplomacy horizon as *KQ* features the stories, culture, and the history of Korean adoptees in the United States and beyond. Through *KQ*, the state can directly access opinions stemming from the public sphere of Korean adoptees.

The concept of soft power has received much attention in discussions surrounding new public diplomacy (Kim, 2017; 298). As McClellan (2004) has argued, the soft power of non-state actors influences public opinion in a target country, and it broadly affects the policy decisions. *KQ* also possesses these soft power capabilities given its long history, diverse activities, networks, and archive.

CONCLUSION

Lee and Ayhan (2015; 62) state that public diplomacy includes diaspora communities as a potential partner. They describe that if not actively engaged, "the diaspora stakeholders can actively oppose and lobby against their home country's governments' policies abroad" (Potter, 2008: 58). This paper, however, argues that Korean-American adoptees could act as non-state actors because they have access to a public sphere that is mainly theirs, and their actions are based on universal values. They represent their interests from the perspective of their identity as members of the Korean-American community.

Furthermore, from a cultural perspective, a non-state actor can be said to possess the cultural history. Over time, *KQ* has accumulated the opinions, stories, information about Korean-American culture, and the community of Korean-American adoptees. As Nye (2004; 1) states, "information is power" in the global information age. Furthermore, culture has power in public diplomacy being a product of exchanged meanings between members of a society or a group (Kim, 2017). *KQ* possesses this kind of soft power as it played a central in the formation of the identities of Korean-

American adoptees and Korean-American culture.

Drawing from Lee and Ayhan (2015), this paper examines the public diplomatic value of *KQ* as a non-state actor. However, as the authors have suggested, more research is required to fully grasp the significance of non-state actors. As collaborations between *KQ* and the Korean government have been limited, it is not possible to examine their collaboration in greater detail. However, the present author intends to conduct further research in the field of public diplomacy, particularly about the relations between states and non-state actors.

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"Partnering for Tomorrow": Conceptualizing South Korea's Public Diplomacy Approach toward ASEAN

Seksan Anantasirikiat

INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently celebrated its 50th founding anniversary in August 2017. South Korea, in its role as a key dialogue partner, organized the inauguration of the ASEAN Culture House in Haeundae, Busan, on September 1, 2017. In doing so, South Korea sought to not only introduce ASEAN to Koreans but also enhance people-to-people contacts (*Korea.Net*, 2017, September 6). This was part of South Korea's longstanding efforts to accommodate the ASEAN-South Korea Cultural Exchange Year in 2017. In addition, the International Conference on ASEAN-South Korea partnership, entitled "Partnering for Tomorrow," was arranged on August 30, 2017. At the conference, South Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Kyung-wha, delivered a speech requesting ASEAN to (1) reinforce President Moon Jae-in's peaceful initiative intended to address issues in the Korean Peninsula, (2) institutionalize the nontraditional ASEAN-South Korea security cooperation, and (3) strengthen the economic ties (*Yonhap News*, 2017, August 30).

Following Kang's remarks, The Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Alan Peter Cayetano, threw light on ASEAN's long-term commitment as South Korea's strategic partner. He stated, "ASEAN were allies of Korea yesterday, we are very good partners with you today, but we look forward to being your brothers and sisters tomorrow" (The Philippine Star, 2017, September 8). Note here that ASEAN and South Korea have both attained

increasing significance in terms of political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects. ASEAN and South Korea have been enthusiastic supporters of regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (Lee, 2015, pp. 207-209). Economically, trade volume and foreign direct investment have been leveraged to a remarkable extent (ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC), 2016, p. 47, 74, 75). ASEAN has been a predominant partner in South Korea's official development assistance (Kim et al., 2017, p. 30).

Socio-cultural affiliations between the two parties have been strengthened, and as a result, tourism, international marriages, and international exchange of students have become more common (AKC, 2016, p. 98, 122, 124). In addition, ASEAN is increasingly taken into account by policymakers in South Korea (Lee, 2015, p. 209). A special envoy to three ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam) led by Seoul City Mayor, Park Won Soon, in the first month of Moon Jae-in's tenure as President is a good example in this context (*Seoul Metropolitan Government*, 2017, May 22). In addition, Kim Young-sun, Secretary-General of AKC, has proposed the "Look South Policy," through which he emphasizes five principal points to improve the relations: (i) middle power diplomacy, (ii) peace and stability in Southeast and Northeast Asia, (iii) mutual benefit, (iv) shared values, and (v) similar cultures, development strategies, and experiences (Kim, 2017).

Given the closer ties between ASEAN and South Korea, it is worth investigating the knowledge gaps in their interconnections, particularly in the realm of public diplomacy. This paper argues that South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN countries and nationals extends beyond the exportation of Korean-ness via the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*)—Korean food, Korean costumes, Korean cosmetic products, the Korean way of life and thinking, and the Korean entertainment industry. South Korea has implemented various public diplomacy measures to "win the hearts and minds" of ASEAN people, who represent a wide range of political and social ideologies—from absolute monarchy to democracy—as well as different ethnic backgrounds and religions. First, this paper reviews South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN, both at the regional and national levels. Next, it conceptualizes these associations through theoretical perspectives of public diplomacy. Last, it highlights the implications of the

theories in relation to South Korea's public diplomacy to pave way for future research. It also offers some policy recommendations for South Korea's diplomacy and soft power.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study relies on two strains of literature that examine ASEAN–South Korea relations. As of 2017, three edited volumes have focused on the links between ASEAN and South Korea. The relations are explored from multiple perspectives, including political security, economics, and socio-cultural perspectives. The three edited volumes are *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Security, Trade, and Community Building*, edited by Ho Khai Leong (2007); *Korea's changing roles in Southeast Asia: expanding influence and relations*, edited by David I. Steinberg (2010); and *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Twenty-five Years of Partnership and Friendship*, edited by Lee Choong Lyol, Hong Seok-Joon, and Youn Dae-young (2015). The first two were published by the Institution of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) based in Singapore, while the last one was published by the Korea Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS), a famous academic circle of Korean scholars working on Southeast Asian and ASEAN studies.

The books focus on several mandatory topics in the field of ASEAN–South Korea ties, such as the ASEAN regional mechanisms and their global context, the economic relations and trade, investment, development assistance, and the migration of ASEAN people to South Korea. Another area of focus in the context of ASEAN–South Korea ties is the latter's efforts to popularize Hallyu throughout Asia, and not just in ASEAN. The books also focus on the following areas: consumer market in ASEAN countries, promotion of culture through products, and technological developments in South Korea (Fair Observer, 2017, May 24; Shim, 2011). I agree with the assessment that the K-pop industry has played a significant role in raising awareness about South Korea in ASEAN countries, especially given their cultural similarities. However, the focus on K-pop as a unique facet may undermine the significance of other actors and surroundings and may affect the relations between the parties.

Considering these limitations, it is important to reassess the ASEAN–South Korea relations, based on the framework of public diplomacy. Anantasirikiat's (2016) is one of the most recent and cohesive essays in this context. It investigates the Korea Foundation's (KF's) educational programs that focus on ASEAN countries. Based on an interview and personal observations, the author argues that the programs are perceived positively by the participants. Moreover, the concept of soft power is used to analyze the significance of the educational programs (Anantasirikiat, 2016, p. 218). The author argues that soft power is not a given and that it is not an inherent property. Rather, it is a product of social interaction and can be reproduced in different contexts. Although the essay forms the basis of this study, the author's analysis is limited to ASEAN students in South Korea. Therefore, this study builds on the essay by re-adjusting the unit of analysis to South Korea's public diplomacy organizations that seek to address ASEAN.

To do so, it is important to first define public diplomacy. This paper uses Bruce Gregory's definition of the concept. As per Gregory, "public diplomacy is 'an instrument used by states, associations of states and some sub-state agencies, and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (Gregory, 2011, p. 353). This definition covers both state and nonstate actors and the relation between their public diplomacy measures and foreign policy objectives. Not all transnational activities can be regarded as public diplomacy measures. To substantiate this claim, the author relies on Kadir Ayhan's accommodative view to justify the involvement of nonstate actors in public diplomacy measures: nonstate actors are *institutionalized* actors to some extent, with *intentional* public diplomacy objectives and in the pursuit of *political* goals; they emphasize the significance of communication with *foreign publics* and prioritize *collective* rather than private interests (Ayhan, in press) (Emphasis added).

The analysis of South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN is based on this framework. It is clear that the public diplomacy programs initiated or realized by the Korean Embassy or public diplomacy agencies such as KF and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) are considered public diplomacy programs. Yet the functioning of some state

organizations such as the National Institute for International Education (NIIED) and other like-minded consortiums should not be neglected. The promotion of Hallyu is considered a public diplomacy strategy as it is both a political goal and an intentional public diplomacy objective; this, however, may not always be the case as the promotion of Hallyu does not always represent a public diplomacy strategy. The author uses Anantasirikiat's (in press) four quadrants, which pertain to the educational ties between South Korea and ASEAN (the former's target audience), in order to identify and analyze the public diplomacy measures that are best suited to the context of this study. The first and third quadrants engage the Korean public and people from ASEAN countries living in South Korea. The second and fourth quadrants indicate the Korean population and the people of ASEAN living in ASEAN countries (Table 1).

The unit of analysis is based on these four quadrants. This study is also based on the following two research questions: (1) what kinds of public diplomacy measures have been enacted to address ASEAN since South Korea established relations with the member states of ASEAN as well as with ASEAN as a regional organization? (2) How can one examine these measures from the perspective of public diplomacy? To address these questions, the author uses the documentary research methodology to identify the aspects of South Korea's public diplomacy programs that focus on ASEAN. Some relevant observations presented in previous studies are also considered. More importantly, the statements and releases, as well as the documents compiled by the Korean Embassy, are used to highlight the involvement and efforts of nonstate actors in fulfilling Korea's foreign policy goals. I also draw from my experience as a former academic officer

Table 1. Four quadrants of the target audiences of ASEAN and South Korea's educational cooperation

	South Korea	**ASEAN**
South Korea	(1) Koreans in South Korea	(2) Koreans in ASEAN countries
ASEAN	(3) ASEAN people in South Korea	(4) ASEAN people in ASEAN countries

Source: Adapted from Anantasirikiat (in press)

at the ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok (Thailand) and my present role as a KF-ASEAN fellow. Additionally, I draw from my experience as a participant in these programs. This form of profitable reinforcement may enhance the analysis undertaken in this study (Ayhan, 2016a, p. 92).

SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD ASEAN

The first section of this paper focuses on South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN. In this context, "toward" indicates the treatment of ASEAN as *foreign publics*. Thus, in this paper, "ASEAN" represents policymakers, businessmen, the civil society, students, and common people acting as strategic and general audiences both in ASEAN and South Korea. First, it outlines the larger context of the dealings between ASEAN and South Korea by marking the initiation of diplomatic relations between the two parties; the statistics collected by the AKC pertaining to political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects are also used. It is examined whether some nonpublic diplomacy measures, particularly the advocacy of K-pop, can be used as a tool to build an environment conducive to promote a positive image of South Korea in ASEAN. The paper also examines the public diplomacy measures using two main areas from the four quadrants of the target audiences: (i) ASEAN nationals living in ASEAN and (ii) ASEAN nationals living in South Korea.

RELATIONS BETWEEN ASEAN AND SOUTH KOREA AT A GLANCE

The diplomatic approaches of South Korea and ASEAN countries vary. Thi Thuy Nga (2016, p. 225) specifies that South Korea's first ties were with the Philippines in 1949. Since then, it has had ties with the following countries: Thailand (1958), Malaysia (1960), Indonesia (1973), Myanmar and Singapore (1975), Brunei Darussalam (1984), Viet Nam (1992), Laos (1995), and Cambodia (1997). ASEAN–South Korea relations have been shaped by the interplay between the global and regional levels. The Philippines and Thailand were the first two countries to dispatch troops to support the operations of the United Nations Command (UNC) during the

Korean War. They also supported the independence movements of many ASEAN countries and worked with the UNC during the War in Viet Nam. Their troops worked with the UNC even during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Dialogues with Laos and Cambodia began in 1974 and 1970, respectively, but were suspended in 1975 when the Khmer Rouge assumed power. South Korea established relations with Laos and Cambodia in 1995 and 1997, respectively.

At the regional level, South Korea kicked-off its relations with ASEAN with sectoral dialogues in 1989; full dialogues were initiated in 1991. In November 2004, the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) were signed. ASEAN and South Korea have leveraged their collaboration since 2009, beginning with the creation of AKC. In 2010, the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and the action plans (2011–2015) were endorsed. These developments transformed their comprehensive cooperation into a strategic partnership. Besides these developments, the ROK Mission to ASEAN was formed in 2012. South Korea has actively participated in ASEAN-led multilateral cooperation initiatives, such as ARF, APT, EAS, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Plus (AKC, n.d.; Kim, 2015, pp. 123-125).

In terms of economics and commerce, ASEAN is a key economic partner of South Korea in trade and investment. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and South Korea facilitates deeper integration in relation to the trade of goods and services. The statistics from AKC (n.d.) reveals that ASEAN ranks as South Korea's second largest trading partner, behind only China. ASEAN's trade volume has increased fifteen-fold from 1989 to 2015. ASEAN is the second-largest destination of South Korean foreign direct investment; the total amount invested has increased by 46 times from 1989 to 2015. Besides, developing countries, especially the so-called CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam), Indonesia, and the Philippines are recognized as recipients of South Korea's development assistance given their status as mid-term strategic companions (2016–2020) (Kwon, 2015, pp. 316-317).

In the context of people-to-people interchanges, ASEAN is the first destination of Korean tourists (AKC, n.d.). As per Kim (2017), ASEAN and

South Korea have experienced an exponential increase in human mobility over the past 55 years (from 376 visitors in 1960 to 8 million in 2016). He argues that the increase in long-term ASEAN migrants vitalizes this great transformation. He also identifies four main categories of migrants from ASEAN to South Korea: foreign residents, migrant workers, international students, and married migrants and their families. In 2016, ASEAN ranked second in the number of foreign residents in Korea (438,895 or 21%), behind only China (1,016,607 or 50%). Most foreign residents from ASEAN are holders of nonprofessional visa (181,257 or 41%). A significant number of people from ASEAN countries visit Korea on a short-term basis (108,837 or 25%), which according to Kim (2017) is a direct consequence of Korea's immigration policies since the 1990s.

The number of ASEAN students studying in South Korea has increased "more than ten-fold over the past fifteen years" (Kim, 2017). Kim (2017) identifies five dominant characteristics of the ASEAN–South Korea relations in terms of higher education: (i) growing number of interactions between ASEAN and South Korea, (ii) imbalances in engagement and flow of student mobility, (iii) market-oriented approach, (iv) event-based programs as a presiding style of future exchanges, and (v) inadequate realization of the concept of "human resource development." Interestingly, Kim (2017) also provides data about the disciplines chosen by ASEAN students in South Korea. Mostly, they choose the Humanities and Social Sciences, followed by Engineering and Applied Sciences. This pattern holds true for all ASEAN countries. Table 2 represents the aggregate of ASEAN students in terms of their country of origin. As of 2016, Viet Nam has the highest number of students in South Korea, whereas Brunei has the lowest.

It is likely that the number of people from ASEAN living in South Korea has doubled; this includes married migrants also. Kim (2017) reveals that, as of 2016, married migrants from four ASEAN countries constitute over 40% of the total number of married migrants in South Korea (61,064). Of the four countries, Viet Nam constitutes 27.4% (41,803) of the total number of married migrants in South Korea, the Philippines constitutes 7.6% (11,606), Cambodia 2.9% (4,473), and Thailand 2.1% (3,182). On the other hand, China alone constitutes 37.4% (56,930) of the total number of married migrants in South Korea, and Japan constitutes 8.6% (13,110). Chart 1

Table 2. ASEAN students in South Korea as per their country of origin (as of 2016)

Countries	Degree and Diploma	Masters	Ph.D.	Language training and other programs	Total
1. Viet Nam	1,469	1,139	858	3,993	7,459
2. Indonesia	422	361	169	401	1,353
3. Malaysia	560	78	45	405	1,088
4. Philippines	110	269	122	181	682
5. Thailand	104	136	65	272	577
6. Myanmar	103	172	51	92	418
7. Singapore	60	21	5	331	417
8. Cambodia	95	168	35	94	392
9. Laos	21	50	11	26	108
10. Brunei Darussalam	5	1	1	78	85

Source: Adjusted from Kim (2017)

represents the aggregate (as of 2016) of the married migrants by gender and country of origin. Kim (2017) also throws light on the four attributes that should be discussed while referring to married migrants living in South Korea: (i) marriages between Korean males and foreign females, (ii) the high incidence rate of second marriages, (iii) the age gap between the Korean male and ASEAN female couple is higher than the age gap between Korean male and non-ASEAN female couples, and (iv) the number of families having ASEAN spouse is understated.

Based on these facts, it can be said ASEAN's importance to South Korea has steadily increased. It is also important to consider ASEAN's perceptions about its ties with South Korea. At the regional level, ASEAN has frequently expressed its concern about the political situation in the Korean Peninsula. Its member states have registered their concern at regional platforms, such as the ASEAN Summit, ARF, and EAS. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) issued a joint statement indicating their "grave concern over the escalation of tension in the Korean Peninsula." The AMM also called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Chart 1. Married migrants by gender and country of origin as of 2016



Source: Modified version of the representation found in Kim (2017)

(henceforth referred to as North Korea) to fully adhere to international laws and the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC's) resolutions (Avendaño, 2017, April 29). It is very clear from the statement that ASEAN advocates self-restraint as a means to achieve peace and security in the region (Avendaño, 2017, April 29).

Nevertheless, in discussions about ASEAN, the significance of *Hallyu* should not be overlooked. *Hallyu*-related activities in ASEAN are first believed to have taken place in Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, where two Korean movies were aired in 1997: "Feeling" (*Neukgim*) and "Golden Grass" (*Geumjanhwa*) (Youn, 2015, p. 837). Even those without an interest in or exposure to K-pop may have some idea of the phenomenon; It is assumed to be the "Korean-ness" of Korean food, products, lifestyle, cultural activities, entertainment, etc. The export of these traits serves as a means to increase awareness about South Korea in ASEAN countries. The dissemination of *Hallyu* in ASEAN can be regarded as the exercise of soft power intended to manipulate other countries' ways of thinking and preferences (Lee, 2009a, p. 125). For instance, overseas "fandoms" pertaining to South Korean cultural icons or K-pop stars indicate the impact

of soft power. Sometimes, people's predilection for these Korean cultural figures may be strong enough to persuade them to travel to Seoul or learn Korean (*VisitKorea*, 2012, April 20).

At the intra-regional level, Viet Nam and Indonesia have continued to recognize South Korea as a pivotal associate for future cooperation, according to a survey by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, in 2014 (Park, 2014, p. 22, quoted in Kim (2017)). This, however, does not mean that South Korea's associations with other ASEAN may be scaled down. At the same time, I also think that the intended targets represented in the second quadrant continue to be overlooked as there are different groups of Koreans living in ASEAN. They can be businessmen, government officers, civil society activists, or ethnic Koreans born in overseas. Table 3 shows the number of Koreans in ASEAN as of 2014–2015. Among ASEAN countries, Viet Nam housed the highest percentage of Koreans. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore also housed a significant percentage of Koreans. On the other hand, Brunei Darussalam was home to only about 300 Koreans.

In summary, the ASEAN–South Korea relations have been political, economically, and socio-culturally significant. As far as the author of this

Table 3. South Korean communities in ASEAN countries as of 2014–2015

Countries	Number of Koreans
1. Viet Nam	≈140,000
2. Philippines	≈89,000 (2014)
3. Indonesia	≈41,000
4. Singapore	≈20,000 (2014)
5. Thailand	≈19,700 (2014)
6. Malaysia	≈12,690
7. Cambodia	≈8,500
8. Myanmar	≈3,106
9. Laos	≈2,000
10. Brunei Darussalam	≈300

Source: Thi Thuy Nga (2016, p. 227)

paper is concerned, ASEAN–South Korea relations are based on mutual appreciation. Further cooperation between the two parties may enhance the strategic importance of the ties. Likewise, the conflicts between South Korea and China have pushed South Korea to find a new playmate for the diversification of its interdependence (Kim, 2017). It presents a good opportunity for South Korea to expand its public diplomacy measures in ASEAN with focus on the four quadrants of the target audiences.

FILLING THE BLANKS IN THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BOND BETWEEN ASEAN AND SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN countries

This section revises the public diplomacy activities represented in the second and fourth quadrants; the second quadrant represents Koreans living in ASEAN as the target audience, and the fourth quadrant represents ASEAN nationals living in ASEAN as the target audience. The first part pertains to the analysis of formal messages and outreach activities that South Korea wants to communicate with ASEAN and the world through its diplomatic mission, which appears on the website of the embassy in each country. Surprisingly, three ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam) do not use English on their websites, and instead use Korean and other national languages. Table 4 identifies five common discursive subjects from the ambassador's message on the website. The revision helps the author to see how the Korean embassies prioritize their tasks. However, the absence of the (✓) symbol does not indicate the embassies' failure in realizing the importance of a subject. For example, it may be possible that the embassy's website in Laos is under maintenance. Hence, the messages are typically very short and without much substance.

Based on the content of the messages, two main points discussed by the embassies have been identified. The first point pertains to statements that detail the interests of ASEAN as well as the country's interest and distinctive features. The second pertains to details concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations (except Laos' website, which is under renovation). South Korean embassies in Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge), the Philippines (ally in the Korean War), and Thailand (ally in the Korean War) elaborate on this point. Next, some definite statistics on political, economic, and socio-

Table 4. Five discursive subjects of the ambassador's greetings

Topics/Countries	ASEAN	BN	CM	ID	MY	MM	LA	PH	SG	TH	VN
Diplomatic inception	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Definite statistics of South Korea and ASEAN/the country in political, economic, and socio-cultural subjects			✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
South Korea's interest and distinctive points	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
ASEAN/the country's interest and distinctive points		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mutual cooperation at the global and regional levels	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	

BN = Brunei Darussalam, CM = Cambodia, ID = Indonesia, MY = Malaysia, MM = Myanmar, LA = Laos, PH = Philippines, SG = Singapore, TH = Thailand, VN = Viet Nam
Source: Compiled from ROK Mission to ASEAN and Embassies (n.d.)

cultural subjects were raised to emphasize the current terms and aspects of collaboration between the countries. Additionally, South Korea's interest and distinctive features are mentioned. For example, Cambodia's *Angkor Wat* is referred to as "a great cultural heritage for all mankind." Singapore is perceived as a country that "successfully implemented its proactive strategies to transform itself into Asia's hub."

Moreover, South Korea's efforts to ally with ASEAN countries at several regional platforms are addressed in many speeches. For example, South Korea has supported ASEAN-led initiatives such as EAS, ARF, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to promote peace and stability in the region. It also supports the MIKTA partnership, which is its own idea and involves Mexico, Indonesia,

South Korea, Turkey, and Australia. MIKTA aims to narrow the development gap in the global South. In addition, the issue of safety and the interest of Koreans living in ASEAN are presented as a flashpoint. The ambassador's remarks in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam address this point. Finally, there are some specific issues relevant to the promotion of South Korea's soft power through public diplomacy, including the soft loans program (Cambodia), the post-Haiyan Typhoon rehabilitation project (the Philippines), the creative economy project (Singapore), and the *Hallyu* projects.

A review of the online media portals (Facebook page or Twitter) of South Korean embassies in ASEAN countries allows one to categorize the contents into the following three themes: information about holidays, messages aimed at persuading visitors to apply to exchange programs run by the governments (such as the Korean Government Scholarship Programs (KGSP) or youth exchange programs managed by AKC) and the advocacy of *Hallyu*-related programs—essay and speech competitions, K-pop music and dance festivals, film festivals, product and service exhibitions, and scholarships for descendants of Korean War veterans. Note here that the embassy works closely with domestic stakeholders, including universities and the local governments, to improve bilateral cooperation (for instance, to generate support from the embassies for Universiti Brunei Darussalam's (UBD); to acquire the support of Korean Culture Club for the K-pop festival; or the congratulatory remarks of the ambassador in the Joint Conference on Korean and Thai Studies in ASEAN at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand).

Public diplomacy is also enacted through policy-based programs, particularly development cooperation and capacity building measures. Policy platforms such as Korea-Indonesia Forum and Korea-Singapore Forum may be involved in these activities. Actually, KOICA is the principal organization in this regard and facilitates South Korea's development cooperation initiatives. For example, KOICA has provided financial support to rural development projects in Cambodia (2010–2012) and Myanmar (2008–2010). These tailor-made projects aim to develop local infrastructures and capabilities. The projects' goals are typically in line with the ends prescribed by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

(KOICA, 2015, September 16). AKC also actively participates in such projects; the organization has implemented capacity-building measures, such as the ASEAN-Korea Tourism Capacity Building in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam as well as the workshop on Cross-Border E-Commerce in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

South Korea's public diplomacy to ASEAN nationals living in Korea

A number of South Korea's public diplomacy activities to ASEAN at home are educational and cultural programs. The author of this paper has chosen cases from AKC, KF, and NIIED as examples in this regard. AKC and KF identify themselves as public diplomacy actors. Their organizational objectives include reinforcing South Korea's foreign policy goals. The programs managed by NIIED, much like those managed by KGSP, can be regarded as public diplomacy measures since NIIED functions "to generate mutual understanding, to create a positive image of the host country, and to support to the host country's foreign policy" (de Lima, 2007, p. 248). Additionally, these programs are based on knowledge, networks, and communication, which are key elements of exercising public diplomacy. The participants are afforded the chance to communicate implications to policymakers and diplomats. The author of this paper has collected data related to the educational and cultural programs that constitute South Korea's public diplomacy to ASEAN at home. Table 4 presents the data.

Note that the target audiences of AKC and KF are not only ASEAN nationals living in South Korea but also the Koreans themselves. For many activities, participants are required to build a model of engagement by creating a platform for discussion and mutual learning. In addition, the recipients of the KGSP or KF scholarship can participate in these events. The number of international students, particularly ASEAN nationals, in these programs has been increasing. Chart 2 depicts recipients of KGSP scholarship based on their country of origin (as of 2014). This shows the increasing significance of ASEAN and its capacity to influence how the government is perceived. In addition to these state agencies, nonstate actors such as Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) Foundation and Daewoong Foundation, have been proactive in offering scholarships to ASEAN nationals.

Table 5. Educational and cultural programs in the context of ASEAN–South Korea relations

Programs/Events	Main organizers	Main activities	Target audiences
Educational programs			
ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest	AKC in collaboration with the KISEAS	Essay competition	Graduate and undergraduate students from ASEAN and South Korea
ASEAN-Korea Youth Network Workshop	AKC or AKC in collaboration with partners	Workshops, field trips, discussions, networking activities	ASEAN and Korean youth
ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies	KF	Full scholarship	Prospective lecturers from ASEAN universities
ASEAN Next-Generation Leaders	KF	Workshops, field trips, discussions, networking activities	Opinion leaders from ASEAN
ASEAN Quiz Contest	AKC	Quiz contest, networking reception	ASEAN and Korean students living in South Korea
ASEAN School Tour	AKC	Talk with ambassadors, quizzes, experiential booth, cultural performances, and fashion shows	High-school Korean students
ASEAN Youth Career Mentorship Program	AKC	Lectures, Q&A sessions	ASEAN and Korean students living in South Korea
Book Launch Events	AKC	Seminars, Q&A session	The Korean public
Lecture Series on ASEAN and Southeast Asian Studies	AKC in collaboration with KISEAS	Lectures, Q&A session	The Korean public
Art and cultural programs			
ASEAN Art Exhibition	AKC	Art exhibition by ASEAN artists	The Korean public
ASEAN Culture and Tourism Photo Contest & Exhibition	AKC	Photo contest and exhibition	General publics from both ASEAN and South Korea
ASEAN-Korea Youth Short Film Festival	AKC	Short film contest	ASEAN and Korean youth

Source: Collated by the author

Chart 2. Recipients of the KGSP scholarship by their country of origin, as of 2014



Source: Applied from Kim (2017)

Likewise, AKC has two potential partners. First, the ASEAN University Network (AUN), which is a network involving top universities in ASEAN countries. AUN has played critical roles in boosting the awareness of AKC among ASEAN students; it has more than 27,000 active members in its Facebook group. AUN also arranges the ASEAN Future Leaders' Programme in collaboration with Daejeon University. Recently, AUN and Incheon National University (INU) have discussed the prospects of developing a program under the theme "Port Cities" to identify like-minded universities (Dhirathiti, 2017, August 4). The Korean Studies Association of Southeast Asia (KoSASA), founded by the Korea Research Institute (KRI), at the University of New South Wales, is an additional strategic partner. It

Table 6. Partner institutions of KRI, University of New South Wales (in alphabetical order)

Countries	Institutions
Cambodia	- Cambodia Development Resource Institute - Royal University of Phnom Penh
Indonesia	- Universitas Indonesia
Laos	- National Economic Research Institute - National University of Laos
Malaysia	- Universiti Malaya - Universiti Tun Abdul Razak
Myanmar	- Myanmar Development Resource Institute - Urban Research and Development Institute - Yangon University of Economics
Philippines	- Asian Development Bank - The Philippine Institute of Development Studies - University of the Philippines
Thailand	- Burapha University - Chulalongkorn University
Viet Nam	- Central Institute of Economic Management - University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City

Source: Korea Research Institute (n.d.)

helps to advance the discipline of Korean Studies in ASEAN by offering academic platforms, such as conferences, seminars, training, and research initiatives. The institutions associated with KRI are shown in Table 6.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD ASEAN

This section analyzes South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN by relying on Kim Taehwan's conceptual model for South Korea's public diplomacy. In general, South Korea has taken initiatives that can be considered measures of "new public diplomacy," which involves nongovernmental actors as subjects of diplomacy and foreign publics and the global virtual space as new objects and soft power assets. The digital

media is also typically involved as a medium (Kim, 2012, p. 533). In my view, the most important element is the "two-way, horizontal, symmetrical, and open" mode of communication engendered by new public diplomacy. It differentiates public diplomacy different from "propaganda." To understand the conceptualization of South Korea's new public diplomacy, Kim (2012, pp. 530-531) begins his analysis by focusing on the process of setting a diplomatic goal. Governmental actors typically extract soft power assets from the existing resources after setting their goals. This also determines the medium through which the agents communicate with the target audience. This analysis is applied to explain South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN.

DIVERSIFYING SOFT POWER RESOURCES AND AGENCY

Kim (2012, p. 531) categorizes South Korea's soft power assets as information/knowledge, the Korean Wave, Korean language/Korean Studies, corporate competitiveness/corporate social responsibility, and tourism packages. The data from the first section shows that *Hallyu* is not the only soft power resource for public diplomacy programs toward ASEAN. Still, this paper does the opposite of Kim's suggestion by focusing on the target audiences prior to focusing on the sources of soft power. From the perspective of the four quadrants, it seems that the third quadrant (ASEAN people living in South Korea) and the fourth quadrant (ASEAN people living in ASEAN countries) represent a wide range of public diplomacy activities, whereas the first quadrant represents a few public diplomacy activities. The second quadrant does not overtly represent public diplomacy activities. The real intention of the author is to throw light on the activities that are not directly related to the promotion of *Hallyu*. This enables one to see that South Korea possesses a wide range of soft power resources.

It is likely that studies about South Korea's public diplomacy focus more on soft power assets and the state/government as the principal actor engaged in the public diplomacy programs. Note here that the role of nonstate actors is still underestimated. Cho (2016, p. 131) offers an interesting analysis of the *Karandashi,* a project that was recognized as the best project on the first "Public Diplomacy Day" (October 29) in 2015. This program was initiated

by 13 university students from Korea University to help children from the Korean–Russian Diasporas (*Koryo Saram*) to adapt to the Korean society. They did so by teaching them Korean. She also considers this program an example of a successful cultural diplomacy measure due to the collaboration it engendered between nonstate actors and the government (Cho, 2016, p. 141).

The findings of this paper also support Cho's argument. The author of this paper suggests that the ASEAN nationals living in South Korea can be considered a new soft power agency since the second quadrant represents many public diplomacy activities between ASEAN and South Korea. Foreigners living in South Korea may influence their families, friends, and peer groups. South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN in the next decade should place importance on the foreign publics living in South Korea as they may be potential soft power agents. As Nancy Snow suggested in her speech delivered at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, the South Korean government may need to rethink its strategy:

> "[T]oo often I see public diplomacy programs that are run from the perspectives of the organizers alone. They may run smoothly, but there isn't enough sensitivity to the needs and the wants of the program participants. Plan your programs according to the other's perspectives and you will be surprised at how much more positive reception you receive." (Snow, 2016, p. 10)

An interview with a participant at the KF-ASEAN Workshop on Unification in May 2016 is further evidence in this context.

To be sure, economic partnership, tourism, and ODA are the most tangible. I would also like to emphasize that Korea has a lot to share with ASEAN in terms of ideas and experiences, such as its development policies that produced the Miracle of Han River, the success of its cultural promotion around the world, and its new technologies and innovations. It should be kept in mind that sharing such ideas is different from imposing them on ASEAN, as the *context* of ASEAN is very different. The idea is to *collaborate* with ASEAN, to come up with more *creative and better-*

informed solutions (Anantasirikiat, 2016, p. 214) (Emphasis added).

Surprisingly, this attendee realizes not only the idea or value the organizer sought to promote but also the limitations of implementing these issues in the ASEAN context. This is an essential issue that was not mentioned in Kim Taehwan's article. Focusing only on the organizer's view is not enough to execute the public diplomacy programs successfully. Another point that should be raised here is the perception of Koreans. Several of Korea's public diplomacy activities toward ASEAN at home have engaged the Korean nationals, as shown in Table 5. The engagement between Koreans and people from ASEAN can enhance mutual understanding and facilitate positive response. It can be said that South Korea has not only enhanced its positive image but has also enhanced the image of its partners—in the context of this paper, ASEAN. The perceptions of a Korean participant are detailed below.

With this program, I realized how many ASEAN students are concerned about Korean unification and other domestic political issues. Even though they are not fluent speakers of Korean, they feel *sympathy and responsibility* since they live in Korea (Anantasirikiat, 2016, p. 214) (Emphasis added).

INSTITUTIONALIZING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES

South Korea's public diplomacy has evolved impressively since the 1990s. The establishment of KF and KOICA in 1991 can be considered the very first attempt to institutionalize South Korea's public diplomacy (Anantasirikiat, 2017). The visions of these organizations, at least, lay the groundwork for "making friends with the world" and "strengthening friendly ties with developing countries." In KF's case, it stresses on improving the awareness of South Korea through four types of activities, which include global networking, support for Korean studies overseas, support for media, and culture and arts exchange (Korea Foundation, n.d.). KOICA focuses on economic and social development assistance, such as developing innovative programs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, civil society partnerships, and volunteer dispatch to developing countries (KOICA, n.d.).

Twenty years later, South Korea has advanced the execution of public diplomacy by formulating the "Cultural Diplomacy Manual" (*Woegyo*

Menyueol) in 2010 and appointing the first ambassador for public diplomacy (Ma Young-sam) in 2011. These developments display South Korea's increasing interest in public diplomacy at the governmental level. In the academic circle, the Public Diplomacy Center was founded under the Institute for International Trade and Cooperation at Ewha Womans University in February 2014 (Ayhan, 2016b, p. 14). The institutionalization of South Korea's public diplomacy has been reinforced following the enactment of the "Public Diplomacy Law" (*Gonggongwoegyo Beob*) in 2016. This law provides the fundamental framework for three main features of South Korean public diplomacy: the general principles of South Korea's public diplomacy, the policy coordination among the related organizations, and the participation of private and nonstate actors (National Legal Information Center, 2016).

Following the provision of the law, the integrated commission on public diplomacy held its inaugural meeting on August 10, 2017. The committee endorsed the first "Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy" (*Je Il-cha Daehanminguk Gonggongwoegyo Gibongyehoek*) for the years 2017–2021. In addition, the committee consisting of the representatives from the concerned ministries, private companies, educational institutions, and local governmental agencies recognized KF as the overseer of public diplomacy. Several ongoing issues were also addressed, e.g., the optimization of the existing soft power resources, the promotion of policies on the unification and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the global network for disseminating Korean values, and the adaptability of Korean nationals in other cultural environments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, August 10). It is explicit from these actions that South Korea has implemented public diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Table 7 shows the vision, objectives, and promotion strategies of South Korea's public diplomacy according to the first basic plan on public diplomacy. It is fascinating that South Korea's public diplomacy toward ASEAN has covered most of the activities and main ideas of the plan, particularly the enhancement of the network of institutions in managing public diplomacy. This is very important to reduce cost, leverage the mutual benefits, and facilitate information-sharing. The emerging institution can be considered an example of division of labor or a form of public–private

Table 7. Vision, objectives, and promotion strategies of South Korea's public diplomacy

Vision	Engaging the world with attractive Korea, together with the Koreans (*Gukmingwa Hamkke, Segyewa Sotonghaneun Maeryuk Hanguk*)
Goals	- Enhance national image through rich cultural assets - Promote "correct" understanding of South Korea - Create a friendly strategic environment for policy implementation - Strengthen public diplomacy capacity and collaboration
Promotion strategies	Cultural public diplomacy - Spread the charm of an advanced cultural nation - Enhance the favorability through cultural assets - Foster communication via interactive cultural exchange
	Knowledge public diplomacy - Improve the understanding of Korean history and tradition - Expand the promotion of Korean Studies and Korean language
	Policy public diplomacy - Develop the understanding of South Korea's policy to the target countries - Increase the number of policy-related public diplomacy activities - Reinforce the policy public diplomacy activities targeting at the domestic foreigners
	Public diplomacy with the Koreans - Systematize the people-participated public diplomacy - Strengthen the public-private collaboration in public diplomacy
	Infra-public diplomacy - Establish the central-local-civic nexus of participation - Promote international networks in public diplomacy - Set the transparent performance evaluation of public diplomacy activities - Build an online system for information sharing and communication - Conduct a basic survey for public diplomacy formulation

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017, p. 11)

partnership. The government offers the financial support and credibility, while the nonstate actors return with trust and engagement of the participants. This institutionalization should be furthered. The author agrees with the Secretary-General of AKC that a "control tower" is necessary to direct the future relations between ASEAN and South Korea for more effective and efficient strategic partnerships (Park, 2017, June 25).

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA'S DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

ASEAN'S POSSIBLE ROLE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE

Since ASEAN has gained more interest from the policymakers, the author proposes that ASEAN can also play a role in the issues related to the Korean Peninsula because ASEAN itself, either at the regional level or as individual countries, has impacts on North Korea. The data from the "North Korea in the World–North Korea's External Relations" project, initiated by the East-West Center, Hawaii University, and the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK), displays eight countries in ASEAN (except Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines), allowing North Korea to set up an embassy with the subsistence of South Korean embassies as well. On the other hand, there are five ASEAN countries—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Viet Nam—establishing their own missions in Pyongyang (DPRK Global, 2017). Details of the recognition of diplomatic ties are noted in Table 8.

In addition, the government-run *Pyongyang Koryo* restaurants are permitted to operate in Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Siam Reap, and Vientiane (Jaipragas, 2017). Nonetheless, a North Korean restaurant in Jakarta is believed to have engaged in "clandestine intelligence activities" (*Asian Correspondent*, 2017, February 21) at the

Table 8. Diplomatic recognition between ASEAN countries and North Korea

Country	Year	Country	Year
Brunei Darussalam	1999	Myanmar	1975*
Cambodia	1964	Philippines	2000
Indonesia	1964	Singapore	1975
Laos	1975	Thailand	1975
Malaysia	1973	Viet Nam	1950

* Myanmar first established relations with North Korea in 1975. However, the diplomatic relations were suspended due to the Rangoon (Yangon) Bombing Incident in 1983. The resurrection of the bilateral ties took place in 2007.

Source: DPRK Global (2017) and Jaipragas (2017)

same time North Korea is believed to have illegally sold arms in some ASEAN countries (Griffiths, 2017, March 2). At the international level, some countries in mainland Southeast Asia have played an important role in handling the North Korean refugees. Thailand is the only country that has voluntarily expatriated refugees to South Korea, whereas Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam have forcefully repatriated them to North Korea (Maierbrugger, 2016). Therefore, ASEAN is a direct stakeholder on the Korean Peninsula issues. It is the correct time to enhance knowledge about public diplomacy and think about the role of ASEAN as a strategic partner.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

The studies about South Korea's diplomacy and soft power are based on two subjects: theme-based and actor-based. Most of the samples of scholarships set the theses as follows: cultural diplomacy/the Korean wave (Kang, 2015; Lee, 2009a; Oh, 2016), educational programs and scholarships (Aduol, 2016; Anantasirikiat, 2016; Bader, 2016), middle-power/searching for a global role in international development (Aboubacar, 2013; Chun, 2016; Kalinowski & Cho, 2012; Kim, 2015; Lee, 2016; Lee, 2012; Morin-Gélinas, 2016), nation-branding (Cull, 2013; Lee, 2015), soft power (DeDominicis, 2012, October 1; Lee, 2011; Lee, 2009b; Watson, 2012), sports (Larsen, 2016), and the strategic and organizational dimension of public diplomacy (Cho, 2012; Istad, 2016; Howe, 2017; Kim, 2012, November 7; Kim, 2012; Lee, 2010; Ma, Song, & Dewey, 2013).

Apart from the analysis of theme-based works, it is important to revise them from the viewpoint of the actors. The first group deals with public diplomacy execution by the South Korean government in other countries (Aboubacar, 2013; Aduol, 2016; Chun, 2016; DeDominicis, 2012, October 1; Jun, 2017; Kalinowski & Cho, 2012; Kim, 2015; Lee, 2016; Lee, 2012; Morin-Gélinas, 2016). The second type concerns the management of public diplomacy at home (Anantasirikiat, 2016; Bader, 2016; Cull, 2012; Ordaniel, 2016). These two categories have covered the practices of South Korea's public diplomacy in the real world. The third places importance on the nongovernmental sector, on private companies, civil society, youth organizations, and so on. Such studies always link the positive image or

perception of South Korea with the global spread of Korean products and values (Hong, 2014; Rahman, 2015, October 23).

New research beyond these topics should be conducted, especially project-based research and the research that will reinforce the future challenges of public diplomacy in the next decades. As Anantasirikiat (2017, 2016, p. 219) points out, it is the right time for South Korea to accommodate the "public diplomacy mix" as a new policy equipment. This public diplomacy mix is similar to the energy mix. It is about how one country can implement the existing resources to derive the most effective result. Nonetheless, this public diplomacy mix will consider the context of the target countries. ASEAN is the case that allocates similar mode of communication and types of programs, but there will be some different details in local contexts, such as religions, values, norms, folkways, and traditions. Although South Korea should be able to extract the "universal" values, the author argues that it may need to justify the local context if it wants to succeed in managing public diplomacy, especially the export of South Korea's experiences and narratives of successful economic development and democratization.

CONCLUSION

This paper is an attempt to reorient the excessive focus on *Hallyu* as the singular source of South Korea's soft power to the target audiences. It is correct to state that *Hallyu* has played a significant role in building a conducive environment for Korean economic and political activities. However, there may be some restrictions such as the sustainability of the "wave" and the negative responses from target audiences, as was the case with China's retaliation. The first part of this paper notes a significant increase in engagement between ASEAN and South Korea. Two main characteristics are also witnessed: the diversification of soft power agency and resources and the institutionalization of public diplomacy activities. The author strongly supports the idea raised by the Secretary-General of AKC that a control tower is needed to reinforce the strategic partnership for the next decades.

To facilitate the aforementioned principles, the public diplomacy mix will be an effective policy tool to set the short- and long-term agendas with appropriate methods. South Korea should collect the insights from the academic and policy networks it has built. Perhaps, South Korea should mobilize the scholars who received the scholarship and conduct a policy dissemination of target audiences' countries. The end result will be a "niche" project—a product of two-way symmetrical engagement, in order to "win hearts and minds of people." In addition, ASEAN itself can play a constructive role in issues related to the Korean Peninsula. It increases participation to promote peace and stability in its own ways. Therefore, South Korea should grasp this moment to frame the government and general publics in ASEAN to move forward together. ASEAN and South Korea were once good friends and strategic partners. Now, we are joining hands more tightly to go through the turbulent times with mutual understanding and respect.

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